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A b s tra c t.
The American C o n s t i tu t io n  is  ove r two hundred years o ld .  I t  was th e  
p ro du c t o f  th e  tim e s  and r e f le c ts  th e  two images o f  government, P re s id e n t ia l 
and C ongress iona l. The memories o f  both  th e  C o n tin e n ta l Congress and George 
I I I  p layed  an im p o rta n t p a r t .  However, th e  im p e ra tiv e  o f  s tro n g  le a d e rs h ip , 
more e s p e c ia lly  in  th e  tw e n t ie th  c e n tu ry  as th e  U n ited  S ta te s  w ithd rew  from  
is o la t io n is m  and co n fro n te d  two w o rld  wars and an in te rn a t io n a l dep ress ion , 
and a h o s t i le  env ironm ent, d ic ta te d  th a t  th e  P re s id e n t became th e  p re ­
em inent branch o f  government. For th e  most p a r t  p o l i t i c a l  th in k in g  and
p u b lic  o p in io n  e x to l le d  t h i s  s te a d fa s t and v ir tu o u s  le a d e rs h ip , w h ile
Congress la rg e ly  subm itte d  t o  P re s id e n t ia l d a n in a tio n . However, th e  Vietnam 
War, and la t e r  W atergate r a d ic a l ly  shook t h i s  consensus. The war was
perce ive d  to  be th e  P re s id e n t ’ s w ar; i t  was seen as th e  p ro d u c t o f  an 
" Im p e r ia l P re s id en cy". The P re s id e n t was blamed f o r  Am erica ’ s invo lvem ent 
in  Indoch ina , and t h is  to g e th e r w ith  W atergate , appeared to  sym bo lise  a 
P residency o u t o f  c o n t ro l.
Congress was shamed and f e l t  re s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  r is e  o f  th e  Im p e ria l 
P res idency. Thus, in  th e  wake o f  th e  V ietnam  War and W atergate, Congress 
sought t o  a s s e r t i t s  long eroded p re ro g a tiv e s . The 1970s w itnessed  a s e r ie s  
o f  le g is la t iv e  in i t i a t i v e s  in tended  to  cu rb  th e  Im p e ria l P res idency in
fo re ig n  p o l ic y .  However, Congress re a sse rte d  i t s e l f  w ith  such fe rv o u r  and 
d e te rm in a tio n  th a t  th e  whole fu tu re  o f  American fo re ig n  p o l ic y  was p u t to  
r is k ,  e s p e c ia lly  w ith  regard  to  coherence, c o n t in u ity  and f l e x i b i l i t y .  The 
1970s le g is la t io n  g re a t ly  l im ite d  th e  P re s id e n t’ s range o f  o p tio n s  in  
fo re ig n  p o l ic y .
Am erica, a superpower, cannot conduct a cohe ren t fo re ig n  p o l ic y  w ith  two 
heads a t  th e  s te rn .  The in te rn a t io n a l system n e c e s s ita te s  s tro n g  pu rpos ive  
le a d e rs h ip , le a d e rs h ip  which can o n ly  be fu rn is h e d  by th e  P re s id e n t.
11
Congress p la y s  a v i t a l  r o le  as regards d is c u s s io n  and consensus fo rm a tio n , 
b u t th e  tim e  has come f o r  Congress to  recogn ise  th a t  i t  cannot compete w ith  
th e  P re s id e n t in  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  fo rm u la t io n  and im p lem en ta tion . To t r y  
th re a te n s  th e  fu tu re  success o f  American fo re ig n  p o l ic y .
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B ib lio g ra p h y
lD!trpc|uctim
The C o n s t itu t io n a l s tru g g le  between th e  P re s id e n t and Congress is  in h e re n t 
in  th e  American system o f  government. As such one approaches th e  a n a ly s is  
and d is c u s s io n  o f  American p o l i t i c s  w ith  t h i s  aspect fo rem ost in  
c o n s id e ra tio n . One m igh t n a tu r a l ly  assume th a t  t h i s  "s e p a ra tio n  o f  powers" 
is  most expe d ie n t to  th e  e x e rc is e  o f  power, one branch checking  and 
re s t ra in in g  th e  p o te n t ia l aggrandizem ent o f  th e  o th e r.
However, d u r in g  th e  course o f  one ’ s research one was com pelled to  
recogn ise  th e  o fte n  d e tr im e n ta l aspect to  t h is  system o f  government, 
sepa ra te  in s t i t u t io n s  sh a r in g  power. S epa ra tion  promotes c o m p e tit io n  and th e  
d r iv e  f o r  power f o r  i t s  own sake ra th e r  than  i t s  own good. As such th e  main 
o b je c t iv e  o f  t h is  th e s is  was to  de te rm ine  which branch o f  government was 
most s u ite d  to  th e  e f fe c t iv e  e x e rc is e  o f  power in  fo re ig n  p o l ic y .
The Vietnam War and W atergate hera lded  a re v o lu t io n  in  American fo re ig n  
p o l ic y .  The 1970s w itnessed  a resurgence in  C ongressional a s s e rtiv e n e s s , 
th e  repurcuss ions  o f  which a re  s t i l l  re v e rb e ra tin g  over two decades la te r .
The Founding Fa the rs as is  shown in  Chapter 1 had s tru g g le d  to  fa s h io n  a 
system o f  checks and ba lances a t  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n a l C onvention, b u t e a r ly  
in to  th e  n a t io n ’ s h is to r y ,  th e  P re s id e n t proved to  be b e t te r  a b le  to  manage 
th e  needs o f  th e  modern w o rld  and more w i l l i n g  to  use th e  means a t  h is  
d is p o s a l.
The re v o lu t io n  in  th e  wake o f  th e  Vietnam War and W atergate r a d ic a l ly  
a lte re d  academic th in k in g  on th e  P res idency, most o f  which had e x to l le d  a 
s tro n g  P re s id e n t. New l i t e r a t u r e  appeared which accused th e  P residency o f  
abusing i t s  power, o f  becaning th e  " Im p e ria l P residency"
Congress, long subm iss ive  and co m p lia n t, was jo l t e d  in to  a c tio n ,  and 
th ro u g h o u t th e  1970s th e  le g is la tu r e  a ttem pted  to  p ro s c r ib e  th e  P re s id e n t’ s 
a u th o r i ty  and freedom o f  a c t io n  in  fo re ig n  p o l ic y .  A lthough  t h is  a c t io n  was
w e ll in tended , i t  i s  th e  c e n tra l argument o f  t h i s  th e s is  th a t  th e  outcome 
was d e tr im e n ta l to  th e  o v e ra ll success and in t e g r i t y  o f  American fo re ig n  
p o l ic y .  For example, th e  War Powers R e s o lu tio n , supposedly th e  h e ig h t o f  
C ongressional a sse rtiv e n e s s  and in tended  to  enhance Congress’ ro le  in  
fo re ig n  p o l ic y ,  has proved to  be i l l  -  founded, i l l  -  conce ived , open to  
in te r p r e ta t io n  and a c tu a l ly  a fu r th e r  augm entation o f  th e  power o f  th e  
P res idency as is  shown in  C hapter 4 . I t  has n o t stopped success ive
P re s id e n ts  from  go ing  to  war o r  increased  C ongressional p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  th e  
d e c is io n .
T h is  th e s is  a tte m p ts  to  dem onstate, e s p e c ia lly  in  C hapters 4 , 5, and 6 
th a t  Congress is  n o t w e ll designed to  c a te r  f o r  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  needs, in  
c o n tra s t  to  th e  P res idency, which is  u n ite d  in  th e  person o f  th e  P re s id e n t.
The b ig g e s t th r e a t  is  th a t  th e  c o n tin u in g  cong ress iona l in te r fe re n c e  in  
American fo re ig n  p o l ic y  w i l l  sap U n ited  S ta te s  a u th o r ity  in  th e  w o rld . 
Congress has sought g re a te r  c o n tro l o f  American fo re ig n  p o l ic y ,  b u t what is  
gained i f  t h a t  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  is  rendered le ss  e f fe c t iv e ?  Domestic
a c c o u n ta b i l i ty  may inc rease  b u t a t  th e  c o s t o f  coherence and d ir e c t io n  in  
th e  in te rn a t io n a l a rena. I t  is  t im e  f o r  Congress to  recogn ise  th e  immense
c a b a b i l i t y  and v i r t u e  o f  th e  P res idency in  th e  modern age; Congress can n o t
compete, and r e a l ly  shou ld  n o t even t r y .
1- t he U n ited  S te te s
"Your C o n s t i tu t io n ,  S ir ,  is  a l l  s a i l  and no a n c h o r." i
"The d o c tr in e  o f  th e  s e p a ra tio n  o f  powers was adopted by th e  Convention o f  
1 7 8 7 .. .n o t to  promote e f f ic ie n c y  b u t t o  p re c lud e  th e  e x e rc is e  o f  a r b i t r a r y
pow er."2
" I t  is  an axiom o f  American h is to r y  th a t  th e  C o n s t itu t io n  came from  th e  
Framers as ’ a bundle o f  com prom ises’ "
The American C o n s t itu t io n  o f  1787 was an experim ent n e ce ss ita te d  by the  
f a i lu r e  o f  th e  C o n fede ra tion . As th e  U n ited  S ta te s  emerged v ic to r io u s ly  from  
th e  war w ith  B r i ta in  th e re  had been co n s id e ra b le  doubt as to  what fo rm  the
new government would ta k e , a lthough  l i t t l e  doubt as to  th e  f a c t  th a t  th e
American people d id  n o t w ish  to  have a monarch. The p a in fu l lessons o f  
c o lo n ia l government and o f  r e la t io n s  w ith  th e  King remained v iv id .  D uring
th e  fo u r  years between th e  /Vnerican peace t r e a ty  w ith  B r i ta in  in  1783 and
th e  opening o f  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n a l Convention in  1787, th e  fo re ig n  a f f a i r s  o f  
th e  U n ited  S ta te s  d id  n o t p re sen t any immediate danger, b u t th e  c o u n try  was 
weak.^
In  1776 e ig h t  s ta te s  adopted w r i t te n  C o n s titu t io n s ;  a l l ,  b u t New York 
adopted a system w ith  a supreme le g is la tu r e  and a weak, n e a r ly  t o t a l l y  
subo rd ina ted  e x e c u tiv e . The dom inant fe e l in g  d u r in g  much o f  th e  p re ­
re v o lu t io n a ry  p e rio d  was one o f  h o s t i l i t y  to  th e  e xe cu tive  , an e xe cu tive  
represented by th e  K ing .s  The C o n tin e n ta l Congress in  1787 adamantly 
re je c te d  a proposal th a t  would have mandated to  Congress th e  appointm ent o f  
an e x e cu tive  c o u n c il f o r  managing th e  a f f a i r s  o f  th e  U n ited  S tates.®  A l l  
t h a t  was p rov ided  f o r  was a com m ittee o f  s ta te s  to  s i t  w h ile  Congress was 
n o t in  sess ion , com m ittees which had no m i l i t a r y ,  d ip lo m a tic  o r  f is c a l
pow ers.7 These Congressional com m ittees, unable to  adequa te ly  a d m in is te r th e  
a f f a i r s  o f  th e  th i r te e n  independent s ta te s  and w ith  no power to  ra is e  money, 
had to  r e ly  on th e  s ta te s ’ v o lu n ta ry  co o p e ra tion  . Indeed, George Washington 
was o fte n  g re a t ly  f r u s t ra te d  over th e  in a b i l i t y  o f  Congress to  impel th e  
s ta te s  to  a c t in  c o n c e rt. A t t im e s ,d u r in g  h is  e ig h t  years as General o f  th e  
C o n tin e n ta l Army, he fea re d  th e  R e vo lu tio n  would be lo s t  due to  la c k  o f  
u n i ty  among th e  s ta te s  ra th e r  than  to  any problems posed by B r i t a in .  In  a 
l e t t e r  to  Washington in  1779 John Jay noted th e  o u ts ta n d in g  fa u l t s  o f  th e  
com m ittee process as "want o f  system , a t te n t io n  and knowledge".® A u th o r ity  
was vested  in  a one house le g is la tu r e ,  th e  C o n tin e n ta l Congress, and each 
s ta te  possessed a s in g le  v o te  re g a rd le ss  o f  i t s  p o p u la tio n  and p o l i t i c a l  
im portance.
D esp ite  th e  inadequacies and f a i l in g s  o f  th e  C o n tin e n ta l Congress, th e  
A r t ic le s  o f  C on federa tion  which to o k  e f f e c t  in  1781 " in  tu rn  c rea ted  weak 
n a tio n a l government, w ith  a weak congress , la c k in g  power even to  le v y  taxes 
and checked d i r e c t ly  by th e  s ta te  le g is la tu re s ,  and a ’ to k e n ’ e x e c u tiv e  
occupying th e  m eaningless o f f ic e  o f  P res iden t".®  The p o s i t iv e  approval o f  
n ine  s ta te s  was necessary in  most m a tte rs  having to  do w ith  war, t r e a t ie s  
and m a jo r a p p ro p r ia t io n s , which was v i r t u a l l y  im poss ib le  t o  ach ieve  when 
a f t e r  th e  war th e  s ta te s  aga in  went t h e i r  separa te  ways. The S ec re ta ry  o f  
" fo re ig n "  a f f a i r s  was re s p o n s ib le  t o  a com m ittee o f  Congress which ke p t him 
in  t i g h t  re in .  Jay, who h e ld  o f f ic e  as S ecre ta ry  o f  Fore ign  A f fa i r s  
i n i t i a l l y  in  1784, c e r ta in ly  knew more o f  European a f f a i r s  than  any member 
o f  Congress, having  been posted as Fore ign  M in is te r  to  Spain . Congress 
i t s e l f  was im po ten t b e fo re  th e  th i r te e n  s ta te  governments, "so i t  cou ld  
n e ith e r  r e t a l ia t e  e f f e c t iv e ly  a g a in s t fo re ig n  h u m ilia t io n s  no r n e g o tia te  to  
lessen o r  remove them"."*® For example, when Congress asked th e  s ta te s  to  
pass tonnage o r  t a r i f  r e s t r ic t io n s  a g a in s t B r i t is h  tra d e , most s ta te s
com plied one way o r  a no the r, excep t C o n ne c ticu t whose f r e e  tra d e  p o l ic y  
c a n ce lle d  th e  laws o f  he r ne ighbours.
A c r i t i c a l  s i tu a t io n  e x is te d  in  which no money was go ing in to  th e  Federal 
T reasury . There was n o t even re sp ec t f o r  fe d e ra l a u th o r ity .  So long as pay 
c la im s  remained u n s e tt le d  , th e  army remained a pow erfu l fo rc e .  W ith o u t a 
r e l ia b le  a u th o r ity  Congress cou ld  n o t in te rv e n e  d e c is iv e ly  in  th e  s tru g g le s  
between d eb to rs  and c re d ito r s  and t h i s  la c k  o f  power le d  to  such o u tb u rs ts  
as S hay's R ebell io n .
S ta r t in g  in  1871 Congress too k  th e  f i r s t  s te p  in  th e  d ir e c t io n  o f  a 
se p a ra tio n  o f  powers when i t  appo in ted  s in g le  o f f ic e r s  to  head c e r ta in  
departm ents and programmes. However, these  o f f ic e r s  soon became d isenchanted 
because the y  f e l t  l im ite d  to  what Congress had dec la red  in  a p u b lic  a c t.  Y e t 
th e  scope and powers o f  these  o f f ic e r s  d id  expand as th e  scope f o r  
a d m in is tra t iv e  e f f ic ie n c y  w idened. As C ron in  has shown, "s lo w ly  an e v o lv in g  
se p a ra tio n  o f  powers and th e  idea  o f  an n a tio n a l e x e c u tiv e  were becoming 
a p p a re n t" . 2
Under th e  A r t ic le s  o f  C on fede ra tion  , Congress had found i t  im poss ib le  to  
speak f o r  a u n ite d  Am erica. The Founding Fa the rs who came to  P h ila d e lp h ia  
b e lie v e d  th a t  o n ly  a s tro n g  n a tio n a l government cou ld  cope s u c c e s s fu lly  w ith  
th e  p o l i t i c a l  and economic problems a t  heme and g iv e  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  such 
s ta tu s  in  th e  w o rld  as would carmand re sp e c t abroad. The Founders sought a 
"more p e r fe c t  U n io n " .L a te r , in  F e d e ra lis t  10,"*® Madison s ta te d , "Among 
th e  numerous advantages promised by a w e ll -  co n s tru c te d  un ion  none deserves 
to  be more a c c u ra te ly  developed than  i t s  tendency to  break and c o n tro l 
v io le n c e  o r  fa c t io n " .  An e x e c u tiv e , th e  Founders a ls o  p e rce ive d , was v i t a l  
to  n e g o tia te  t r e a t ie s  and conduct and implement fo re ig n  p o l ic y ,  e s p e c ia lly  
tra d e  r e la t io n s .  Not o n ly  was an e xe c u tiv e  im p o rta n t f o r  e f fe c t iv e  
a d m in is tra t io n  b u t Congress had proved i t s e l f  t o  be inccm petent in  such 
m a tte rs . Between 1776 and 1787 th e re  was enough expe rience  w ith  s ta te  
le g is la tu re s  to  d e s tro y  na ive  assum ptions about t h e i r  in h e re n t b e n e f i t .
James Madison, who had gained h is  p o l i t i c a l  experience  f i r s t  as a member o f  
th e  V ir g in ia  L e g is la tu re  and la t e r  as a le a d in g  f ig u r e  in  th e  Congress o f  
C on fede ra tion  argued, "E xperience  has proved a tendency in  o u r government to  
th row  a l l  power in to  th e  le g is la t iv e  v o r te x . The E xecu tives  o f  th e  s ta te s  
a re , in  g en e ra l, l i t t l e  more than  cyphers, th e  le g is la tu re s  om n ipo ten t. I f  
no e f f e c t iv e  check can be devised  f o r  re s t ra in in g  th e  i n s t a b i l i t y  and 
encroachment o f  th e  l a t t e r  , a re v o lu t io n  o f  some k in d  o r  ano the r would be 
in e v i t a b le " .14
Thus, i n i t i a l l y  th e  P h ila d e lp h ia  C onvention was c a lle d  n o t t o  w r i te  a new 
govern ing  document b u t to  remedy th e  pe rce ived  d e fe c ts  o f  th e  A r t ic le s  o f  
C o n fe d e ra tio n . Power in  th e  s ta te s  and then  in  th e  C on fede ra tion  Congress 
had passed by th e  1780s in to  th e  hands o f  a g ra r ia n  ra d ic a ls .  The movement 
f o r  th e  new c o n s t i tu t io n  was in  p a r t  a re a c tio n  by v a r io u s  e l i t e s  to  th a t  
development, and n o t o n ly  to  th e  weakness o f  th e  C on federa tion  
Government.The de lega tes  to  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n a l Convention represen ted  th e  
sove re ign  s ta te s ,  th e  p rim a ry  c e n tre s  o f  power under th e  A r t ic le s  o f  
C o n fe d e ra tio n . S ta te  s o v e re ig n ty  p resen ted  de lega tes  w ith  t h e i r  most s e r io u s  
problem . As a r e s u l t ,  th e  C onvention undertook to  c re a te  a n a tio n a l 
government th a t  would be a new c e n tre  o f  power, s u p e r io r  to  th e  s ta te s ,  y e t 
n o t d e p r iv in g  them o f  t h e i r  lo c a l powers and r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s .  The Framers 
o f  th e  C o n s t itu t io n  b u i l t  a s t ru c tu re  th a t  they  th o u g h t o f  as a fe d e ra l 
re p u b lic .  They re a liz e d  th a t  the y  were p io n e e rin g  in  p o l i t i c a l  in s t i t u t io n s .  
A fe d e ra l re p u b lic  in v o lv in g  a c a re fu l ba lanc ing  o f  powers as between th e  
new n a tio n  and th e  o ld e r  s ta te s  was a n o ve lty .T h e  Founding F a the rs  b o ld ly  
ven tu red  in to  an unmapped p o l i t i c a l  arena.
In  fo re ig n  a f f a i r s  as in  dom estic , th e  s o lu t io n  to  problems under th e  
A r t ic le s  o f  C on federa tion  appeared to  l i e  in  two changes:(1 ) more power to  a 
fe d e ra l government and, (2 ) th e  c re a tio n  o f  a fe d e ra l e x e c u tiv e  which cou ld  
focu s  p o l ic ie s  and a c tio n s  , and in  th e  case o f  fo re ig n  a f f a i r s  p re se n t a 
s in g le  fa ce  to  th e  o u ts id e  w o rld . As C ron in  no tes , "bo th  h is to r y  and
expe rience  p o in te d  to  th e  need f o r  a s in g le  e xe c u tiv e  who would complement 
le g is la t iv e  p o lic y -m a k in g ".i®
The f i f t y - f i v e  Founding Fa the rs were among A m erica ’ s b e s t educated and 
most experienced men. T h e ir  average age was fo r ty - tw o  and th e y  were la rg e ly  
com prised o f  law yers and businessmen. T w o -th ird s  had served in  Congress, 
tw enty-one  had fo u g h t in  th e  re v o lu t io n a ry  war and seven were s ta te  
governors. " I t  was a conven tion  o f  th e  w e ll-b re d , w e ll- fe d ,  w e ll- re a d  and 
w e ll-w e d " .17 The Founders them selves, shaped by t h e i r  B r i t is h ,  c o lo n ia l and 
c o n fe d e ra tio n  experiences were u n c e rta in  who shou ld  make American fo re ig n  
p o l ic y .  T h e ir  " in v i t a t io n  t o  s tru g g le " i®  re f le c te d  t h e i r  own am bivalence 
about th e  a p p ro p r ia te  balance between s w i f t  a c tio n  and c le a r  command on th e  
one hand and popu la r su p p o rt and checked and balanced power on th e  o th e r.i®  
The d e lib e ra te  and ambiguous m ix ing  o f  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  powers in  th e  
C o n s t itu t io n  came f i r s t  from  th e  p e rce p tio n  o f  th e  B r i t is h  experience  and 
th e  th e o re t ic a l fo u n d a tio n  th e re o f.  C e r ta in ly  th e  Founders d id  rebe l a g a in s t 
th e  B r i t is h  experience  b u t th e y  a ls o  borrowed from  i t s  ideas and c u ltu r e .  
They were a f t e r  a l l  B r i t is h  in  background and accustomed by p ra c t ic e  to  
B r i t is h  govern ing  in s t i t u t io n s .
The B r i t is h  expe rience  in  th e  th re e  c e n tu r ie s  b e fo re  American independence 
in v o lv e d  v io le n t  f lu c tu a t io n s  in  th e  d is t r ib u t io n  o f  power among th e  
branches o f  government. S trong  e x e c u tiv e  le a d e rsh ip  under th e  Tudors and 
S tu a rts  in  th e  la te  f i f t e e n th  and s ix te e n th  c e n tu r ie s  was fo llo w e d  by c i v i l  
war and th e  beheading o f  C harles I  by a supreme p a r lia m e n t, which in  tu rn  
was fo llo w e d  by a m i l i t a r y  ju n ta .  When George o f  Hanover became K ing in  
1714, a p e r io d  o f  r e la t iv e  s t a b i l i t y  ensued which ended w ith  th e  ascendence 
to  th e  th ron e  o f  George I I I .  Thereupon, th e re  fo llo w e d  a c t iv e  s tru g g le s  f o r  
u lt im a te  c o n tro l between th e  K in g ’ s  m in is te rs  and p a r lia m e n t. T h e re fo re , th e  
B r i t is h  experience  was pe rce ived  to  be one o f  f lu c tu a t in g  p e rio d s  o f  
e x e c u tiv e  and le g is la t iv e  dominance, w ith  some in te r lu d e s  o f  co o p e ra tio n . 
Thus, " B r i t i s h  c o n s t itu t io n a lis m  f i r s t  d e fin e d  th e  se p a ra tio n  o f  powers th a t
8became th e  b a s is  o f  th e  American C o n s t i t u t i o n " . 2 0  por t h e i r  own needs, 
however, th e  Founders cons ide red  i t  v i t a l  to  mix these  powers to  c re a te  a 
b e t te r  balance.
On th e  p h ilo s o p h ic a l s id e , th e  E n g lish  p h ilo so p h e r John Locke had argued 
f o r  supreme power to  re s id e  in  le g is la t iv e  hands, b u t he a ls o  supported th e  
n o tio n  o f  some e xe c u tiv e  p re ro g a tiv e s . O rn s te in  argues, "What Locke g ive s  us 
in  th e  f in a l  a n a ly s is  is  n o t le g is la t iv e  supremacy r e a l ly  b u t a . . . ’ balanced 
c o n s t i t u t io n ’ " . 2 1  A lso  o f  g re a t i n f 1uence was M ontesquieu , 2 2  whose w r i t in g s  
had appeared to  show th e  a bso lu te  n e c e s s ity  o f  s e p a ra tin g  le g is la t iv e ,  
e x e c u tiv e  and ju d ic ia l  powers. B road ly  speaking , th e  Founders expected th a t  
fo re ig n  a f f a i r s ,  l i k e  dom estic , would have separa te  p o lic y -m a k in g  and p o l ic y  
a d m in is tra t io n  components; th e  fo rm e r t o  be th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  o f  Congress, 
th e  l a t t e r  th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  o f  th e  e x e c u tiv e .
The Founding Fa thers them selves had seve ra l a lte r n a t iv e s  in  m ind. The 
f i r s t  o p tio n  was a c o u n c il o f  s ta te s  as a p lu ra l e x e c u tiv e  to  a d m in is te r 
departm ents. Such an e x e c u tiv e  would be p a r t  o f  a system o f  le g is la t iv e  
supremacy in  n a tio n a l government. The second o p tio n  was f o r  an e xe c u tiv e  
branch th a t  would share power w ith  th e  le g is la tu r e  s u b je c t to  a system o f  
checks and balances. The t h i r d  in v o lv e d  a s tro n g  e x e c u tiv e  in ve s te d  w ith  
e xe c u tiv e  powers. The Founders fea re d  concen tra ted  e x e c u tiv e  power, b u t th e y  
yearned a ls o  f o r  a more e f fe c t iv e  govern ing  c a p a b i l i t y  th a t  would in c lu d e  
th e  a b i l i t y  to  n e g o tia te  t r e a t ie s ,  conduct d ip lom acy and a d m in is te r th e  
grow ing fu n c t io n s  o f  n a tio n a l government. Thus, th e  fo u n d e rs ’ ta s k  was to  
c re a te  an e xe cu tive  in s t i t u t io n  th a t  cou ld  be re c o n c ile d  w ith  re p re s e n ta tiv e  
government and th e  ideas o f  re p u b lic a n is m . 23  The o v e r r id in g  p r i o r i t y  was to  
c o n s tru c t a n a tio n a l p o l i t i c a l  system th a t  was e f fe c t iv e  and s a fe . The 
Founding Fa thers b e lie ve d  th a t  more government was necessary i f  America was 
to  s u rv iv e  and p rospe r.
T h e re fo re , th e  Framers acted  a g a in s t th e  backdrop o f  two e x p l i c i t  fe a rs .  
F i r s t l y ,  th e  la s t  th in g  th e y  wanted was a " re in c a rn a tio n "  o f  a George I I I  on
American s o i l ,  b u t second ly , the y  a ls o  fea red  p op u la r u p r is in g s  and 
unchecked democracy th a t  had come to  a c lim a x  w ith  Shay’ s R e b e llio n . The 
expe rience  o f  th e  Founders le d  them to  seek more c e n t r a l iz a t io n  o f  a u th o r ity  
than  th e y  had known under th e  A r t ic le s  o f  C on fe d e ra tio n . The V ir g in ia  
P l a n , 2 4  which th e  Convention to o k  as i t s  s ta r t in g  p o in t  was ve ry  much th e  
c h i ld  o f  Madison. What Madison proposed was th e  d e m o lit io n  o f  th e  A r t ic le s  
o f  C on federa tion  and th e  e re c tio n  in  i t s  p lace  o f  a s tro n g  n a tio n a l 
government on a p op u la r fo u n d a tio n .
D e c is io n s  th a t  Es t a b l i s h e d th e  C m s t itu t lo n a lD im e n s io n s  o f  th e  Pre s id e ncy .
A lthough  th e  C onven tion ’ s g re a t c r i s i s  developed o ve r th e  re p re s e n ta tio n  
in  th e  le g is la tu r e , 2 5  th e  de lega tes  spen t a g re a te r  amount o f  tim e  
th ra s h in g  o u t c e r ta in  v e x a tio u s  problems r e la t in g  to  th e  e x e c u tiv e .
The Convention re je c te d  th e  idea  o f  a c o l le g ia l  e x e c u tiv e  o r  a c o u n c il.  In  
th e  debate, Sherman o f  C o n n e c ticu t, who favoured  th e  e le c t io n  o f  members o f  
Congress by th e  s ta te  le g is la tu re s ,  argued th a t  th e  number o f  th e  e x e cu tive  
shou ld  "n o t be f ix e d  b u t . . . t h e  le g is la tu r e  shou ld  be a t  l ib e r t y  to  a p p o in t 
one o r  more as experience  m ig h t d ic t a t e " . 2 ® Randolph, Governor o f  th e  S ta te  
o f  V ir g in ia  , then proposed an e xe c u tiv e  c o u n c il o f  th re e  men, m a in ta in in g  
th a t  " u n ity  in  th e  E xecu tive  m a g is try " e n ta ile d  th e  " fo e tu s  o f  m onarchy".2 ? 
However, G erry o f  M assachusetts argued th a t  a p lu ra l e x e c u tiv e  w ould, in  
m i l i t a r y  m a tte rs  r e a l ly  be a "genera l w ith  th re e  heads".2 ® Gouverneur M o rr is  
o f  P ennsy lvan ia , v ie w in g  th e  e x e c u tiv e  as p ro te c to r  and th e  le g is la tu r e  as 
th e  th r e a t ,  argued, th e  "E xe cu tive  M a g is tra te  shou ld  be th e  guard ian  o f  th e  
peop le , even i f  th e  low er c la sse s  a g s t . ( s ic ) .  L e g is la t iv e  ty ra n n y , a g a in s t 
th e  G reat and th e  W ealthy who in  th e  course o f  th in g s  w i l l  n e c e s s a r ily  
compose th e  L e g is la t iv e  body" . 2 9  W ilson , P e n n sy lva n ia ,le a d e r o f  a s tro n g  
e xe c u tiv e  fa c t io n ,  wanted a " s in g le  m a g is tra te , as g iv in g  most energy, 
d is p a tc h  and r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  to  th e  o ff ic e " .® ®  I t  was a ls o  th e  b es t sa feguard
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a g a in s t ty ra n n y . As chairman o f  th e  Committee o f  D e ta i l ,  W ilson had th e  
o p p o r tu n ity  to  in c o rp o ra te  h is  concep tion  o f  th e  o f f ic e  in to  th e  d r a f t  o f  
th e  C o n s t itu t io n .
S t i l l  unsolved remained th e  q u e s tio n  o f  re s t ra in in g  th e  e x e c u tiv e  by a 
c o u n c il.  W hile  deba ting  th e  p ro v is io n  f o r  th e  P re s id e n t to  re q u ire  th e  
o p in io n  in  w r i t in g  o f  th e  heads o f  departm ents. Mason o f  V ir g in ia  argued
th a t  in  r e je c t in g  a c o u n c il t o  th e  P re s id e n t, "we were about to  t r y  an
experim en t on which th e  most d e s p o tic  Governments had never ven tu red  -  th e  
Grand S igno r h im s e lf had h is  D ivan ".® i He went on to  propose a C ouncil o f  
S ta te  f o r  th e  P re s id e n t made up o f  s ix  members, two from  E aste rn , two from  
M idd le  and two f r o n  Southern s ta te s ,  w ith  a ro ta t io n  and d u ra t io n  o f  o f f ic e
s im i la r  to  those  o f  th e  senate  and appo in ted  by Congress o r  th e  Senate,
F ra n k lin  o f  P ennsylvan ia , agreed, re g a rd in g  th e  c o u n c il as a check on a bad 
P re s id e n t and an a id  to  a good one. However, th e  idea  o f  a c o u n c il was 
re je c te d  as i t  was judged th a t  th e  P re s id e n t "by persuad ing  h is  c o u n c il to  
concur in  h is  wrong measures, would a c q u ire  t h e i r  p ro te c t io n . . . "®2
The V ir g in ia  P lan c a lle d  f o r  a n a tio n a l e xe c u tiv e  to  be named by e le c to rs  
chosen by Congress. Sherman o f  C o n ne c ticu t argued th a t  th e  e x e cu tive  be o n ly  
an " i n s t i t u t io n  f o r  c a r ry in g  th e  w i l l  o f  th e  L e g is la tu re  in to  e f fe c t "  and 
consequen tly , e x e cu tive  o f f i c i a l s  shou ld  be "p e rs o n s .. .appo in ted  by and 
accoun tab le  to  th e  L e g is la tu re  only".®® W ilson proposed th e  cho ice  o f  
P re s id e n t by e le c to rs  chosen by th e  people , b u t t h i s  m otion  was de fea ted . 
As Mason argued, " i t  would be as u n n a tu ra l to  r e fe r  th e  ch o ice  o f  a p rope r 
c h a ra c te r f o r  c h ie f  M a g is tra te  to  th e  people , as i t  would to  r e fe r  a t r a i l  
o f  c o lo u rs  to  a b l in d  man".®4 Thus, i n i t i a l l y  th e  p op u la r e le c t io n  p lan  
f a i le d ,  and th e  C onvention re a ff irm e d  le g is la t iv e  e le c t io n  unanim ously. 
However, M o rr is  o f  Pennsylvann ia  and Madison contended th a t  th e  e x e c u tiv e  
shou ld  be independent o f  th e  le g is la tu r e  and by way o f  compromise th e  
conven tion  sw itched  to  e le c to rs ,  b u t p rov ided  f o r  t h e i r  cho ice  by s ta te  
le g is la tu re s .  The C onvention, however, then  re ve rte d  back to  i t s  o r ig in a l
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p la n  f o r  le g is la t iv e  e le c t io n  and as such th e  proposal went to  th e  Canm ittee 
o f  D e ta i l ,  which had to  dec ide  how Congress would v o te  f o r  th e  P re s id e n t. 
However, th e  m a tte r was so co m p le te ly  in  d is p u te  th a t  i t  was passed to  th e  
Committee o f  Eleven®® where a compromise d e c is io n  was reached. I t  was 
decided th a t  e le c to rs  e q u a llin g  in  number Senators and R ep resen ta tives  from  
th e  s ta te s  and appo in ted  by th e  s ta te s  , be re sp o n s ib le  f o r  t h e i r  e le c t io n  
o f  th e  P re s id e n t. W ith  th e  acceptance o f  th e  E le c to ra l C o lle g e , th e  
C onvention f i n a l l y  c u t  loose  from  th e  n o tio n  th a t  th e  P re s id e n t shou ld  be 
p o l i t i c a l l y  accoun tab le  to  th e  le g is la tu r e  ra th e r  than  th e  peop le . Thus, one 
can re a d ily  a p p re c ia te  H a m ilto n ’ s im press ion  o f  th e  e x e c u tiv e  in  F e d e ra lis t  
67 when he w r i te s ,  " th e re  is  h a rd ly  any p a r t  o f  th e  system th e  arrangement 
o f  which cou ld  have been a ttended  w ith  g re a te r  d i f f i c u l t y . . . " . ® ®
The Convention a ls o  decided upon a broad a p p o in tin g  power f o r  th e  
P re s id e n t. W ilson argued th a t  "a  p r in c ip a l reason f o r  u n i ty  in  th e  e xe c u tiv e  
was th a t  o f f ic e r s  m igh t be appo in ted  by a s in g le  re s p o n s ib le  person".®? 
Madison favoured  th e  appo in tm ent o f  judges by th e  Senate , th e  Senate being 
th e  more s ta b le  and independent branch o f  th e  le g is la tu r e .  Gorham’ s 
(M assachusetts) proposa l f o r  e x e c u tiv e  a p p o in te n t  and consent was 
o r ig in a l l y  re je c te d . The p r in c ip le  o f  S e n a to ria l appo in tm ent was re a ff irm e d  
and th e  d e c is io n  passed to  th e  Committee o f  D e ta i l .  I t s  re p o r t  gave genera l 
a p p o in tin g  power to  th e  P re s id e n t b u t a llo c a te d  judges  and ambassadors to  
th e  Senate. The Committee o f  Eleven in  c o n tra s t ,  g ranted  th e  appointm ent o f  
Supreme C ourt judges , ambassadors and a l l  o th e r o f f ic e r s  to  th e  U n ited  
S ta te s  whose appointm ent was n o t o th e rw ise  p rov ided  f o r  , t o  th e  p re s id e n t 
w ith  Senate adv ice  and consen t. I t  was t h is  fo rm u la  th a t  was f i n a l l y  
accepted.®®
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Checks i^ l i ^ c e s
A f te r  extended debate, th e  o f f ic e  o f  th e  P re s id e n t would f i n a l l y  f in d  
e xp ress ion  in  A r t ic le  I I  o f  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n .  Once th e  o f f ic e  had been 
c re a te d , th e  Framers were com pelled to  co n s id e r how to  p re ven t abuses o f  
power. One techn ique  was to  p ro v id e  f o r  th e  c o lla b o ra t iv e  e xe rc is e  o f  
pow ers.39
Two In te rp re ta t io n s  o f  One C o n s t itu t io n .
“ In  s h o r t ,  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n  r e f le c ts  th e  s tru g g le  between th e  two 
concep tions o f  o f f ic e :  th a t  i t  ought a lways to  be su b o rd in a te  to  th e  supreme 
le g is la t iv e  power, and th a t  i t  ought to  be, w ith in  generous l im i t s ,  
autonomous and s e l f  d i r e c t in g “ .4°
Hypothes i s  I : P ro te c t io n  Aga in s t  A P o w e r- H ungryPresident^^ 
One In te rp re ta t io n  o f  th e  American C o n s t itu t io n .
F o re ig n -p o lic y  making was to  be in  th e  hands o f  Congress g iven  th e  f a c t  
th a t  i t  was Congress which was g iven  th e  in d is p u ta b le  pre-em inence over th e  
power o f  th e  purse. D e lib e ra tio n s  o f  th e  C o n s t itu t io n a l Convention in d ic a te  
th a t  th e  Founders knew ve ry  w e ll th a t  c o n t r o l l in g  money, a p p ro p r ia t io n s  and 
taxe s  meant c o n t r o l l in g  p o l ic y .  The s ig n i f ic a n t  ro le  to  be p layed by 
Congress is  dem onstrated by th e  document o f  th e  C o n s t itu t io n  i t s e l f .  O f th e  
e ig h te en  powers g iven  to  Congress in  A r t ic le  1, S ec tion  8, seven a re  re la te d  
d i r e c t ly  to  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  w h ile  s e v e ra l, most n o ta b ly , t r e a ty  r a t i f i c a t i o n ,  
th e  power o f  appoin tm ent and th e  power to  d e c la re  war a re  dom inant.
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War-mak ing.
D iscuss ion  a t  th e  conven tion  o f  th e  power to  conduct war focused on two 
p o in ts :  f i r s t l y ,  th e  ro le  o f  Congress and second ly , th e  v a r io u s  ro le s  o f  th e  
Senate and th e  House. W ith  regard  to  Congress as a whole , th e  Founders had 
an e x te n s iv e  debate o ve r w hether to  ass ign  Congress th e  power to  "d e c la re " 
war o r  "make" war.The o r ig in a l  d r a f t  c o n s t i tu t io n  had assigned Congress th e  
power to  make war, b u t Madison argued th a t  th e  word "make" shou ld  be changed 
to  "d e c la re " ,  le a v in g  th e  e x e c u tiv e  th e  power to  repe l sudden a tta c k s . 
O thers argued th a t  t h i s  n o tio n  was a lre a d y  im p l i c i t .  When th e  Founders 
s e t t le d  on th e  term  "d e c la re  w a r" , i t  i s  c le a r  th a t  t h e i r  in te n t io n  was to  
enab le  th e  P re s id e n t to  repe l sudden a tta c k s  w ith o u t re q u ir in g  Congressional 
a p p ro va l, b u t a n y th in g  o th e r  than  a sudden a tta c k  and th a t  a llow ed  tim e  f o r  
cong ress iona l debate was to  be a d e c is io n  in  th e  hands o f  th e  le g is la tu r e .
Members such as C harles P inkney o f  South C a ro lin a  wanted to  leave th e  war 
power in  th e  hands o f  th e  Senate a lone , th e  Senate be ing  th e  chamber a lre a d y  
in v o lv e d  in  fo re ig n  p o l ic y .  However, th e  de lega tes  in s is te d  th a t  such a 
grave n a tio n a l c o n s id e ra t io n  shou ld  d e f in i t e ly  be vested  in  bo th  Houses.
In  th e  C o n s t itu t io n ,  Congress was a ls o  g iven  th e  power to  " ra is e  and 
su p p o rt arm ies " and to  "p ro v id e  and m a in ta in  a navy" and th e  power to  
re g u la te  th e  armed fo rc e s . The P re s id e n t was to  be Commander-in-Chief b u t 
th e  la c k  o f  s ig n i f ic a n t  debate , to g e th e r w ith  m inim al a t te n t io n  in  th e  
r a t i f i c a t i o n  debate and th e  F e d e ra lis t  Papers leaves co n s id e ra b le  doubt as 
to  th e  ro le  th e  Founding F a the rs  envisaged f o r  th e  e xe c u tiv e  as Commander-in 
C h ie f. As S ch le s in g e r s ta te s ,  "above a l l  th e  Founders were determ ined to  
deny th e  American P re s id e n t what B lacks tone  had f r e e ly  conceded to  th e  
B r i t is h  K ing, th e  ’ s o le  p re ro g a tiv e  o f  making war and peace’ " indeed,  
H am ilton  d id  argue in  F e d e ra lis t  69 th a t  th e  P re s id e n t’ s powers as 
Com m ander-in-Chief "would be n o m in a lly  th e  same w ith  th a t  o f  th e  K ing o f
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G reat B r i t a in ,  b u t in  substance much in f e r io r  to  i t " .^3 I t  would amount to  
n o th in g  more than th e  supreme d ir e c t io n  o f  th e  m i l i t a r y  and naval fo rc e s . 
Abraham S ofaer contends th a t  th e  l im ite d  debate a t  th e  C o n s titu t io n a l 
Convention r e f le c ts  th e  Founders’ in te n t io n  to  g iv e  more a u th o r ity  to  
Congress. T o ta l ly  m iss ing  was any debate th a t  would have accompanied an 
unders tand ing  o f  th e  Commander-in-Chief c lause  as c re a tin g  an undefined  
re s e rv o ir  o f  power to  use th e  m i l i t a r y  in  s itu a t io n s  unau tho rised  by 
Congress.44
T re a ty  Power
M ajor debate ce n tre d  around th e  ro le  o f  th e  P re s id e n t, some de lega tes  
m a in ta in in g  th a t  th e  P re s id e n t shou ld  a c t m a in ly  as an agent o f  th e  Senate 
in  n e g o tia t in g  t r e a t ie s ;  o th e rs  a rg u in g  f o r  a much more p o s i t iv e  and a c t iv e  
ro le  f o r  th e  P re s id e n t. In  a monarchy th e  power to  make t r e a t ie s  was a lm ost 
a lways vested  in  th e  e x e c u tiv e . However, Congress had e xe rc ise d  under th e  
A r t ic le s  o f  C o n fe d e ra tio n . Thus, i t  seemed n a tu ra l to  d iv id e  th e  power, 
s p e c ify in g  th a t  th e  P re s id e n t shou ld  a c t  w ith  adv ice  and consent o f  th e  
Senate; many deemed th e  House to o  f l i g h t y  and cumbersane f o r  th e  
requ irem ents o f  d ip lom acy. The C onvention a ls o  fo llo w e d  th e  p recedent o f  th e  
A r t ic le s  o f  C on federa tion  in  re q u ir in g  a tw o - th ird s  m a jo r ity  in  th e  Senate 
to  approve a t r e a ty  in  o rd e r to  sa feguard  th e  r ig h ts  o f  a la rg e  re g io n a l 
m in o r ity .  The u lt im a te  a llo c a t io n s  o f  power re f le c te d  th e  Founders’ d e s ire  
t o  balance fo re ig n  p o l ic y  ro le s .  C e r ta in ly  th e  P re s id e n t was g iven  much 
g re a te r  leeway, b u t o n ly  to  a degree f o r  th e  Founders d id  n o t want a 
P re s id e n t unchecked in  any a rea o f  fo re ig n  p o l ic y .
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Powe r  o f  th e  Purse
The Founders w e ll knew th a t  th e  ro o t  o f  power in  government was th e  power 
o f  th e  purse. I t  was th e  power th a t  p a r lia m e n t had used to  e x e rc is e  c o n tro l 
ove r th e  B r i t is h  K ing. "The conscious d e c is io n  to  g ive  t h is  power to  
Congress re f le c te d  th e  u n d e rly in g  sense o f  th e  Founders th a t  Congress was to  
be th e  ’ f i r s t  among e q u a ls ’ o f  th e  th re e  b r a n c h e s " .4s
H y p o t ! ^ I I : P ro te c t io n A g a in s t  A P o w e r-H u n g ry  Congress.4e
"L ib e r ty  t o  be en joyed , must be l im ite d  by law , f o r  law ends where ty ra n n y  
beg ins , and th e  ty ra n n y  is  th e  same , be i t  th e  ty ra n n y  o f  a monarch, o r  o f  
a m u lt itu d e , -  nay, th e  ty ra n n y  o f  a m u lt itu d e  may be g re a te r  s in c e  i t  is  
m u lt ip l ie d  ty ra n n y "
B urke .
"C o n tra ry  to  to d a y ’ s p re v a il in g  v ie w ", w r i te s  Szamuely, th e  reason the  
Framers o f  th e  C o n s t itu t io n  assigned s p e c i f ic  r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  to  th e  
d i f f e r e n t  arms o f  th e  government was n o t o n ly  to  sa feguard  a g a in s t th e  
emergence o f  an over m igh ty  e x e c u tiv e . The fe a r  o f  excess ive  power a cc ru in g  
to  th e  le g is la tu r e  was a t  le a s t  as g r e a t " .4?
An accum ula tion  o f  le g is la t iv e  abuses on th e  s ta te  le v e l,  canbined w ith  a 
dem onstra tion  o f  le g is la t iv e  incompetence on th e  n a t io n a l,  had spawned a new 
o u tlo o k  tow ard e x e cu tive  power. A 1784 s tud y  o f  th e  Pennsylvann ia  government 
l is t e d  many in s tan ce s  o f  le g is la t iv e  v io la t io n s  o f  th e  s ta te  c o n s t i tu t io n  
and b i l l  o f  r ig h ts .  For example, th e  assembly had dep rived  persons o f  t r i a l  
by ju r y .  In  1785, Madison had suggested th a t  th e  le g is la tu r e  shou ld  be
to ld  what i t  co u ld  n o t do ra th e r  than  what i t  c o u ld . As John Adams s ta te d .
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" i f  th e re  is  one c e r ta in  t r u t h  to  be c o lle c te d  from  th e  h is to r y  o f  a l l  ages, 
i t  i s  t h i s ;  th a t  th e  p eop les ’ r ig h ts  and l ib e r t ie s ,  and th e  dem ocra tic  
m ix tu re  in  a c o n s t i tu t io n  can never be preserved w ith o u t a s tro n g  e x e c u tiv e , 
o r ,  in  o th e r words, w ith o u t s e p a ra tin g  th e  e x e cu tive  from  th e  le g is la t iv e  
p ow er".48 One cou ld  re a d ily  argue th a t  th e  predom inant a n x ie ty  in  1787 was 
n o t ove r e x e c u tiv e  power o r  th e  th r e a t  o f  a d ic ta to r .  In  W ils o n ’ s o p in io n , 
th e  people o f  America d id  n o t oppose th e  B r i t is h  K ing , "b u t th e  p a r lia m e n t, 
th e  o p p o s it io n  was n o t a g t ( s ic )  an U n ity  b u t a c o r ru p t  m u lt i tu d e " .49 
W ils o n ’ s g re a t fe a r  was th a t  th e  "n a tu ra l o p e ra tio n  o f  th e  L e g is la tu re  w i l l  
be t o  sw allow  up th e  E x e c u tiv e "; Gouverner M o rr is  contended th a t  th e  
"L e g is la tu re  w i l l  c o n t in u a l ly  seek to  aggrandize  and p e rpe tua te
th e m se lve s ".50
Madison warned o f  t h i s  aggrandizem ent o f  th e  le g is la tu r e  a t  th e  expense o f  
o th e r departm ents in  F e d e ra lis t  49, w h ile  in  F e d e ra lis t  51 he co n tin u ed , 
" th e  remedy f o r  t h i s  inconven ience is  t o  d iv id e  th e  le g is la tu r e  in to  
d i f f e r e n t  branches, and to  render them by d i f f e r e n t  modes o f  e le c t io n  and 
d i f f e r e n t  p r in c ip a ls  o f  a c t io n  , as l i t t l e  connected w ith  each o th e r as th e  
n a tu re  o f  th re e  common fu n c t io n s . . . w i l l  a d m it" .s i The p ro spe c t o f  a 
le g is la t iv e  body possessed o f  th e  power o f  th e  purse, e n tru s te d  a ls o  w ith  
th e  ta s k  o f  c re a tin g  th e  agencies o f  government and in v e s tin g  them th e  
a p p ro p r ia te  g ra n ts  o f  a u th o r i ty ,  re s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  c o l le c t io n  o f  ta xe s , 
d u t ie s ,  im posts and e x c ise s , th e  payment o f  deb ts ; to  p ro v id e  f o r  th e  
common defence and genera l w e lfa re  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s , to  c o in  money, to  
re g u la te  commerce and d e c la re  w ar, prompted many Founders to  b e lie v e  th a t  
th e  o ld  e v i ls  o f  th e  p re v io u s  system o f  government were aga in  upon them. I t  
was t h i s  fe a r  which le d  to  A r t ic le  I I  o f  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n .  T h is  A r t ic le  
makes i t  c le a r  th a t  th e  powers o f  th e  P re s id e n t, e s p e c ia lly  enumerated 
powers, a re  d e r ive d  from  th e  C o n s t itu t io n ,  and n o t d e r ive d  from  o r  l im ite d  
by th e  le g is la t iv e  powers g ran ted  Congress in  A r t ic le  I .  In  o th e r w ords, th e
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powers o f  the  P re s id e n t a re  n o t those  o f  Congress to  c o n fe r on th e  e x e c u tiv e  
no r cou ld  the y  be m o d ifie d  o r  resc inded  by Congress.
The phrase, "E xe cu tive  power" is  ve ry  genera l and s u f f i c ie n t ly  ambiguous 
so th a t  no one cou ld  say p re c is e ly  what i t  meant. I t  is  th e re fo re  p o s s ib le
to  say th a t  i t  re fe r re d  to  more than  th e  enumerated powers th a t  fo llo w e d  th e
term  in  th e  C o n s t itu t io n  and m igh t co nce iva b ly  c o n fe r a s e t o f  u n s p e c if ie d  
e x e c u tiv e  powers.
P re s id e n ts , though re sp o n s ib le  f o r  th e  e xecu tio n  o f  laws and, th e re fo re , 
th e  se rva n ts  o f  Congress, would a ls o  be i t s  m asters f o r  i t  was th e  P re s id e n t
who was e n tru s te d  w ith  th e  ro le  o f  speaking f o r  th e  n a tio n  as a whole in  a l l
i t s  d e a lin g s  w ith  fo re ig n  s ta te s .  I t  i s  w o rth  re c a l l in g  th a t  th e  purpose o f  
th e  C o n s t itu t io n  was " to  form  a more p e r fe c t  U n ion", and f o r  th e  Founders 
t h a t  meant a union b e t te r  a b le  to  conduct r e la t io n s  w ith  o th e r  n a tio n s . For 
th e  Founders th e  conduct o f  fo re ig n  r e la t io n s  was "e x e c u tiv e  a lto g e th e r " .52
The P re s id e n t ia l te rm  o f  o f f ic e  was to  be s p e c if ie d  by th e  C o n s t i tu t io n  
which cou ld  n o t be a lte re d  by any le g is la t iv e  d e c is io n  w ith o u t a 
c o n s t itu t io n a l amendment, o th e rw is e , as H am ilton  argued in  F e d e ra lis t  68, a 
P re s id e n t "m igh t . . .b e  tem pted to  s a c r i f ic e  h is  d u ty  to  th e  com plaisance f o r  
those  whose fa v o u r was necessary to  th e  d u ra tio n  o f  h is  o f f i c i a l
consequence".53
By s p e c ify in g  th a t  " th e  P re s id e n t s h a l l . . .  re ce ive  f o r  h is  s e rv ic e , a 
compensation which s h a ll n e ith e r  be increased o r  d im in ish e d  d u r in g  th e  
p e r io d  f o r  which he s h a ll have been e le c te d " ,54 " th e  Founders c le a r ly  
a ttem pted to  safeguard  th e  p re ro g a tiv e s  o f  th e  e x e c u tiv e  a g a in s t th e  
in c u rs io n s  o f  th e  le g is la tu r e " .55
C e r ta in ly  as regards t r e a t ie s ,  th e  C o n s t itu t io n  s p e c if ie d  th a t  a tw o - 
t h i r d s  m a jo r ity  was re q u ire d  f o r  r a t i f i c a t i o n ,  b u t t h i s  r a t i f i c a t i o n  
procedure was re s t r ic te d  to  o n ly  one house. By g ra n tin g  r a t i f i c a t i o n  to  th e  
Senate, th e  Founders s ig n a lle d  th a t  th e y  wanted to  remove c e r ta in  fo re ig n  
p o l ic y  d e c is io n s  from  th e  House and consequently  d i r e c t  p op u la r c o n t ro l.  The
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tw o - th ird s  requ irem ent was n o t o n ly  a check on th e  P re s id e n t. The Founders 
wished to  l i m i t  th e  power o f  th e  Senate a ls o  and th e  tw o - th ird s  requ irem ent 
meant th a t  th e re  was an e f fe c t iv e  check on th e  Senate as w e l l . 5 6
As regards th e  power o f  th e  purse , t h i s  is  n o t as e x te n s iv e  as may a t  
f i r s t  appear.57 The power o f  th e  purse was n o t g iven  u n i la t e r a l ly  to  th e  
le g is la tu r e  f o r  th e  P re s id e n t was g iven  both th e  v e to  power and th e  
a u th o r ity  to  a d m in is te r e xp e n d itu re s . Szamuely w r i t e s , " i t  was in  o rd e r to  
re s t ra in  th e  p a ro c h ia l and v a c i l la t in g  w i l l  o f  Congress th a t  th e  Framers 
g ran ted  th e  e x tra o rd in a ry  power o f  v e to " .58 The e xe c u tiv e  power o f  ve to  was
g ran ted  by th e  C o n s t itu t io n  so as to  enab le  th e  n a tio n a l in te r e s t  to
?]o v e r r id e  th e  s e c tio n a l in te r e s t .  The ve to  represen ted  one means o f  s e l f -  ||
defence f o r  th e  fe d e ra l E xecu tive . j
4I t  would appear, th u s , th a t  th e  Founders envisaged th e  o f f ic e  o f  th e  g
wP re s id e n t as th e  summit o f  government and n o t m erely as th e  coequal branch. i
Concerning war powers and th e  Commander-in-Chief c la u se , i t  is  c le a r  th a t  i
th e  F ounders ,in  changing Congress’ power from  "make" war to  "d e c la re " .-J
in tended  th a t  th e  P re s id e n t be g iven  s u b s ta n t ia l leeway. The la ck  o f  debate J
su rround ing  th e  Com m ander-in-Chief r e s u lts  in  d i f fe r e n t  in te r p r e ta t io n s  o f  J
what was in tended and leaves i t  u n c e rta in  as to  th e  reach o f  th e  t i t l e .  In  i
s ta rk  va ria n ce  to  S o fa e r’ s  aguement c ite d  e a r l ie r ,  Koenig contends, " th e  JIC o n s t i tu t io n ’ s Com m ander-in-Chief c lause  p ro v id e s  ano the r s to u t  peg on which |
t o  hang wars and o th e r v io le n t  engagements th e  P re s id e n t conducts w ith  o r  I
w ith o u t a d e c la ra t io n  o f  war by Congress, and i t  enab les th e  P re s id e n t to
'4
d e fin e  th e  n a t io n ’ s s tance  in  war between o th e r b e l l i g e r e n t s " . 5 9  The * j
P re s id e n t, as Com mander-in-Chief c o n tro lle d  an im p lie d  th r e a t  in  peace t im e  q
as w e ll as th e  means f o r  d ra m a tiz in g  h is  p o l ic ie s .  One must a ls o  co n s id e r q
H a m ilto n ’ s  argument in  F e d e ra lis t  23 when he w ro te , " th e  c ircum stances th a t  11endanger th e  s a fe ty  o f  n a tio n s  a re  i n f i n i t e  and f o r  t h i s  reason no
c o n s t itu t io n a l shack les  can w is e ly  be imposed on th e  power to  which th e  ca re  Ii
o f  i t  is  com m itted" .59 In  h is  c a p a c ity  as th e  Com m ander-in-Chief, th e
1a
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P re s id e n t would share w ith  no o th e r ,  le a s t  o f  a l l  a no the r branch o f  
government, h is  a u th o r ity  ove r th e  armed fo rc e s  o f  th e  n a tio n .
To conclude , "bo th  th rough  i t s  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  e f f i c i e n t  and s w i f t  
d is p a tc h  o f  th e  a f f a i r s  o f  s ta te ,  and th rough  i t s  be ing th e  'o rgan  o f
in te rc o u rs e  between th e  n a tio n  and fo re ig n  n a tio n s  ’ (H a m ilto n ), th e
P re s id e n t, n o t th e  Congress, was to  be assigned th e  ta s k  o f  n a tio n a l 
le a d e rs h ip " .51 H am ilton  in  F e d e ra lis t  70 w r i te s ,  " ta k in g  i t  f o r  g ran ted , 
th e re fo re ,  th a t  a l l  men o f  sense w i l l  agree in  th e  n e c e s s ity  o f  an e n e rg e tic  
E xecu tive , i t  w i l l  o n ly  remain to  in q u ire  what a re  th e  in g re d ie n ts  which 
c o n s t itu te  t h i s  e n e r g y ? . . . f i r s t ,  u n i ty ;  second, d u ra t io n ; t h i r d ly ,  an 
adequate p ro v is io n  f o r  i t s  s u p p o rt; f o u r th ly ,  com petent p o w e r s " .52
In  b r ie f ,  i t  can be concluded, th a t  th e  C o n s t itu t io n  s p e c if ie s  c e r ta in  
ro le s  and fu n c t io n s  f o r  each arm o f  government. "B u t th e  a l lo c a t io n  o f  
powers cou ld  h a rd ly  be, in  i t s  n a tu re  c le a rc u t" ,  s ta te s  S ch le s in g e r, "and 
p a r t ic u la r ly  in  th e  case o f  th e  war power i t  was a m a tte r, in  H a m ilto n ’ s 
ph rase , o f  ’ j o i n t  possess ion ’ ".53
The S epa ra tion  o f  jPoiæ An A r t i c l e  o f  F a ith .
" I t  is  a w id e ly  accepted axiom o f  American p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  th a t  th e
Founding F a the rs , in  t h e i r  abundant wisdom framed a c o n s t i tu t io n  which 
c re a te d  a government composed o f  th re e  separa te  branches which were d e s tin e d  
to  e x is t  in  a c o n te n tio u s  r e la t io n s h ip " ,54 w r ite s  Kahn. Power was to  be 
separa ted  . As N eustadt p o in ts  o u t,  " th e  C o n s t i tu t io n a l Convention c re a te d  a 
government o f  ’ separa ted powers’ . . .R a the r, i t  c re a te d  a government o f
separa ted  in s t i t u t io n s  s h a r in g  powers".5  5 I m p l ic i t  in  t h i s  n o tio n  o f  shared 
power i s  co n s ta n t c o m p e tit io n  and d r iv e  f o r  g re a te r  power. "The a b id in g  
u n c e r ta in t ie s " ,  argues S ch le s in g e r, " l i e  p r in c ip a l ly ,  a lm ost w h o lly , in  th e  
s e p a ra tio n , d is t r ib u t io n  , fra g m e n ta tio n  o f  powers between th e  P re s id e n t and
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C ongress".55 The d iv is io n  o f  powers in  th e  conduct o f  fo re ig n  re la t io n s  is  
n o t what i t  i s  in  dom estic a f f a i r s .
The s e p a ra tio n  o f  powers is  in h e re n t ly  u n s ta b le . For example, re g a rd in g  
th e  war power, i f  th e  P re s id e n t were to  c la im  a l l  th e  im p lic a t io n s  o f  h is  
c o n tro l o f  d ip lom acy, he c o u ld , by c re a tin g  an antecedent s ta te  o f  th in g s ,  
sw allow  up th e  C ongressional power to  a u th o r iz e  h o s t i l i t i e s .  I f  Congress 
were to  c la im  a l l  th e  im p lic a t io n s  o f  i t s  power to  a u th o r iz e  h o s t i l i t i e s ,  i t  
co u ld  sw allow  up much o f  th e  P re s id e n t’ s power to  conduct d i p l o m a c y . 5 ?
C e r ta in ly  th e re  is  a " t w i l ig h t  zone" -  a domain o f  Congress in  which th e
P re s id e n t can a ls o  a c t.  Indeed, a f t e r  th e  P h ila d e lp h ia  Convention had
ad jou rned , Madison co n fid e d  to  J e ffe rs o n  th a t  th e  boundaries between th e  
E x e c u t iv e ,L e g is la t iv e  and J u d ic ia l powers"though in  genera l so s tro n g ly  
marked in  them selves, c o n s is t  in  many ins tan ce s  o f  mere shades o f
d i f f e r e n c e " . 5 8  in  t h i s  zone, one f in d s  co n cu rre n t powers where th e  two
branches have in terw oven r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  and competing o p p o r tu n it ie s .
The absence o f  a comprehensive "n a tu ra l"  d iv is io n  o f  power in  fo re ig n  
a f f a i r s  has spawned a s tro n g  urge to  compete f o r  power o r  to  c la im  
co n cu rre n t a u th o r ity .  As Henkin argues, " in s te a d  o f  a n a tu ra l s e p a ra tio n  o f  
’ E xe c u tiv e ’ frcm  ’ L e g is la t iv e ’ fu n c t io n s  th e re  has grown an ir r e g u la r ,  
u n c e rta in  d iv is io n  o f  each -  a l l  have served and n u rtu re d  p o l i t i c a l  fo rc e s  
in v i t in g  s t r u g g le " .5 9 Each branch has an undefined  re s id iu m  o f  in h e re n t 
a u th o r ity  on which to  draw -  th e  P re s id e n t th rough  E xecu tive  power and th e  
C o n s t itu t io n a l in ju n c t io n  th a t  "he s h a ll ta ke  ca re  th a t  the  Laws be 
f a i t h f u l l y  execu ted "; and Congress th rough  th e  C o n s t itu t io n a l a u th o r ity  " to  
make a l l  laws which s h a ll be necessary and p rope r f o r  c a rry in g  in to  
E xecu tion  —  a l l . . .  Powers vested  in  t h i s  C o n s titu t io n  in  th e  Government o f  
th e  U n ited  S ta te s "
I t  was envisaged th a t  a l l  C o n s t itu t io n a l d is p u te s  would be reso lved  by th e  
Supreme C o u rt. However, in  p ra c t ic e  th e  c o u r ts  a re  u n l ik e ly  to  s tep  in to  
in te n se  c o n fro n ta t io n s  between th e  P re s id e n t and Congress. Whether t h i s  is
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from  th e  sense th a t  th e  boundary between Congress and th e  P re s id e n t cannot 
be d e fin e d  by law , whether from  th e  r e a l iz a t io n  o f  th e  in h e re n t l im i t a t io n  
o f  ju d ic ia l  power, o r  w hether f r o n  prudence , " th e  c o u r ts  w i l l  n o t make 
c e r ta in  what was l e f t  u n c e rta in " .7 o  Fore ign  a f f a i r s  is  e s p e c ia lly  v u ln e ra b le  
to  be ing  dec la red  non ju s t ic ia b le .
The C o n s t itu t io n  is  s i l e n t  on c e r ta in  issues o f  im p o rt as to  th e  conduct 
o f  fo re ig n  r e la t io n s .  For example, th e  re c o g n it io n  o f  fo re ig n  s ta te s ,  th e  
a u th o r ity  to  c la im  n e u t r a l i t y  and th e  ro le  o f  e xe c u tiv e  agreements a re  
o u tw ith  C o n s t itu t io n a l a u th o r iz a t io n .  Thus,as S ch le s in g e r w r i te s ,  " th e  
s tru g g le  began in  th e  s ile n c e s  o f  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n " .H o w e v e r ,  acco rd ing  to  
Koenig, " in  in te rb ra n c h  s tru g g le s  o ve r co n cu rre n t powers, th e  advantage most 
o fte n  l ie s  w ith  th e  branch th a t  o u tra ce s  th e  o th e r in  ta k in g  th e  i n i t i a t i v e ,  
whoever g e ts  th e re  f i r s t  p re v a i ls .  G e n e ra lly  th e  P re s id e n t has run fa s te r  
than  Congress and, th e re fo re ,  u s u a lly  occup ies a f a r  g re a te r  s e c to r  o f  th e  
g rey a re a " .72 The problem  is  compounded when one f in d s  th a t  fo re ig n  a f f a i r s  
is  n o t a term  a c tu a l ly  found in  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n .73
F o re ign A f f a i r s , ' U n c e r t a in ^ in P r in c ip le  and C o n f l i c t i n P r a c t i c e " .
F o re ign  a f f a i r s  is  n o t a d is t in c t  c o n s t i tu t io n a l ca te g o ry , th e re fo re ,  th e  
c o n s t i tu t io n a l model re g a rd in g  fo re ig n  a f f a i r s  is  incom ple te  and u n c le a r. In  
i t s  o u t l in e s  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l d iv is io n  o f  a u th o r ity  between th e  P re s id e n t 
and th e  Congress is  reasonab ly  c le a r :  Congress makes laws and th e  P re s id e n t 
executes them; Congress le v ie s  taxes  to  p ro v id e  f o r  th e  common defence and 
genera l w e lfa re  and th e  P re s id e n t spends as Congress d ir e c ts .  However, as 
Henkin contends, “ th e re  is  more to  fo re ig n  r e la t io n s  than  laws and 
expend i  tu  re s ".74
The C o n s t itu t io n  does n o t c o n ta in  a power to  conduct fo re ig n  r e la t io n s .  
Few p ro v is io n s  deal w ith  fo re ig n  a f f a i r s  and in  aggregate th e y  do n o t 
c o n s t i tu te  p le n a ry  a u th o r i ty .  "The boundaries between th e  P re s id e n t and
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Congress a re  f l u i d  and cannot be d e fin e d ; fo re ig n  a f f a i r s  a re  n o t in  f a c t  
sepa rab le  and th e  m achinery f o r  runn ing  them cannot be is o la te d  from  th e  
re s t  o f  government; no r co u ld  one tra n s p la n t  a new organ f o r  th e  conduct o f  
fo re ig n  a f f a i r s  le a v in g  th e  re s t  o f  body p o l i t i c  as i s " . 75 (H enkin)
I t  Has Been L i f e  Unc^r The C o n s t i tu t io n  Th a t H asJBeg^ th e
le a n i ng o f  t ^  ^
The C o n s t itu t io n  is  a ’ f ig h t in g  C o n s itu t io n ’ .76
"What was em erging, le s s  from  id e o lo g ic a l p re s c r ip t io n  than  from  
o p e ra tio n a l ca n p u ls io n , was an e x e c u tiv e  p e rs p e c tiv e , a d if fu s e d  fe e l in g  
th a t  th e  E xecu tive  branch, w ith  s u p e r io r  in fo rm a tio n  and d i r e c t  
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y ,  was th e  source o f  judgm ents to  which Congress, w ith o u t 
a b d ic a tin g  i t s  sepa ra te  powers shou ld  c u s to m a rily  d e fe r " .77 po r example, in  
th e  C o n s t i tu t io n  th e  P re s id e n t is  empowered " to  re c e iv e  ambassadors and 
o th e r p u b lic  m in is te rs "  and a lthough  t h i s  can be construed  as a p u re ly  
cerem onia l r o le ,  i t  can a ls o  im p ly  th a t  th e  P re s id e n t, in  re c e iv in g  a 
fo re ig n  envoy co ns ide rs  th e  envoy as re p re s e n tin g  a le g it im a te  government 
w ith  which th e  U n ited  S ta te s  shou ld  have re la tio n s .7 Q  T h is  process soon 
extended to  war-m aking.
In  1793, Washington p roc la im ed  n e u t r a l i t y  in  th e  war between B r i t a in  and 
France. In  a s e r ie s  o f  a r t ic le s  s igned  ’ P a c if ic u s ’ , H am ilton  supported both  
th e  p o l ic y  o f  Washington and h is  u n i la te r a l  r ig h t  to  d e c la re  i t .  H am ilton  
contended th a t  s in c e  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  was by i t s  n a tu re  an E xecu tive  fu n c t io n ,  
th e  powers o f  d e c la r in g  war and r a t i f y in g  t r e a t ie s  bestowed by th e  
C o n s t i tu t io n  on Congress were "e xce p tio n s  o u t o f  th e  genera l ’ E xecu tive  
power’ vested  in  th e  P re s id e n t" . Compelled to  re p ly ,  M ad ison ,’ H e lv id iu s ’ , 
denied th a t  th e  powers o f  making wars and t r e a t ie s  were in h e re n t ly
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e x e c u tiv e , a rgu ing  th a t  a lthough  th e y  were roya l p re ro g a tiv e s  in  B r i ta in ,  
t h a t  d id  n o t n e c e s s a r ily  make them P re s id e n t ia l p re ro g a tiv e s  in  th e  U n ited  
S ta te s . The v iew  o f  H am ilton  p re v a ile d . Indeed, in  F e d e ra lis t  72, H am ilton  
d e fin e d  e x e cu tive  power so e xp a n s ive ly  to  encompass those  roya l p re ro g a tiv e s  
th a t  he l e f t  th e  way c le a r  f o r  fu tu re  P re s id e n ts  to  c la im  them. However,
what is  i r o n ic  about th e  P a c if ic u s  -  H e lv id iu s  debate is  th a t  both H am ilton
and Madison had served a t  th e  P h ila d e lp h ia  Convention, then  a fte rw a rd  
c o lla b o ra te d  w ith  John Jay on th e  F e d e ra lis t  Papers. They were thu s  u n iq u e ly  
p laced to  in te r p r e t  th e  d e c is io n s  o f  th e  Convention. The whole episode
fu r th e r  emphasizes th e  a m b ig u ity  o f  th e  C o n s t itu t io n .
As so many c o n tro v e rs ie s  were l e f t  o u tw ith  e x p l i c i t  re s o lu t io n  a t  th e  
C o n s t itu t io n a l Convention and in  th e  C o n s t itu t io n  i t s e l f  and because so much 
in  th e  C o n s t itu t io n  r e l ie d  on o ve r la p p in g  and shared powers, th e  f i r s t  few 
years o f  th e  new government were a tim e  o f  te s t in g .  These years were c ru c ia l 
f o r  s e t t in g  a tone  and e s ta b lis h in g  p recedents . W ashington’ s a d m in is tra t io n  
e s ta b lis h e d  a s tro n g  and v ig o ro u s  ro le  f o r  th e  P re s id e n t in  th e  fo re ig n  
p o l ic y  process and i t  was Washington who e s ta b lis h e d  th e  precedent th a t  th e  
e x e cu tive  cou ld  n e g o tia te  t r e a t ie s  w ith o u t th e  p r io r  adv ice  o f  th e  Senate. 
However, i t  is  in te r e s t in g  to  no te  th a t  Congress d id  n o t re p u d ia te
W ashington’ s u n i la te r a l  d e c la ra t io n  o f  n e u t r a l i t y  f o r  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  o f  
Am erica in  th e  war between B r i t a in  and France.
D uring  th e  f i r s t  f o r t y  years  o f  th e  new C o n s t i tu t io n ,  th e  d r i f t  was toward 
more e xe c u tiv e  power in  fo re ig n  r e la t io n s .  The P re s id e n t c la im ed th e
s ile n c e s  o f  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n .  P ious s ta te s ,  "He f in d s  a genera l ’ power to  
conduct fo re ig n  r e la t io n s ’ f o r  th e  n a tio n . Then he assumes what has n o t been 
e x p re s s ly  assigned to  Congress is  to  be exe rc ised  by th e  E xecu tive . H is  
g ra n ts  o f  a u th o r ity ,  such as ’ The E xecu tive  Power’ and th e  Canmander-in- 
C h ie f t i t l e ,  a re  expanded th rough  ru le s  o f  c o n s tru c tio n  to  t h e i r  l im i t s .  H is
powers when combined " r e s u l t "  in  a d d it io n a l powers: s o le  organ o f
communication w ith  fo re ig n  governments, a l l ia n c e  powers, war powers,peace
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powers. He a ls o  c la im s  in h e re n t power as Commander-in-Chief to  ta k e  
emergency power to  save th e  n a t i o n . . . "7a Napoleon’ s  maxim was quoted by 
J u s tic e  Jackson in  th e  s te e l s e iz u re  case, and i t  is  e s p e c ia lly  a p t: " th e  
to o ls  belong to  th e  man who can use them ".^o
Compranis e s ,I r r e s o lu t im s ,O v e rs ig h ts  and In te n t io n a l S ile n c e s .
"The p r in c ip a l d i f f i c u l t y " ,  notes Henkin, "has been th a t  from  th e  
beg inn ing  , th e  compromises, ir r e s o lu t io n s ,  o v e rs ig h ts  and in te n t io n a l 
s ile n c e s  o f  th e  C o n s t itu t io n  l e f t  i t  u n c le a r who had s a i l  and who had 
rudde r, and, most im p o rta n t, where is  c o m m a n d " .T h e  C o n s t itu t io n  t e l l s  
o n ly  h a l f  o f  what one needs to  know. "No document o r ig in a t in g  as t h i s  had 
and developed as t h i s  had been developed cou ld  be lo g ic a l o r  even 
c o n s is te n t.  That is  why every  a ttem pted a n a ly s is  o f  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n  has 
been doomed to  f a i lu r e .  From th e  n a tu re  o f  i t s  c o n s tru c t io n , th e  C o n s t itu t io n  
d e f ie s  a n a ly s is  upon a lo g ic a l b a s is " .  52
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C h a p t e r 2 : T h e R is e  o f t h e  M o d e rn P re s id e n c y a n d  Theory  o f  P re s id e n t ia l 
Pqy^r.
From th e  P re s id e n t t o  " th e  P re s id e n c y "; th e  flm per i  a ] P res idency '' to  th e  
Postmod e r n P resi den t.
"The P residency is  n o t m ere ly an a d m in is tra t iv e  o f f ic e .  That is  th e  le a s t  
o f  i t .  I t  is  more than  an e ng in e e rin g  jo b ,  e f f i c i e n t  o r  i n e f f i c i e n t " . i
The C o n s t i tu t io n  as has been dem onstrated d id  n o t f i r m ly  s e t t le  th e  issue  
o f  how power was to  be e xe rc ise d  by th e  P re s id e n t o r  th e  Congress. I t  
p rov ided  que s tio ns  ra th e r  than  answers. I t  cou ld  be argued th a t  th e  Founding 
Fa the rs  l e f t  th e  o f f ic e  o f  th e  P re s id e n t e x t r a o r d in a r i ly  loose  in  d e f in i t io n  
p a r t ly  because th e y  t ru s te d  Washington to  in v e n t t r a d i t io n  as he went a long .
The o f f ic e  o f  th e  P re s id e n t is  an in s t i t u t io n  made a p iece  a t  a tim e  by 
success ive  men in  th e  W hite House. For example, J e ffe rs o n  reached o u t to  
Congress to  p u t to g e th e r th e  beg inn ings o f  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s ,  and L in c o ln  
v a s t ly  expanded th e  a d m in is tra t iv e  reach o f  th e  o f f i c e . 2 C ru c ia l ly ,  however, 
th e  n in e  p o s t -  Hoover P re s id e n ts  have been d i f f e r e n t  from  t h e i r  
predecessors in  a number o f  re sp ec ts .
F i r s t l y ,  i t  has come to  be taken  f o r  g ranted  th a t  th e  P re s id e n t shou ld  
re g u la r ly  i n i t i a t e  and seek to  w in su p p o rt f o r  le g is la t iv e  a c tio n  as p a r t  o f  
h is  c o n tin u in g  r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s .  The P re s id e n t has a ls o  become f a r  more 
a c t iv e  in  e v a lu a tin g  le g is la t iv e  enactm ents w ith  a v iew  to  d e c id in g  whether 
t o  e x e rc is e  th e  v e to , than t r a d i t i o n a l l y  was th e  case. Secondly, from  a 
P re s id e n t th a t  e xe rc ised  few u n i la te r a l  powers, th e re  has been a s h i f t  to  
one th a t  is  p rov ided  by th e  way o f  s ta tu te s ,  c o u r t  d e c is io n s  and in fo rm a l 
p recedents w ith  many more occas ions f o r  d i r e c t  p o l ic y -  making, f o r  example, 
th rough  e x e c u tiv e  o rd e rs . T h ir d ly ,  f r o n  a P residency w ith  ex trem e ly  modest 
s t a f f  su p p o rt, th e re  has evo lved  a P re s id e n t ia l bureaucracy. The P re s id e n t
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has a t  h is  d isp osa l a s t a f f  o f  thousands.a F in a l ly ,  th e re  appear to  have 
been m ajor changes in  th e  q u a l i t y  and q u a n t ity  o f  p u b lic  a t te n t io n  to  
incumbent P re s id e n ts .
F ive  reasons u n d e r lie  th e  r is e  o f  P re s id e n t ia l government in  th e  T w en tie th  
C en tu ry : (1 ) th e  p r o l i f e r a t io n  o f  in te rn a t io n a l ca rm itm ents and c r is e s ;  
c r is e s  maximise P re s id e n tia q l power, (2 ) th e  p o s it iv e  economic s ta te ;  th e  
demands o f  an in d u s t r ia l  s o c ie ty  made th e  P re s id e n t th e  c h ie f  a d m in is tra to r  
o f  th e  means to  keep th e  c o u n try  moving, (3 ) th e  ’ paradox o f  Congressional 
expansion ’ (R o s s ite r ) .  Congress seemed unable to  expand i t s  own power 
w ith o u t a t  th e  same tim e  expanding th e  power o f  th e  e x e c u tiv e ,*  (4 ) th e  
" in s t i t u t io n a l is a t io n "  o f  th e  P res idency. Two w o rld  wars v a s t ly  expanded 
fe d e ra l p a y ro lls  and new a d m in is tra t iv e  and personnel a u th o r ity  f e l l  to  th e  
P re s id e n t, (5 ) S trong P re s id e n ts  became th e  leade rs  o f  Congress. A f te r  th e  
tu rn  o f  th e  C entu ry, th e  P re s id e n t was expected to  have an e x te n s iv e  
le g is la t iv e  programme and to  work a c t iv e ly  f o r  i t s  passage.® G reenste in  
w r i te s ,  "For many Americans th e  complex, u n c e rta in  p o l i t i c a l  w o rld  o f  o u r 
tim e s  seems to  be d e a lt  w ith  by p e rs o n if ic a t io n ,  in  th e  form  o f  p e rce p tio n s  
o f  th e  q u a l i t y  o f  perform ance and personal v i r t u e  o f  th e  incumbent 
P re s id e n t" .6
The R ise  o f  th e  Pre s idency
Rqoseye 11 : £ ’ .45 ) .  The Emergence o f  th e  Modern P res i dency .
The i n i t i a l  s tage  in  th e  tra n s fo rm a tio n  o f  th e  P residency re s u lte d  from  th e  
a lm ost o v e rn ig h t r is e  in  e x p e c ta tio n s  about th e  a p p ro p r ia te  d u t ie s  o f  th e  
C h ie f E xecu tive . C ron in  contends, " i t  was F.D.R. who beyond a l l  T w en tie th  
C entury P re s id e n ts  p u t th e  stamp both  o f  p e rs o n a lity  and c r i s i s  on th e  
P re s id e n cy ".7 in  th e  management o f  th e  D epression, R ooseve lt c la im ed powers 
which in  th e  p a s t had o n ly  been e xe rc ise d  on th e  ju s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  war.
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D uring  th e  Second W orld War, "he endowed th e  p recedents o f  both  th e  C iv i l  
War and th e  F i r s t  W orld War w ith  unprecedented s c o p e " . 8 D uring  R o o seve lt’ s 
term  o f  o f f ic e ,  th e  w id e ly  accepted need f o r  economic in te rv e n t io n  a t  home 
and th e  need f o r  m i l i t a r y  in te rv e n t io n  abroad swept away a l l  o p p o s it io n  to  
th e  e s c a la t in g  growth in  power and p re s tig e  o f  th e  Presidency.® Polsby 
w r i te s , "  A l l  P re s id e n ts  re ce ive  v ig o ro u s  c r i t ic is m ;  f o r  o n ly  a fo r tu n a te  few 
does p ra is e  pour f o r th  in  comparable volume and in te n s i t y .  F ra n k lin  
R ooseve lt is  c e r ta in ly  one o f  th e  e le c t  g roup ".
A lso , in  1936, th e  Supreme C ourt f o r c e f u l ly  upheld e x e c u tiv e  a u th o r ity  in  
fo re ig n  re la t io n s :  J u s tic e  S u th e rla nd , in  th e  U.S. Vs. C u r t is s  -  W righ t
E xpo rt Corp e t  a l (299 U.S. 304), argued th a t  th e  powers o f  ’ in te rn a l 
s o v e re ig n ty ’ la y  w ith  in d iv id u a l s ta te s ,  b u t those  o f  ’ e x te rn a l s o v e re ig n ty ’ 
la y  w ith  n a tio n a l government.
The premodern h is to r ic a l  r e c o r d , i i  e s p e c ia lly  in  th e  N ine teen th  C entury 
was one o f  numerous occasions o f  C ongressional a ve rs ion  to  mere suggestions 
by th e  P re s id e n t th a t  c e r ta in  le g is la t io n  be enacted. R ooseve lt q u ic k ly  
e s ta b lis h e d  th e  p ra c t ic e  o f  a dvo ca ting , backing  and engaging in  th e  p o l i t i c s  
o f  w in n ing  f o r  le g is la t io n .  Thus, by th e  end o f  R o o seve lt’ s long ten u re  o f  
o f f ic e ,  p re s id e n t ia l le g is la t iv e  was assumed i f  n o t w h o lly  approved.
T h is  a c tiv is m  began w ith in  days o f  R ooseve lt ta k in g  o f f ic e .  The "Hundred 
D a y s " 12 le g is la t io n  designed to  a l le v ia te  th e  Depression was pe rce ived  to  be 
a r e s u l t  o f  h is  le a d e rs h ip . In  one in s ta n ce , concern ing  th e  Federal D epos it 
Insu rance  C o rp o ra tio n , R ooseve lt was p ra ise d  f o r  th e  passage o f  a programme 
which he p e rs o n a lly  opposed b u t f o r  which he gave h is  backing  once he 
re a lis e d  i t  had to o  much C ongressional su pp o rt to  be de fea ted . "T ha t 
R ooseve lt was g iven  c r e d i t  f o r  th e  i n i t i a t i v e s  o f  o th e rs  p o in ts  to  th e  f a c t  
th a t  d u r in g  h is  a d m in is tra t io n  people  tended more and more to  th in k  o f  th e  
P re s id e n t as a symbol f o r  governm ent." G reenste in  c o n t in u e s ," th e  p u b lic  
d e a lt  w ith  th e  in c re a s in g  co m p le x ity  o f  government by p e rs o n ify in g  i t " . i 3
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R ooseve lt a ls o  e s ta b lis h e d  th e  p recedent o f  accustom ing th e  n a tio n  to  
expec t th e  P re s id e n t to  be a ided  by an a rra y  o f  p o l ic y  a d v is e rs  and 
im p lem enters .14 I n i t i a l l y ,  these  o f f i c i a l s  were o f f i c i a l l y  on th e  p a y ro lls  
o f  d iv e rs e  non -  W hite House agencies. U n o f f ic ia l ly ,  th e y  were " th e  
P re s id e n t’ s men". U n fo r tu n a te ly , th e  h ig h  p r o f i le  o f  these  a id e s ,i®  w h ile  to  
R o o se ve lt’ s b e n e f i t ,  a ls o  upstaged him to  a c e r ta in  e x te n t and, th e re fo re ,  
th rea te ne d  h is  c e n t r a l i t y  as th e  symbol f o r  n a tio n a l le a d e rs h ip . However, 
th e  sheer volume o f  work th rea te ne d  to  swamp th e  P resident.'*®  T h is  dilemma 
le d  t o  R o o seve lt’ s  in te r e s t  in  procedures th a t  would p ro v id e  th e  P res idency 
w ith  a ides  who were o f f i c i a l  b u t n o t h ig h ly  v is ib le .
In  1937 th e  Brownlow Committee, th e  Committee on th e  A d m in is tra t io n  o f  th e  
Federal Government, appo in ted  by R ooseve lt in  1937, proposed such a s t a f f .  
The Committee argued th a t ,  because o f  th e  mushrooming r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  o f  
th e  E xecu tive  branch, th e  P re s id e n t needed e x tra  h e lp . I t  proposed th a t  an 
E xecu tive  O f f ic e  o f  th e  P re s id e n t (E .G .P .) be e s ta b lis h e d  in tended to  serve  
as th e  P re s id e n t’ s own a d v is o ry  s t a f f .  The E.G.P. would a ls o  in c lu d e  a W hite 
House O f f ic e  (W .H.G.) s ta f fe d  by s k i l le d  and anonymous a id e s . As Hodgson 
p o in ts  o u t, th e  Brownlow Committee’ s recommendations le d  d i r e c t ly  t o  th e  
f i r s t  c le a r  s tep  in  th e  d ir e c t io n  o f  th e  modern and in s t i t u t io n a l iz e d  
P r e s i d e n c y .  17 The R eo rgan isa tion  A c t o f  1939 p u t th e  recommendations in to  
a c t io n .19
The Bureau o f  th e  Budget (B .G .B .) was e s ta b lis h e d  in  1921. U n t i l  th e  
passage o f  th e  1939 R eo rga n isa tion  A c t th e  Bureau was lodged in  th e  
T reasury , a lthough  i t  was o f f i c i a l l y  an o f f ic e  o f  th e  P residency and 
re s t r ic te d  to  mere bookkeeping. I t  d id  n o t a tte n d  to  P re s id e n t ia l p o l ic y  
goa ls  as ide  from  th e  genera l 1920s p o l ic y  o f  h o ld in g  down budgetary requests  
and e xp e n d itu re s . Post R eo rga n isa tion  A c t th e  Bureau rece ived  a new 
d ir e c to r ,  H aro ld  D. Sm ith, who was ve ry  much anonymous b u t com m itted to  
c re a tin g  an o rg a n is a tio n  o f  h ig h ly  a b le  p u b lic  a d m in is te rs  who would have a 
c o n tin u in g  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  to  th e  P re s id e n t . The 1939 A c t moved th e  B.G.B.
34
from  th e  T reasury Department b u i ld in g  to  d i r e c t ly  o p p o s ite  th e  W hite House. 
Sm ith was thu s  in  an id e a l p o s it io n  to  c o n s u lt re g u la r ly  w ith  th e  P re s id e n t.
When Truman to o k  o f f ic e  in  1945, i t  was s t i l l  u n c e rta in  how th e
P re s id e n t ia l o f f ic e  would deve lop . G reenste in  argues, "R ooseve lt e v id e n t ly  
was a b le  to  wed h is  own g re a t powers o f  personal communication to  th e
genera l sense o f  n a tio n a l urgency, c h a n n e llin g  what had h i th e r to  been a 
s t a t i c  p a t r io t ic  se n tim en t -  American v e n e ra tio n  o f  th e  g re a t P re s id e n ts  o f  
th e  p a s t “  in to  a dynamic component o f  th e  incumbent P re s id e n t’ s r o le " . is  I t  
was n o t in e v ita b le  th a t  th e  "modern P residency" would co n tin u e  in to
subsequent a d m in is tra t io n s . 20
Truman: (Democr a t ,  19.4.§r..!.92.),, I n s t i t u t io n  o f  th e  M o d e rn
Pres id ency.
Under Truman, th e re  was a s h i f t  f r o n  th e  p e rs o n a lly  s t im u la te d  p o l ic y  
i n i t i a t i v e s  o f  R ooseve lt t o  th e  more m ethodica l development o f  p o l ic y  in  
c o n s o rt w ith  th e  W.H.O. and th e  B.O.B. Much o f  Truman’ s im pact on th e  
P residency can be i l lu s t r a t e d  by comparing h is  and R o o seve lt’ s s ty le s  o f  
h an d lin g  th e  B .O .B .: R ooseve lt tre a te d  Smith ve ry  in fo rm a lly ,  l i k e  an
u n o f f ic ia l  a d v is e r ra th e r  than  th e  head o f  a s ta tu to r y  P re s id e n t ia l s t a f f  
agency. However, under Truman th e  Bureau i t s e l f  and i t s  d ir e c to r  became an 
in te g ra l p a r t  o f  th e  P res idency. Soon th e  B.O.B. to o k  on th e  ro le  o f  a 
c e n tra l c o o rd in a tin g  in s t i t u t io n ,  re sp o n s ib le  f o r  fra m in g  and fo rm a liz in g  
th e  annual p re s e n ta tio n s  o f  what became known as th e  "programme o f  th e  
P re s id e n t" . Truman was re s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  expanded ro le  o f  th e  B .O .B ., th e  
increased  s iz e  o f  th e  W.H.O. and th e  conve rs ion  o f  th a t  s t a f f  in to  a team 
m eeting d a i ly  w ith  th e  P re s id e n t . 21
I t  was d u r in g  Truman’ s f i r s t  two term s o f  o f f ic e  th a t  th e  Bureau began as 
s tandard  o p e ra tin g  procedure , to  examine a l l  departm enta l a p p ro p r ia t io n s
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requests  in  r e la t io n  to  th e  P re s id e n t’ s o v e ra ll programme. The Bureau 
g ra d u a lly  became in vo lve d  in  th e  le g is la t iv e  process. I t  became th e  norm f o r  
th e  B.O.B. to  c le a r  and co o rd in a te  a l l  le g is la t iv e  requests o r ig in a t in g  
w ith in  fe d e ra l departm ents, to  h e lp  d r a f t  le g is la t io n  o r ig in a t in g  from  th e  
W hite House and to  c le a r  and d r a f t  E xecu tive  O r d e r s .22
The C ouncil o f  Econanic A dv ise rs  (C .E .A .) , which was p rov ided  f o r  in  th e
Employment A c t o f  1946, was a fu r th e r  a d d it io n  to  th e  P re s id e n t’ s power. The
C ouncil became p a r t  o f  th e  P re s id e n t’ s team and th e  R eport o f  th e  
P re s id e n t’ s C ouncil o f  Economic A dv ise rs  is  now one o f  th e  th re e  m ajor 
P re s id e n t ia l communications se n t to  Congress in  January each y e a r .2 3
The N a tio na l S e c u r ity  C ouncil (N .S .C .) emanated f r o n  th e  N a tio na l S e c u r ity  
A c t o f  1947 which a ls o  b rough t about th e  u n i f ic a t io n  o f  th e  armed fo rc e s . 
One o f  i t s  s p e c i f ic  ta sks  was to  oversee th e  p re p a ra tio n  o f  memoranda th a t  
d e fin e  and e va lu a te  o p tio n s  f o r  p o l ic y  d e c is io n s . The memoranda cover th e  
e n t ir e  gamut o f  fo re ig n  p o l ic y ;  one o f  th e  most famous documents produced 
being N .S .C .-6 8 . The 1947 A c t a ls o  c rea ted  th e  C e n tra l In te l l ig e n c e  Agency
( C . I .A . )  , which a lthough  in tended to  be independent o f  th e  m i l i t a r y  and
separa te  from  any o th e r e xe cu tive  agency, i t s e l f  evo lved in to  an agency w ith  
programmes and p o l ic y  p re fe re n ces .
In  th e  expanded domain o f  independent P re s id e n t ia l a c t io n , Truman was 
re sp o n s ib le  f o r  i n i t i a t i n g  and im plem enting p o lic y -m a k in g . Examples in c lu d e  
h is  d e c is io n  to  use a tom ic weapons a t  th e  end o f  World War I I  and the  
d e c is io n  to  send American tro o p s  to  Korea. "D esp ite  dom estic p o l ic y  s ta s is ,  
h is  low general p o p u la r ity ,  and th e  p o l i t i c a l  c o s t l in e s s  o f  sane o f  h is  
d e c is io n s " , contends G reenste in , "Truman’ s p ra c t ic e  o f  e x e c u tiv e  
a sse rtive n e ss  entrenched th e  tendency o f  a l l  b u t th e  most co n se rva tive  
p o licy -m a ke rs  to  lo o k  to  th e  P re s id e n t as th e  main fram er o f  th e  agenda f o r  
p u b lic  d e b a te ".24
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Eisenhower: (Repub]le a n ,19 C o n firm a tio n  o f  th e  Modern P resfdency
A re c e n t reassessment o f  th e  Eisenhower P residency 25  has shown th a t  
Eisenhower was f a r  from  be ing  th e  mere puppet o f  Adams and D ulles2 6 and was 
in t im a te ly  in vo lve d  in  n a tio n a l s e c u r ity  p o lic y -m a k in g . However, Eisenhower 
was a dom estic p o l i t i c a l  c o n s e rv a tiv e  w ith o u t a g re a t d e s ire  t o  innova te  æ d 
he does seem to  have de lega ted  a u th o r ity  to  Adams, f o r  example, as a fram er 
o f  a lte r n a t iv e s  under c ircum stances where Truman would have canvassed 
a lte r n a t iv e s  o f  h is  own.
Hodgson s ta te s ,  "The ve ry  f a c t  th a t  P re s id e n t Eisenhower was r e la t iv e ly  
in a c t iv e  seems to  have fo s te re d  th e  development o f  th e  in s t i t u t io n a l  
P re s id e n c y ".27 Things s t i l l  had to  g e t done which i f  th e y  were n o t go ing  to  
be done a t  th e  express o rd e rs  o f  th e  P re s id e n t, were go ing  to  have to  be 
done by someone e ls e . In  1956, th e  W hite House s t a f f  had increased to  fo u r  
hundred. By th e  end o f  E isenhower’ s second te rm , th e  E .O .P ., in c lu d in g  
th e  B .O .B ., th e  G.E.A. and o th e r  fu n c t io n s  had a p a y ro ll o f  a lm ost th re e  
thousand .28 "A t f i r s t  t h e i r  (W hite  House a s s is ta n ts )  ro le  was to  he lp  
th e  P re s id e n t: to  read, to  e v a lu a te  and d ig e s t  m a te r ia l f o r  him; to  he lp  him 
d r a f t  speeches, messages and o th e r te x ts ;  to  meet w ith  th e  people he cou ld  
n o t see and in  genera l share th e  p h y s ic a l burden o f  th e  o f f ic e " .  However, 
as Hodgson co n tin u e s , "G ra d u a lly  th e y  became n o t ju s t  an e x te n s io n  o f  th e  
P re s id e n t’ s person, b u t an e x te n s io n  o f  h is  power" 2 9  W ith  tim e  th e  W hite 
House s t a f f  would usurp th e  C ab ine t.
F u rth e r in s t i t u t io n a l is in g  th e  W hite  House under Eisenhower, each 
P re s id e n t ia l a s s is ta n t  had f ix e d  r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  . O nly Adams re p o rte d  
d i r e c t ly  t o  th e  P re s id e n t, everyone e ls e  was su b o rd in a te  to  Adams in  a ve ry  
c le a r  W hite House cha in  o f  command. C ab ine t m eetings grew in  s iz e  and a 
C ab ine t S e c re ta r ia t  was e s ta b lis h e d  to  fo l lo w  up on d e c is io n s  reached in  th e  
C ab ine t m eetings and to  keep th e  agenda. The main fe a tu re ,  however, o f  th e
37
Eisenhower system o f  s t a f f  o rg a n is a tio n  was th e  c h a n n e llin g  o f  a l l  l in e s  o f  
communication to  th e  P re s id e n t th rough  Adams.
To conclude, then , th e  r is e  o f  th e  P residency was due to :  (1 ) th e  s o c ia l 
acceptance th a t  government shou ld  be a c t iv e  and re fo rm is t  ra th e r  than  s im p ly  
p ro te c t iv e  o f  th e  s ta tu s  quo, (2 ) th e  breakdown in  th e  p r in c ip le  o f  dual 
fe d e ra lis m  in  th e  f i e l d  o f  Congress’ le g is la t iv e  powers, (3 ) th e  breakdown 
o f  th e  p r in c ip le  o f  th e  se p a ra tio n  o f  powers as d e f in in g  th e  re la t io n s h ip  
between th e  P re s id e n t and th e  Congress in  law -  making, (4 ) th e  breakdown o f  
th e  p r in c ip le  th a t  th e  Congress may n o t d e lega te  i t s  powers, and (5 ) th e  
im pact on th e  P re s id e n t’ s power as Commander-in-Chief and th e  organ o f  
fo re ig n  re la t io n s  in  th e  wake o f  two w o rld  wars and th e  emergence o f  th e  
U n ited  S ta te s  from  is o la t io n is m .s i
The modern P residency was c re a te d  by R ooseve lt. However,the th e o ry  o f  th e  
P residency is  more re c e n t. I t  was c re a te d  by Eisenhower a lb e i t  
u n in te n t io n a l ly .  "The s tro n g  P re s id en cy", argued R o s s ite r  d u r in g  
E isenhower’ s te rm , " i s  th e  p ro du c t o f  even ts  th a t  cannot be undone and o f  
fo rc e s  th a t  co n tin u e  t o  r o l l . We have made o u r d e c is io n  f o r  th e  New Econony 
and th e  New In te rn a tio n a lis m , and in  making them we have made t h is  k in d  o f  
P residency a p re ro g a tiv e  f o r  th e  e f fe c t iv e  conduct o f  o u r C o n s t itu t io n a l
sys tem ".s2
There was l i t t l e  th e o re t ic a l d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  P residency be fo re  
E isenhower.^3 A rash o f  b io g ra p h ie s  o f  th e  s tro n g  P re s id e n ts  o f  h is to r y ,  
such as C arl Sandburg’ s L in c o ln ^ j* d id  p o r tra y  th e  P re s id e n t as th e  
s a v io u r o f  th e  n a tio n . However, i t  was n o t u n t i l  th e  mid 1950s when two 
s tro n g  a c t i v i s t  Dem ocratic P re s id e n ts  had been succeeded by a R epub lican, 
who was a rguab ly  s tro n g  b u t c e r ta in ly  n o t a c t i v is t ,  th a t  l i t e r a t u r e  about 
th e  P residency p ro l i fe r a te d .^ ^  Two sepa ra te  q ue s tio n s  about P re s id e n t ia l 
power emerged: f i r s t l y  how much does th e  P re s id e n t have; and second ly , how 
much shou ld  he have?
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H ypothesis  I  
T h e " 1 9 6 0 Schoo l "3 6
The 1960 school favoured  a s tro n g  P residency and judged Congress by i t s  
a b i l i t y  and w il l in g n e s s  to  e nac t th e  P re s id e n t’ s programme. W ith in  t h i s  
p e rs p e c tiv e , th e  P re s id e n t represen ted  a n a tio n a l c o n s titu e n c y , whose w i l l  
was la rg e ly  embodied in  h is  programme. For Congress to  f a i l  to  enact t h is  
programme by g iv in g  in to  p a ro c h ia l,  s e c tio n a l o r  s p e c ia l in te r e s t  groups was 
seen as a n ti-d e m o c ra tic .s ?  As W a lte r Johnson argued, "one o f  th e  few 
p o l i t i c a l  t r u th s  about th e  American system o f  government is  th a t  the  
P re s id e n t a lone  can g iv e  th e  n a tio n  an e f fe c t iv e  le a d ".3® As regards th e  
le g is la tu r e ,  " a t  b es t Congress was a lo y a l h e lpm a te .. . a t  w o rs t, i t  was an 
agg ress ive  backseat d r iv e r . . ."® ®  Marcus C u n l i f fe  would conclude, 
" . . . H is t o r ic a l l y , t h e  le g is la t iv e  branch has sought t o  weaken e xe cu tive  
a u th o r ity  th rough  je a lo u s  o b s tru c tio n is m . The e xe cu tive  branch is  th e  hero 
o f  th e  s to ry  o f  American Federal government. Congress th e  v i l la n " . * ®  The 
1960 School a llow ed  f o r  no o th e r n a t io n a l,  p o l i t i c a l  o r  governmental 
le a d e rs h ip  than th e  P re s id e n t’ s .
The new th e o ry  was founded on new assum ptions concern ing  th e  p o l i t i c a l  
system and i t s  env ironm ent. F i r s t l y ,  i t  was m a in ta ined  th a t  th e  in s t i t u t io n s  
o f  American government cou ld  no lo n ge r re p re sen t o r  se rve  an in c re a s in g ly  
complex and d i f fe r e n t ia te d  s o c ie ty ,  and th a t  o n ly  th e  P residency cou ld  
expand t o  serve  th e  new groups and c la im s . Secondly, th e  w o rld  was viewed to  
be in  a s ta te  o f  permanent th r e a t ,  j u s t i f y in g  a p e rp e tu a lly  s tro n g  
P residency. The w o rld  was c loaked in  th e  darkness o f  th e  Cold War. I t  was 
th e  West’ s moral o b l ig a t io n  to  d e fe a t th e  e v i l  o f  Communism. An 
in te rn a t io n a l c lim a te  o f  extrem e te n s io n  and h o s t i l i t y  evo lved  between th e  
two a d v e rs a r ia l b lo c s . The th r e a t  o f  n u c le a r war became a genuine
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p o s s ib i l i t y .  A rno ld  and Roos w r i te ,  "Now a l l  th e  P re s id e n ts  were to  be
L in c o ln s , o r  more p re c is e ly ,  F ra n k lin  R o o s e v e lts ".“H
Makers o f  th e T h e o ry
The 1960 consensus was based on th e  assum ption th a t  th e  P residency d e r iv e s  
i t  g re a t v i r t u e  from  i t s  lo f t y  h e ig h t . *2 Truman used to  say th a t  th e  
P re s id e n t was th e  "o n ly  lo b b y is t  th e  whole people had in  W ashington". As 
such, i t  rose h igh  above th e  p e t ty ,  p a r t i c u la r i s t  concerns o f  Congressmen.
Herman F in e r summed up th e  se n tim en t w e ll when he described  th e  P residency
as " th e  in c a rn a tio n  o f  th e  American people in  a sacrament resem bling  th a t  in  
which th e  w a fe r and th e  w ind a re  seen as th e  body and b lood o f  C h r is t "
For th e  1960 sch oo l, th e  g re a t v i r t u e  o f  th e  P residency e n ta ile d  g re a t 
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y .  In  1956, R o s s ite r  described  th e  burden o f  th e  P residency as 
"c o lo s s a l "4 4 ; by 1960, i t  was "monstrous"**®. Corwin w ro te  o f  th e  o f f ic e  as a 
" k i l l i n g  jo b "^® ; and Koenig, a "horrendous c h a l l e n g e " ^ ? ,  indeed, th e  burden 
o f  th e  P residency was pe rce ived  as so enormous th a t  o n ly  by d e f in in g  each 
s p e c i f ic  ro le  and fu n c t io n  co u ld  one a p p re c ia te  h is  nob le  ta s k . The idea  o f  
th e  P re s id e n t as w earer o f  many "h a ts " ,  th e  u b iq u ito u s  man in  th e  American 
p o l i t i c a l  system, was a fa v o u r ite  among th e  1960 School. R o s s ite r went so 
f a r  as to  award th e  P re s id e n t e leven  h a ts : C h ie f o f  S ta te , C h ie f E xecu tive , 
Com m ander-in-Chief, C h ie f D ip lom a t, C h ie f L e g is la to r ,  C h ie f o f  P a rty , "v o ic e  
o f  th e  p eo p le ", p ro te c to r  o f  th e  peace, manager o f  th e  p ro s p e r ity ,  w o rld  
le a de r and "P re s id e n t o f  th e  W est".4®
The 1960 School saw n o t o n ly  g re a t v i r t u e  and r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  in  th e  
P res idency, b u t a ls o  g re a t power. Corwin described  th e  h is to r y  o f  th e  
P residency as th e  " h is to r y  o f  agg rand izem en t".<9 Tugwell concurred , n o tin g  
th e  "v a s t accumulation"®® o f  P re s id e n t ia l power. However, w h i ls t  th e  School 
argued th a t  a lthough  th e  P re s id e n t’ s was indeed g re a t, i t  was n o t enough. 
Koenig pe rce ived  a "chasm" between th e  amount o f  power th e  P residency needs
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and is  b e lie ve d  to  have and what i t  r e a l ly  has.®* F in e r argued th a t  th e  
e f fe c t iv e  power o f  th e  o f f ic e  was inadequate because o f  th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  
i t  had to  meet.®2 Thus, much o f  th e  w r i t in g  o f  th e  1960 School searched f o r  
ways to  reduce th e  gaps. For example, F in e r proposed th e  c re a tio n  o f  e leven 
e le c t iv e  V ic e -P re s id e n ts  to  share e x e c u tiv e  power, in  a manner s im i la r  to  
th e  B r i t is h  Cabinet.®®
Rossi t e r : The Ame r ic a n P re s id e ncy
"The P re s id e n t is  n o t a G u l l iv e r  im m ob ilized  by te n  thousand t in y  chords, 
nor even a Prometheus chained to  a rock o f  f r u s t r a t io n .  He is  ra th e r  a k in d  
o f  m a g n if ic e n t l io n ,  who can roam w id e ly  and do g re a t deeds".®*
C lin to n  R o s s ite r s e t o u t in  The A m e r ic a n P r e s id e n c y to  examine th e  
c h a ra c te r o f  th e  o f f ic e .  H is  co n c lu s io n  was s im p le , namely th a t  a 
t e r r i f y in g ly  complex w o rld  n e ce ss ita te d  one man ru le  and fo rc e d  one to  r e ly  
more and more on th a t  one man. He s ta te s ,  "we must cease w asting  ou r 
e ne rg ie s  in  d iscu ss in g  whether th e  government o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  is  going 
to  be p o w e rfu l, o r  we a re  go ing  to  be o b lite ra te d " .® ®
R o s s ite r ’ s work re p re sen ts  a s te p  fo rw a rd  from  th e  R ooseve ltian  image o f  
th e  P residency to  a model o f  what th e  o f f ic e  ought to  be. As R o s s ite r 
a ttem pted to  shape a th e o ry  o f  th e  o f f ic e ,  he was com pelled to  examine th e  
d is t r ib u t io n  o f  power in  th e  n a tio n a l p o l i t i c a l  system. A rgu ing  f o r  a s tro n g  
P res idency, he c le a r ly  envisaged th e  re la t io n s h ip  between th e  P re s id e n t and 
Congress as a balance s c a le ; an inc rease  in  th e  power o f  th e  P re s id e n t would 
n e c e s s a r ily  be accompanied by a decrease in  th e  power o f  Congress. In  o th e r 
words, i t  was a zero-sum game.
lb ® .A m e r ic a n P re s id e n c y re p re s e n ts  th e  th re s h o ld  o f  th e  f u l l  modern v iew  
o f  th e  P residency. However, in  i t ,  R o s s ite r  d ism isses th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  
enhancing th e  P re s id e n t’ s power th rough  sys te m a tic  re fo rm . R ather he argues
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t h a t  th e  P re s id e n t must le a rn  to  l i v e  w ith in  a "c o o rd in a te " p o l i t i c a l  system 
and he s im p ly  d ir e c ts  Congress on th e  n e c e s s ity  o f  fo l lo w in g  th e  P re s id e n t.
The f u l l  blown modern v iew  o f  th e  P residency e la b o ra te s  on R o s s ite r 's  work 
by le a v in g  a s ide  th e  s e p a ra tio n  o f  powers d o c tr in e  and fo c u s in g  n o t on th e  
s t ru c tu ra l and in s t i t u t io n a l  c h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f  th e  o f f ic e ,  b u t on th e  
dynamic process o f  le a d e rs h ip . The e x p l i c i t  in te r e s t  is  th e  m ax im iza tion  o f  
le a d e rs h ip  p o s s ib i l i t ie s .  N eus tad t’ s Pr®s.id®!2M§.] P®w®E™ and B urn ’ s 
j^ .a d lg ck  o f  petTracracySJ a re  th e  two most s ig n i f ic a n t  works re o re se n tin g  t h is  
modern v iew  o f  th e  P res idency.
T h eN eu s tad t Mod : P re s id e n t ia lP o w e r: th e p o w e r to  persuade.
"The separateness o f  in s t i t u t io n s  and th e  sh a rin g  o f  a u th o r ity  p re s c rib e s  
th e  term s on which a P re s id e n t persuades. When one man shares a u th o r ity  w ith  
a no the r, b u t does n o t ga in  o r  lo se  h is  jo b  upon th e  o th e r ’ s whim, h is  
w il l in g n e s s  to  a c t upon th e  u rg in g  o f  o th e rs  tu rn s  on whether he conce ives 
th e  a c tio n  r ig h t  f o r  him . The essence o f  a P re s id e n t’ s  persuas ive  ta s k  is  to  
convince  such men th a t  what th e  W hite House wants o f  them is  what th e y  ought 
to  do f o r  t h e i r  sake and on t h e i r  a u th o r ity ".® ®
In  P r e s id e n t ia lP o w e r ,N e u s ta d t  s e t  o u t to  examine th e  P residency as a 
problem  in  d e c is io n  th e o ry . The model probes th e  c h a ra c te r o f  P re s id e n t ia l 
power and concludes, "P re s id e n t ia l power is  th e  power to  persuade".®® The 
N eustadt model is  concerned w ith  th e  l ik e l ih o o d  th a t  th e  P re s id e n t would 
f a i l  t o  be p o l i t i c a l l y  e f fe c t iv e  because o f  th e  r e s t r a in ts  imposed on him by 
o th e r e lem ents in  th e  p o l i t i c a l  system, th e  advantages o f  o th e rs  in  th a t  
system and because o f  h is  own f a i lu r e  to  e x e rc is e  s k i l le d  le a d e rs h ip . 
N eustadt w r i te s ,  " in  form  a l l  P re s id e n ts  a re  leade rs  b u t t h i s  guarantees no 
more than  the y  w i l l  be c le rks".® ®  C e r ta in ly ,  the  P re s id e n t has g re a t and
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d iv e rs e  resources b u t he has power o n ly  in s o fa r  as he can employ them in  
n e g o tia t io n s  and b a rg a in in g . N eustadt d ram atized h is  p o in t :  in  th e  run-up to  
th e  1952 P re s id e n t ia l e le c t io n ,  P re s id e n t Truman would ponder ove r th e  
problems o f  th e  General -  become -  P re s id e n t shou ld  Eisenhower w in  th e  
fo rthco m in g  e le c t io n .  "He’ l l  s i t  here and he ’ l l  say, ’ Do t h is !  Do t h a t ! ’ And
n o th in g  w i l l  happen. Poor Ik e  i t  won’ t  be a b i t  l ik e  th e  Army".®*
Governmental power is  in f lu e n c e  o f  an e f fe c t iv e  k in d  on th e  behaviour o f
men a c tu a lly  in vo lve d  in  fo rm u la tin g  and im plem enting fo re ig n  p o l ic y .  The
N eustad tian  model is  b u i l t  on th e  assu irp tion  th a t  success fu l in f lu e n c e  f o r  
th e  P re s id e n t stems from :
a) b a rg a in in g  advantages in h e re n t in  th e  o f f ic e  w ith  which to  persuade o th e r 
men th a t  what he wants o f  them is  what t h e i r  own r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  re q u ire  
them to  do;
b) th e  e xp e c ta tio n s  o f  those  o th e r  men concern ing  h is  a b i l i t y  and w i l l  t o  
use th e  v a r io u s  advantages th e y  p e rce ive  him as hav ing ;
(c )  those  men’ s e s tim a te s  o f  how th e  p u b lic  v iew s him and o f  how t h e i r  own 
p u b lic s  may view  them i f  th e y  do as th e  P re s id e n t wants.®® N eustadt s ta te s ,  
" in  s h o r t ,  h is  power is  th e  p ro du c t o f  h is  vantage p o in ts  in  government, 
to g e th e r w ith  h is  re p u ta t io n  in  th e  Washington community and h is  p re s t ig e  
outside".® ®
By conse rv ing  h is  in f lu e n c e  and understand ing  h is  p o s it io n ,  th e  P re s id e n t 
can overcome th e  l im ita t io n s  imposed by h is  environm ent. T h e re fo re , th e  ta s k  
is  t o  overcome th e  b a r r ie rs  imposed by th e  se p a ra tio n  o f  powers. To th e  
degree th a t  th e  P re s id e n t can persuade he can overcome th e  f r u s t r a t io n s  
in h e re n t in  th e  s e p a ra tio n  o f  powers.
P re s id e n t ia l cho ices e i th e r  enhance o r  d is s ip a te  a P re s id e n t’ s power. 
N eustadt argues th a t ,  "a  P re s id e n t is  so u n iq u e ly  s itu a te d  and h is  p o l ic y  so 
bound up w ith  th e  uniqueness o f  h is  p la ce , th a t  he can coun t on no one e ls e  
to  be p e rc e p tiv e  f o r  h im ".®* N e u s ta d t’ s h ypo thes is  a ttem p ts  to  in s t r u c t  th e  
P re s id e n t on how to  work w ith in  these  l im ita t io n s  in  o rd e r t o  have th e
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g re a te s t o p p o r tu n ity  f o r  overcom ing them. The model suggests a d e c is io n  
th e o ry  to  h e lp  th e  P re s id e n t in  h is  quest to  impose h is  w i l l  on o th e rs : The 
P re s id e n t must in q u ire  o f  each p o te n t ia l d e c is io n : ’ What w i l l  t h is  do f o r  my 
po w e r.’ Each a c tio n  bears on h is  p re sen t and fu tu re  power to  persuade and 
th e  P re s id e n t who is  most a b le  to  maximise h is  power w i l l  be most e f fe c t iv e  
a t  le a d e rs h ip . Thus, N eustadt concludes th a t  a P re s id e n t’ s c a p a c ity  to  lead 
re s u lts  f ra n  h is  adeptness a t  persuasion.®®
A C r i t iq u e .
As P e te r S p e r lic h  p o in ts  o u t, a lthough  N eustad t’ s  model has a pe rsuas ive  
r in g ,  t h i s  in  p a r t  t e s t i f i e s  to  an u lt im a te  weakness f o r  N eustadt f a i l s  t o  
co n s id e r o th e r a lte rn a tiv e s .® ®  There is  a tendency in  P.r.e®ld®QE.i§.l PPW^rJr:® 
d e p ic t  th e  P re s id e n t as a lo n e ly  f ig h t e r  a g a in s t a l l  o th e rs . Those w ith  whom 
th e  P re s id e n t must deal a re  seen as h is  n a tu ra l a d v e rs a rie s . S p e r lic h  
p o s its ,  " i s  i t  so in co n ce iva b le  th a t  some persons may gen u in e ly  want to  he lp  
a President?"®? Not everyone in  th e  P re s id e n t’ s environm ent can be a 
b a rg a in e r and n o t everyone wants to  be.
N eus tad t’ s model a ls o  assumes th a t  no one can see th in g s  as th e  P re s id e n t 
does because no one can stand  e x a c t ly  in  h is  p la ce . However, what is  unique 
is  o n ly  in te r p r e ta t io n  and n o t th e  c o n s t itu e n t e lem ents. P re s id e n t 
f a i l s  to  a p p re c ia te  th a t  a P re s id e n t who would always ba rga in  and who would 
a lone  c a rry  o u t a l l  th e  ta s k s  assoc ia ted  w ith  success fu l b a rg a in in g , would 
soon be b u rie d  by o ve rloa d .
"Command" and "pe rsuas ion " a re  th e  o n ly  two ways in  which a P re s id e n t can 
in f lu e n c e  th e  a c tio n  o f  o th e rs  which th e  model co n s id e rs . However, a re  
command and persuasion th e  f u l l  range o f  in flu e n c e  a lte rn a t iv e s ?  Is  cormand 
as co u n te rp ro d u c tiv e  as th e  model d esc rib e s  and is  b a rg a in in g  as p ro p it io u s ?
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The model f a i l s  to  ta ke  in to  account ro u tin e  P re s id e n t ia l requests  which a re  
acted  upon w ith o u t b a rg a in in g  and w ith o u t command, th u s  te n d in g  to  ove r­
emphasize th e  d ram a tic  n a tu re  o f  .P re s id e n tia lP o w e r.
• Not a l l  p o te n t ia l r e c ip ie n ts  o f  P re s id e n t ia l in f lu e n c e  a re  equal o r  
independent. T h is  im p lie s  th a t  th e  need f o r  b a rg a in in g  s t ra te g ie s  v a r ie s  
d i r e c t ly  w ith  th e  im portance o f  th e  issue  and th e  independence o f  th e  
in f lu e n c e  re c ip ie n t .  S p e r lic h  contends, " i f  a P re s id e n t were to  fo l lo w  
N e us tad t’ s p re s c r ip t io n  a t  a l l  t im e s , th e re  would be ve ry  l i t t l e  d if fe re n c e  
in  h is  approach to  h is  D ire c to r  o f  th e  Bureau o f  Budget about a m inor item  
and h is  approach to  an o p p o s it io n  Senator in  re sp ec t to  a m ajor new 
p o licy ".® ®  N eustadt makes no re fe ren ce  to  d e p r iv a t io n  o r  in s tru m e n ta l 
rewards, and must a P re s id e n t a lways barga in? O ften  one is  l e f t  pondering 
w hether pow er-m axim iza tion  is  an end in  its e lf .® ®
Burns in  D e a d lo c k o fD e m o c ra c y re p re s e n ts  th e  n e x t lo g ic a l s tep  in  th e
development o f  th e  modern P residency th e o ry . Burns s tands back from  th e  view  
o f  le a d e rs h ip  dynamics, which p re v a ils  in  th e  N eustad tian  model, to  
co n ce n tra te  on a concep tion  o f  th e  P residency w ith in  th e  s t ru c tu re  o f  
n a tio n a l government. However, both  Neustadt and Burns e x to l th e  n o tio n  o f  
expanded P re s id e n t ia l power. Burns s ta te s ,  " th e  P re s id e n t ia l le a de r 
m u s t...b e  a c o n s tru c t iv e  in n o v a to r who can re-shape to  some degree th e  
c o n s te l la t io n  o f  p o l i t i c a l  fo rc e s  in  which he opera tes".?®
D ead lo cko fD em ocr a c y fo c u s e s  on th e  in s t i t u t io n a l  and p a r ty  fo u n d a tio n s  
o f  American n a tio n a l p o l i t i c s  and asks whether th e y  su pp o rt o r  h in d e r th e  
P re s id e n t. As A rno ld  and Roos p o in t  o u t, " h is  a n a ly s is  c u ts  to  th e  h e a rt o f  
th e  s e p a ra tio n  o f  powers which works to  negate e x e cu tive  power and 
independence".?* The Burns a n a ly s is  l ie s  a t  th e  le v e l o f  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s :  
Each o f  th e  m ajor n a tio n a l p a r t ie s  has a P re s id e n t ia l and C ongressional 
s id e , which in  tu rn  r e f le c ts  a M adisonian o r  J e ffe rs o n ia n  t r a d i t io n .  A rno ld  
and Roos s ta te  B urns’ argument th u s : " th e  s e p a ra tio n  o f  powers has c rea ted  a 
s c h iz o id  p o l i t i c a l  system. The P residency and Congress each re s ts  on
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d i f f e r e n t  c o n s titu e n c ie s , m a n ife s ts  d i f f e r e n t  in te r e s ts  and in v o lv e s  
d i f f e r e n t  p o l i t i c a l  processes. One checks ra th e r  than suppo rts  th e  o the r".?®
The system o f  checks and balances makes dynamic le a d e rsh ip  im p o ss ib le , th e  
P re s id e n t be ing th e  o n ly  p o s s ib le  source o f  th a t  le a d e rs h ip . Burns contends, 
" th e  ta s k  o f  govern ing  is  ha rde r in  th e  U n ited  S ta te s , f o r  th e  le a d e r . . .must 
b r in g  to g e th e r th e  r ig h t  com b ina tion  o f  P re s id e n t ia l p a r ty  and Congressional 
p a rty ".?®  He m a in ta in s  th a t  th e  o n ly  way to  overcome th e  problem is  th rough  
m a jo r ity  su pp o rt f o r  P re s id e n t ia l le a d e rs . O therw ise, he s ta te s ,  "we can 
choose bo ld  and c re a t iv e  le a de rs  w ith o u t g iv in g  them th e  means to  make t h e i r  
le a d e rsh ip  e f fe c t iv e .  Hence we d im in is h  a democracy’ s most e s s e n tia l and 
p r ic e le s s  commodity -  th e  le a d e rsh ip  o f  men who a re  w i l l i n g  t o  move ahead to  
meet emerging p rob lem s".?*
" In  summary, th e n " , w r i te s  Andrews, " th e  1960 w r i te r s  g lo r i f ie d  th e  
P re s id e n c y .. .T ha t in s t i t u t io n  in ca rna te d  governmental v i r t u e .  I f  o n ly  i t  
cou ld  be made v i r t u a l l y  om n ipo tent th rough  in s t i t u t io n a l  re form s and by 
e le c t in g  men w ith  enough w i l l  power and s k i l l ,  th e  P residency cou ld  s o lv e  as 
many problems as humanly poss ib le ".? ®
As Hodgson p o in ts  o u t, w h ile  th e  l ib e r a l  programme appeared to  be w ork ing  
a t  home and guaran tee ing  n a tio n a l s e c u r ity  and honour abroad, th e re  was 
l i t t l e  in c l in a t io n  to  ch a llen g e  th e  powers o f  th e  P residen t.?®  However, he 
c o n tin u e s , " f o r  th e  f i r s t  t im e , and as a d i r e c t  r e s u lt  o f  th e  Vietnam War, 
th e  idea  began to  spread th a t  i f  th e  P residency was n o t as s tro n g  as i t  
needed to  be in  o rd e r to  do what l ib e r a ls  wanted to  do a t  hone, i t  m igh t be 
a lto g e th e r  to o  f re e  to  roam l i k e  a m igh ty  l io n  and do g re a t deeds abroad"*?? 
Aaron W ildavsky f i r s t  drew a d is t in c t io n  between th e  fo re ig n  and dom estic 
P re s id en c ie s  in  an a r t i c le  , "The Two P re s id en c ie s " which appeared in  1966.
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"The Two P re s id en c ie  T hes is .
"The U n ited  S ta te s  has one P re s id e n t, b u t i t  has two p re s id e n c ie s : one 
P residency is  f o r  dom estic a f f a i r s  and th e  o th e r is  concerned w ith  defence 
and fo re ig n  p o l ic y .  S ince W orld War I I ,  P re s id en ts  have had much g re a te r  
success in  c o n t r o l l in g  th e  n a t io n ’ s defence and fo re ig n  p o l ic ie s  than  in  
dom ina ting  i t s  dom estic p o lic ie s " .? ®
In  1966 W ildavsky argued th a t  th e  P re s id e n t e xe rte d  g re a te r  c o n tro l over 
fo re ig n  and defence p o l ic y  than  dom estic . H is  ev idence f o r  t h is  "two
P re s id e n c ie s " th e s is  was th a t  Congress passes s u b s ta n t ia l ly  more
P re s id e n t ia l p roposa ls  in  th e  realm  o f  fo re ig n  and defence p o l ic y  than  in  
dom estic . To s u b s ta n t ia te  h is  th e s is ,  W ildavsky com piled from  th e
C ongressional Q u a rte r ly  S e rv ice  ta b u la t io n  o f  P re s id e n t ia l i n i t i a t i v e s  and 
Congressional responses, 1948 -  1964.?® He s ta te d , "when re fugees and
im m ig ra tion  -  which Congress co n s id e rs  p r im a r i ly  a dom estic  concern -  are  
removed frcxm th e  general fo re ig n  p o l ic y  area, i t  is  c le a r  th a t  P re s id en ts  
p re v a il about seventy per c e n t o f  th e  tim e  in  defence and fo re ig n  p o l ic y ,  
compared w ith  f o r t y  pe r ce n t in  th e  dom estic sphere".®®
The "Two P re s id en c ie s " argued th a t  fo re ig n  and dom estic p o l ic y  a re  shaped 
in  d is t in c t  p o l i t i c a l  arenas, marked by d i f f e r e n t  p o l i t i c a l  c o n f ig u ra tio n s : 
(1 ) due to  th e  in te rn a t io n a l r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  assumed by th e  U n ited  S ta te s  
in  th e  a fte rm a th  o f  W orld War Two, fo re ig n  p o l ic y  has come to  dom inate th e  
P re s id e n t’ s agenda. The pace o f  in te rn a t io n a l even ts is  ra p id , d e c is io n s  are  
i r r e v e r s ib le ,  and success o r  f a i lu r e  is  q u ic k ly  c le a r ,  (2 ) fo re ig n  p o l ic y  is  
la rg e ly  o u ts id e  th e  f i e l d  o f  p a r t is a n  c o n f l i c t ;  u n l ik e  dom estic p o l ic y ,  th e  
P re s id e n t does n o t in h e r i t  a d e ta ile d  p a r ty  programme in  fo re ig n  p o l ic y ,  (3 )
th e  P re s id e n t’ s co m p e tito rs  a re  weak in  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  -  Congress
isfragm ented  and th e  p u b lic  unin form ed. For W ildavsky th e  key to
P re s id e n t ia l power in  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  d id  n o t l i e  in  th e  C o n s t itu t io n a l
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fo u n d a tio n s , b u t in  changes th a t  had taken  p lace  in  th e  in te rn a t io n a l system 
s in c e  1945. The growth in  th e  number o f  T h ird  World n a tio n s , th e  e x is te n ce  
o f  n u c le a r weapons, th e  th r e a t  o f  th e  h o loca u s t and th e  Cold War were a l l  
c i te d  by W ildavsky as reasons why fo re ig n  p o l ic y  tended to  d r iv e  o u t 
dom estic concerns.
There a re  two reasons as to  why th e  idea  o f  "tw o P re s id en c ie s " gained 
prominence d u r in g  th e  la te  1960s: (1 ) th e  Cold W ar's  emphasis on th e  
c o n tin u in g  spread o f  Communism which tended to  exaggerate c r i s i s  d e c is io n  -  
making and n a tio n a l s e c u r ity  issu e s , (2 ) th e  m ethod ica l weakness o f  th e  case 
s tud ie s .® *
A C r i t iq u e .
O nly Eisenhower was c le a r ly  more success fu l in  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  than  modern 
T w en tie th  Century P re s id e n ts . From N ixon ’ s Vietnam p o l ic ie s  and F o rd ’ s 
a ttem p ts  to  in te rv e n e  in  Angola, to  Reagan’ s d i f f i c u l t i e s  g a in in g  su pp o rt 
f o r  th e  C ontras and S .D . I . ,  i t  i s  c le a r  th a t  P re s id e n t ia l c o n tro l o f  fo re ig n  
p o l ic y  is  n o t as com plete as W ildavsky once argued.
Those who la rg e ly  agree w ith  th e  "two P re s id en c ie s " th e s is  in c lu d e , Cohen, 
F le is h e r  and Bond, Rourke and Leloup and Shull;®® those  who g e n e ra lly  
d isa g re e  in c lu d e , C a rte r , Edwards, Peppers and Sigelman.®® However, 
re g a rd le ss  o f  t h is  debate, th e re  a re  seve ra l und ispu ted  fa c ts :  (a ) th e
genera l le v e l o f  C ongressional su p p o rt f o r  th e  P re s id e n t has d e c lin e d , (b ) 
th e  re la t io n s h ip  between th e  two branches is  c o n s ta n tly  in  f lu x ,  and (c )  in  
th e  p a s t , a n a ly s is  has tended to  ove r o r  under e s tim a te  Congress’ im pact on 
th e  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  processes.
W ildavsky ’ s t h i r t y  p o in t  m argin o f  d if fe re n c e  occurred  d u r in g  a tim e  span 
co ve rin g  th e  most f r i g i d  p e r io d s  o f  th e  Cold War, when Congress d isp la ye d  
g re a t deference to  P re s id e n ts  a c t in g  as Com mander-in-Chief and C h ie f 
D ip lom a t. In  c o n tra s t,  d u r in g  th e  p e r io d , 1965 -  1975, Leloup and S h u l l ’ s
48
a n a ly s is  o f  P re s id e n t ia l boxscores found th a t  Congress adopted f o r t y - s ix  per 
ce n t o f  th e  P re s id e n ts ’ dom estic reques ts  and f i f t y - f i v e  o f  t h e i r  fo re ig n  
and defence p roposa ls.® * T h is  n in e  p o in t  margin is  a t  sharp va ria n ce  w ith  
W ilda vsky ’ s t h i r t y  p o in ts ,  a lthough  i t  does p o in t  in  th e  same d ire c t io n .
Siegelman contends, " th e  m a jo r problem  w ith  P re s id e n t ia l boxscores is  th a t  
so many o f  th e  C ongressional r o l l  c a l ls  on which on which the y  a re  based 
re la te  to  n o n -c o n tro v e rs ia l and in co nse q ue n tia l issu e s . As a r e s u l t ,  th e  
measures a re  an in d is c r im in a te  m ix tu re  o f  a few app les -  m ajor p ieces o f  
le g is la t io n  -  am idst a m yriad o f  oranges -  r e la t iv e ly  t r i v i a l  concerns".®® 
A lso , P re s id e n t ia l p roposa ls  go th rough  many m o d if ic a t io n s  p r io r  to  f in a l  
Congressional approva l o r  re je c t io n .  As such. Sigelman decided to  use a more 
r e s t r ic t iv e  measure o f  P re s id e n t ia l success. He looked a t  vo te s  on which th e  
P re s id e n t had taken a p o s it io n  ra th e r  than  a t  P re s id e n t ia l in i t i a t i v e s .  
A n a ly s is  was l im ite d  to  key vo te s  as determ ined by th e  Congressional 
Q u a r te r ly . However, key vo te s  a re  a ls o  p ro b le m a tic  because th e y  are  sm all in  
number and, th e re fo re , s h i f t s  on a few c lo s e  vo tes  can lead to  la rg e  s h i f t s  
in  th e  percentage o f  vo te s  won.®®
W r it in g  in  1975, a lm ost a decade a f t e r  W ildavsky ’ s o r ig in a l th e s is ,  Donald 
Peppers p o in ts  o u t th a t  th e re  is  a tendency in  "The Two P re s id en c ie s " to  
confuse a P re s id e n t’ s ju r is d ic t io n a l  c o n tro l over governmental d e c is io n s  
w ith  a c tu a l power. In  th e  f i r s t  p lace  a P re s id e n t cannot p h y s ic a lly  c a rry  
o u t p o l ic y :  Peppers uses, as an example, Kennedy’ s d e c is io n  to  w ithd raw  th e  
J u p i te r  m is s ile s  from  Turkey. Kennedy cou ld  n o t d ism a n tle  them and take  them 
back to  America h im s e lf,  th u s  e nsu ring  th e  f u l l  e xecu tio n  o f  h is  p o l ic y .  
D ecis ion-m aking may be th e  P re s id e n t’ s  p re ro g a tiv e  b u t o n ly  th e  o rg a n is a tio n  
under him can implement h is  d e c is io n s . The P re s id e n t is  r e l ia n t  upon o th e rs  
f o r  in fo rm a tio n  and im p lem en ta tion . Heads o f  departm ents and o th e r 
b u re a u c ra tic  p la y e rs  w i l l  emphasize o p tio n s  which w i l l  f u r th e r  th e  in te re s ts  
o f  t h e i r  own o rg an isa tion s .® ?  W ildavsky a ls o  o ve rlo o ks  th e  f a c t  th a t  p u b lic  
o p in io n . Congress, th e  m i l i t a r y  e s ta b lish m e n t and th e  S ta te  Deparünent a l l
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in f lu e n c e  a P re s id e n t to  do what he o th e rw ise  would n o t have done. Peppers 
contends, " i f  the  p u b lic  he ld  Johnson accoun tab le , i t  was th e  bureaucracy 
under him th a t  led  him to  b e lie v e  each e s c a la t in g  s tep  to  be th e  tu rn in g  
p o in t  o f  th e  war".®®
However, perhaps th e  most n o ta b le  change accord ing  to  Peppers in  th e  years 
s in c e  th e  p u b lic a t io n  o f  "The Two P re s id en c ie s " has been a b lu r r in g  in  
d is t in c t io n  between fo re ig n  and dom estic a f f a i r s .  Today fo re ig n  p o l ic y  is  
in c re a s in g ly  n o n -m il i ta ry  and h e a v ily  econanic in  emphasis.®®
I t  is  more than two decades s in c e  W ilda vsky ’ s th e s is  dram atised 
P re s id e n t ia l c o n tro l o f  fo re ig n  p o l ic y .  What remains? F i r s t l y ,  p a r tis a n  and 
id e o lo g ic a l d iv is io n s  do n o t e f f e c t  a l l  areas o f  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  e q u a lly ,  
second ly , because fo re ig n  p o l ic y  is  more l i k e  dom estic p o l ic y ,  t h is  does n o t 
p re ven t P re s id e n t ia l success. Today, however, success is  more dependent on 
p op u la r appeal. T h ird ly ,  much o f  th e  P re s id e n t’ s powers is  beyond th e  reach
o f  Congress -  f o r  example, th e  Com mander-in-Chief power. ®®
However, th e  idea  o f  two P res id en c ie s  was p icked  up. I t  was a n a tu ra l
p ro g ress io n  from  th e  n o tio n  th a t  th e  P re s id e n t had more power in  fo re ig n
p o l ic y  to  th e  idea  th a t  he had to o  much.
In  a 1969 book, A r th u r  M. S ch le s in g e r J n r, acknowledged doubts grow ing f o r  
som e tim e  . . .  re g a rd in g . . . th e  th e s is  o f  th e  s tro n g  P res idency"® *; Hans 
Morgenthau, who in  th e  p a s t had urged P re s id e n ts  t o  a s e r t  t h e i r  
C o n s t itu t io n a l powers a g a in s t Congress, im pe lle d  th e  Senate to  re s to re  i t s  
own vanquished power.®®
H ypothes is  I I
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Sim ultaneous and in  c o n ju n c tio n  w ith  th e  preva lence  o f  s tro n g  P residency 
l i t e r a t u r e ,  and perhaps in  p o l i t i c a l  re a c tio n , came th e  r is e  o f  a m in o r ity  
a n ti-P re s id e n c y  v iew , th e  " l i t e r a r y  th e o ry " sch oo l. S cho la rs  such as 
W illm oore  K e n d a ll, E rnest G r i f f i t h  and James Burnham®® perce ived  
C ongressional p a r i t y  o r  even dominance as a p re re q u is ite  to  th e  re v iv a l o f  
sound p o l i t i c a l  o rd e r. Nelson Polsby argued th a t  a Congress was n o t a 
rubber-stam p f o r  th e  P re s id e n t. Thus, th e  p e rs p e c tiv e  emphasized th a t  
Congress was designed by th e  Founding Fa the rs as p a r t  o f  a scheme o f  checks 
and balances. T h e re fo re , i f  Congress checks th e  P re s id e n t by re fu s in g  to  
enac t one o f  h is  b i l l s  i t  is  s im p ly  pe rfo rm ing  as in tended .
However, what is  im p o rta n t about both  hypotheses is  th a t  w h ile  can ing to  
d i f f e r e n t  conc lus io n s  about th e  balance o f  power between th e  P re s id e n t and 
Congress, the y  both share one fundam ental assum ption: one must n e c e s s a r ily  
chose between a s tro n g  Congress and a s tro n g  P re s id e n t.
The Time o f  R ev is ion
"Power revea led  is  power reduced; power concealed is  power enhanced".®* 
H un ting ton  contends, " in  g e n e ra l, i f  i t  becomes w id e ly  accepted th a t  th e  
P residency la cks  e x te n s iv e  power and th a t  i t s  occupant is  re a d ily  checked by 
o th e r o f f i c i a l s  and groups, t h i s  f a c t  in  i t s e l f  i s  evidence o f  suppo rt f o r  
P re s id e n t ia l power. I f ,  on th e  o th e r hand, people b e lie v e  th a t  th e  P re s id e n t 
is  n o t so pow erfu l o r  th a t  h is  power is  d e c lin in g  when P re s id e n t ia l power is  
r e a l ly  g re a t, p u b lic  o p in io n  never co ns ide rs  i t  to  be g re a t; when 
P re s id e n t ia l power is  fa d in g , p u b lic  o p in io n  co n s id e rs  i t  in o rd in a te " .  T h is  
is  th e  power paradox.®®
The Vietnam War hera lded  th e  end o f  an American e ra . R e s p o n s ib il ity  f o r  
d e fe a t was p laced sq u a re ly  a t  th e  fe e t  o f  th e  P re s id e n t. Four success ive  
P re s id e n ts  had plunged Am erica in to  th e  m ire  o f  South East A s ia . But more
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im p o r ta n t ly ,  w ith  N ixon ’ s a r r iv a l  in  o f f ic e  in  1968, th e  l ib e r a ls  who had 
e x to l le d  expansive P re s id e n t ia l power, now had to  contend w ith  a R epublican
in  th e  W hite House. The L ib e ra ls  had wanted a s tro n g  P residency because the y
assumed th a t  a s tro n g  P re s id e n t would always be on t h e i r  s id e . As Eisenhower 
handed over h is  o f f ic e  to  Kennedy, th e re  were few who would have b e lie ve d  
i t  p o s s ib le  th a t  w ith in  a decade, a co n s e rv a tiv e  would have become th e  
s tro n g e s t P re s id e n t o f  a ll® ® . Hodgson w r i te s ,  " th e  r i f t  between 
in te l le c tu a ls  and th e  W hite House, f i r m  a l l i e s  s in c e  th e  days o f  th e  New 
Deal" had emerged. " . . .T h e  ground was th o ro u g h ly  prepared f o r  th e  o rgy o f  
h a n d w ritin g  and la m e n ta tio n  th a t  g reeted  th e  W hite House re v e la t io n s . . .Now 
th e  re ve rsa l was com plete. The advocates o f  P re s id e n t ia l power became th e  
scourges o f  th e  ’ Im p e ria l P re s id en cy ’ ".®?
A p re cu rso r o f  S c h le s in g e r ’ s s tu d y , T h e Im p e r ia lP re s id e n c y ® ® ,w a s  George 
Reedy’ s .T w ilig h t o f th e P r e s id e n c y .® ® In  1970, Reedy, Johnson’ s fo rm e r press 
s e c re ta ry , warned th a t  th e  W hite House was becoming a c o u r t.  "The 
P re s id en cy", he m a in ta ined , "had taken  on a l l  th e  re g a lia  o f  monarchy excep t 
erm ine robes, a s ce p te r and a crown".*®® Reedy d e p ic te d  th e  P residency as 
is o la te d  from  r e a l i t y ,  convinced o f  h is  own goodness and "p ro te c te d " by "a  
human w a ll o f  sycophants who served as h is  s ta f f " . * ® *  He co n tin u ed , "somehow 
we must le a rn  to  govern o u r people from  an o f f ic e  th a t  is  s e c u la r and n o t 
from  a c o u r t  th a t  is  s a n c tif ie d " .*® ®  In  1975, C a lifa n o , who served under
Johnson s ta te d , " th e  fo rc e s  now a t  p la y  in  ou r s o c ie ty  w i l l  p ress tow ards a
dangerous c o n c e n tra tio n  o f  P re s id e n t ia l power".*®®
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S c h le s in g e r :T he Im pe r i a l P res idency.
"The American p o l i t i c a l  system , though m isconceived by some as made up o f  
th re e  c o o rd in a te  branches o f  equal powers, has worked b es t as a P re s id e n t ia l 
system. O nly s tro n g  P re s id e n ts  have been a b le  to  overcame th e  tendenc ies  
tow ard in e r t ia  in h e re n t in  a s t ru c tu re  so cu n n in g ly  composed o f  checks and 
ba lances". (1962)*®*
"What th e  co u n try  needs today  is  a l i t t l e  s e r io u s  d is re s p e c t f o r  th e  o f f ic e  
o f  th e  P residency; a re fu s a l to  g iv e  any more w e ig h t to  th e  P re s id e n t’ s 
words than  th e  in te l l ig e n c e  o f  th e  u tte ra n c e , i f  spoken by anyone e ls e  ,
would command; an unders tand ing  o f  a p o in t  made so a p t ly  by M ontaigne: ’ S i t
he on never so h igh  a th ro n e , a man s t i l l  s i t s  on h is  bo ttom ". (1973)*®®
The Im p e r ia lP re s id en c y i s l a r g e l y  a h is to r y  o f  th e  P re s id e n t’ s war-m aking 
powers. S c h le s in g e r’ s main concern i s  w ith  th e  apparent s h i f t  in  the  
c o n s t itu t io n a l balance between Congress and th e  P re s id e n t. He contends th a t  
P re s id e n t ia l power had become so expanded and abused, th a t  i t  th rea tened  th e  
C o n s t itu t io n a l system. He argues th a t  th e  o r ig in a l c o n s t i tu t io n a l 
understand ing  was f o r  Congress to  decide  f o r  war o r  peace (excep t in  th e
even t o f  s u rp r is e  a tta c k  which th e  P re s id e n t on h is  own a u th o r ity  m igh t
re p e l) ,  and th a t  th e  Commander-in-Chief c lause  d id  n o t v e s t th e  P re s id e n t 
w ith  independent c o n s t i tu t io n a l a u th o r ity  to  carmence h o s t i l i t i e s .
W r it in g  in  1973,am idst th e  c o n tin u in g  u n p o p u la r ity  o f  th e  Vietnam War and 
th e  traum a o f  W atergate, S c h le s in g e r ’ s c o n te n tio n  th a t  P re s id e n t ia l power 
had a tta in e d  a s ta te  o f  extrem e aggrandizem ent seemed ju s t i f i e d  and ve ry  
a p t. However, S ch les in g e r argued th a t  th e  Vietnam War and W atergate were n o t 
is o la te d  in s tan ce s  o f  u s u rp tio n s  o f  P re s id e n t ia l power b u t m ere ly th e  c lim ax  
o f  rampant P re s id e n t ia l ascendence, p re v a il in g  s in c e  th e  C o n s t itu t io n a l
53
Convention o f  1787. As such, he e xp lo re s  two v i t a l  in s tru m e n ts  th a t  gave 
r is e  to  the  abuse o f  power by th e  P re s id e n t: war power and secrecy.
S ch le s in g e r regards P re s id e n t ia l wars launched s im p ly  by th e  C h ie f 
E xe cu tive s ’ f i a t  as th e  fo u n d a tio n  o f  th e  Im p e ria l P res idency, c u lm in a tin g  
in  th e  T w en tie th  Century w ith  th e  Korean and Vietnam c o n f l ic t s .  The 
increased use o f  E xecu tive  Agreements and expansive e xe cu tive  p r iv i le g e  
fu r th e r  secured fo re ig n  p o l ic y  as th e  p r in c ip a l arena o f  th e  Im p e ria l 
P res idency. P re s id e n t ia l p rim acy, S ch les in g e r argued, had become 
P re s id e n t ia l supremacy. He s ta te d , " th e  image o f  th e  P re s id e n t a c tin g  by 
h im s e lf in  fo re ig n  a f f a i r s ,  im posing h is  own sense o f  r e a l i t y  and n e c e s s ity  
on a w a it in g  government and peop le , became th e  new orthodoxy".*® ®
The P re s id e n t co n s o lid a te d  h is  r is e  in  fo re ig n  a f f a i r s  w ith  such 
programmes as th e  New Deal and th e  G reat S o c ie ty  in  th e  dom estic sphere. The 
expansion o f  th e  n a tio n a l economy, dominated by in te r s ta te  and in te rn a t io n a l 
business and l ia b le  to  c o n tro l th rough  n a tio n a l re g u la t io n  re s u lte d  in  a 
P residency which a p p ro p ria te d  th e  power o f  Congress in  both fo re ig n  and 
dom estic a f f a i r s .  Thus, S ch le s in g e r concluded, "by th e  e a r ly  1970s, th e  
American P re s id e n t had become on issues o f  war and peace th e  most a bso lu te  
monarch. . . among th e  g re a t powers o f  th e  w orld ".*® ?
A C r i t ique
P ious s ta te s ,  " i t  is  in  S c h le s in g e r’ s tre a tm e n t o f  F ra n k lin  D. R ooseve lt, 
H arry  S. Truman, and John F. Kennedy th a t  c e r ta in  q u a s i-c o n s t itu t io n a l 
s tandards a re  smuggled in to  th e  argument".*®® R ooseve lt’ s o rd e rs  to  th e  
armed fo rc e s  p r io r  to  th e  a tta c k  on Pearl Harbour p laced th e  U n ited  S ta te s  
in  a s ta te  o f  h o s t i l i t i e s  w ith  th e  A x is . Congress was n o t in v ite d  to  d e c la re  
a naval war in  th e  A t la n t ic .  However, S ch les in g e r defends R ooseve lt by 
c i t in g  h is  e x te n s ive  c o n s u lta t io n s  w ith  th e  e x e cu tive  branch and 
C ongressional le a de rs  o f  both  p a r t ie s .  S ch les in g e r w r i te s ,  "even a sym bo lic
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concern f o r  Congress expressed a lu rk in g  s e n s i t i v i t y  to  c o n s t i tu t io n a l 
issues".*®®
S ch le s in g e r abandons t h is  lu rk in g  " s e n s i t iv i t y  te s t "  in  h is  a n a ly s is  o f  
Truman’ s d e c is io n  to  in te rv e n e  in  Korea, Truman r e l ie d  s o le ly  on h is  power 
as Com m ander-in-Chief to  o rd e r tro o p s  in to  h o s t i l i t i e s  and d id  n o t ask f o r  a 
d e c la ra t io n  o f  war o r  even a C ongressional re s o lu t io n  o f  s u p p o rt. However, 
S ch le s in g e r is  s w i f t  t o  p o in t  o u t th e  c o n s t itu t io n a l d i f f i c u l t i e s  which 
Truman faced  because th e  tro o p s  were deployed acco rd ing  to  th e  June 25 
re s o lu t io n  o f  th e  U n ited  N a tio ns  S e c u r ity  C o u n c il. He even defends Truman 
f o r  having co nsu lte d  f u l l y  and c a n d id ly  w ith  h is  e x e c u tiv e  co lle ag u es  o n ly . 
In  su p p o rt o f  John F. Kennedy , S ch le s in g e r m a in ta in s  th a t  even in  th e  
depths o f  acute  n a tio n a l emergency, such as th e  Cuban M is s i le  C r is is ,  
Kennedy s t i l l  managed to  c o n s u lt  w ith  members o f  th e  E xecu tive  Committee o f  
th e  N.S.C. (Excom). However, was th e  m is s i le  c r i s i s  th e  grave s i tu a t io n  
which S ch le s in g e r d e p ic ts ?  In  Essence o f D e c i s i o n , A l l i s o n  s ta te s  th a t  
McNamara, S ecre ta ry  o f  Defence, d id  n o t regard  th e  placem ent o f  S o v ie t 
m is s i le s  in  Cuba as a g re a t m i l i t a r y  th r e a t  a g a in s t Am erica. D id n o t Kennedy 
r e ly  most h e a v ily  on McNamara, Sorenson and h is  b ro th e r, R obert ra th e r  than  
th e  Excom, even go ing  so f a r  as to  use R obert Kennedy to  make arrangements 
w ith  th e  S o v ie t le a d e rs h ip  th a t  were n o t d is c lo s e d  to  members o f  Congress o r  
th e  Excom a t  th e  tim e .**®
S ch le s in g e r would appear to  employ s h i f t in g  c r i t e r i a  f o r  th e  e v a lu a tio n  o f  
th e  Johnson and N ixon P re s id e n c ie s . For example, a ltho u gh  S ch le s in g e r 
concludes th a t  seve ra l P re s id e n ts  d id  tra n s g re s s  th e  c o n s t itu t io n a l 
unders tand ing  th a t  Congress d e c la re  w ar, he la y s  th e  main r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  
th e  c re a tio n  o f  th e  im p e ria l P res idency w ith  Johnson and N ixon. A ccord ing  to  
S ch le s in g e r, what d is t in g u is h e s  th e  im p e ria l P re s id e n ts  from  t h e i r  
predecessors is  n o t s im p ly  t h e i r  is o la t io n  from  r e a l i t y  and u n w illin g n e s s  to  
c o n s u lt w ith  Congress, b u t a ls o  t h e i r  la ck  o f  awareness th a t  th e y  were 
a c t in g  beyond t h e i r  a u th o r i ty .  However, "what is  th e  c o n s t itu t io n a l
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d is t in c t io n  between Kennedy’ s a tte m p t to  coop t members o f  th e  E xecu tive  
Committee, Johnson brow beating  h is  C ab ine t s e c re ta r ie s ,  o r  N ixon re t re a t in g  
to  some hideaway a id  c o n s u lt in g  s o le ly  w ith  h is  s e c re ta r ie s  o f  s ta te  and 
defence. The C o n s t i tu t io n  adm its  n e ith e r  th e  Lockean p re ro g a tiv e  nor 
S c h le s in g e r’ s v a r io u s  v e rs io n s  o f  c o n s u lta t io n :  i t  c a l ls  f o r  a Congressional 
d e c la ra t io n  o f  w a r" .* * *
Koenig s ta te s ,  "even th a t  s p e c ta c u la r E x h ib it  A o f  S c h le s in g e r ’ s im p e ria l 
P re s id e n ts , R ichard  N ixon, who s tre tc h e d  to  th e  fa r th e rm o s t l im i t s  c la im s  o f  
e x e c u tiv e  p r iv i le g e ,  impoundments o f  a p p ro p r ia t io n s , and indu lgence  in  sheer 
in d ic ta b le  a c ts , s u ffe re d  many C ongressional r e b u f f s " .* * ® Congress p re v a ile d  
over N ixon by ending th e  s e c re t war in  Cambodia th rough  c u t t in g  o f f  funds , 
and many o f  h is  modest programme p roposa ls  were c o n s ta n t ly  re fused  by th e  
le g is la tu r e .  Indeed, S ch le s in g e r ve ry  much underestim a tes th e  o b s tru c t iv e  
ro le  o f  Congress.
S ch le s in g e r d e p ic ts  Congress as la rg e ly  c o m p lia n t, sup ine  and o n ly  
o c c a s io n a lly  a s s e r t iv e  a g a in s t th e  P re s id e n t. However, t h i s  is  a t  va ria n ce  
w ith  th e  p re v a il in g  v iew  which p e rce ive s  Congress as th e  p o te n t ia l ly  most 
pow erfu l le g is la t iv e  body in  h is to r y .  In  fo re ig n  a f f a i r s  th e  ro le  o f  
Congress has been f a r  g re a te r  than  S ch le s in g e r a llo w s . From th e  p o s t -  C iv i l  
War years u n t i l  th e  c lo s e  o f  th e  N ine teen th  C entu ry Congress’ in f lu e n c e  on 
fo re ig n  a f f a i r s  was s tro n g e r than  th e  P re s id e n ts ’ . A ccord ing  to  S ch le s in g e r 
th e  assum ption o f  war-m aking power by th e  P residency was gradual and was 
more a m a tte r o f  C ongressional a b d ic a tio n  than  P re s id e n t ia l u s u rp a tio n . 
However, th e  House pressed P re s id e n t Monroe, a t  th e  r is k  o f  war w ith  Spain 
to  recogn ise  th e  new L a t in  American re p u b lic s  emerging from  th e  c rum b ling  
Spanish Empire. In  1895, Congress s u c c e s s fu lly  annexed Hawaii and la t e r  
induced a peace-minded P re s id e n t M cK in ley t o  war w ith  Spain ove r Cuba. Post 
W orld War I ,  W ils o n ’ s V e rs a i l le s  T re a ty  was d e fea ted .
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B a r te r  : The P re s ld e n t ja ] C h a ra c te r.* * ®
"What th e  P residency is  a t  any p a r t ic u la r  moment depends in  im p o rta n t 
measures on who is  P re s id e n t" .* * *
B a r te r ’ s work rep re sen ts  th e  f i r s t  m a jo r development from  th e  t a c t ic a l
approach to  th e  s tudy  o f  th e  P residency p u t fo rw a rd  by N eustadt in
P re s id e n t ia lP o w e r . In  th e  American R ep ub lic , th e  P re s id e n t is  th e  c lo s e s t 
app rox im a tion  to  a monarch. B a r te r  s ta te s ,  " th a t  in e v ita b ly  b r in g s  to  te a r
on th e  P re s id e n t in te n se  m ora l, se n tim e n ta l and q u a s i- r e l ig io u s  p ressures
which can, i f  he le t s  them, d is t o r t  h is  own th in k in g  and fe e lin g " .* * ®  B a r te r 
contends th a t  f i r s t l y ,  a P re s id e n t’ s p e rs o n a lity  is  an im p o rta n t shaper o f  
P re s id e n t ia l behav iour in  n o n t r iv ia l  a f f a i r s .  Secondly, he argues 
P re s id e n t ia l p e rs o n a lity  is  s tru c tu re d . T h ir d ly ,  a P re s id e n t’ s  p e rs o n a lity  
in te r a c ts  w ith  th e  power s i tu a t io n  he face s  and th e  n a tio n a l ’ c lim a te  o f  
e x p e c ta t io n s ’ p re v a le n t a t  th e  tim e . T h is  in te r a c t io n  between th e  e x te rn a l 
environm ent and th e  P re s id e n t’ s p e rs o n a lity  a c t as a c a ta ly s t  f o r  th e  
dynamism o f  th e  P res idency. F in a l ly ,  th e  s u re s t way to  p re d ic t  a P re s id e n t’ s 
c h a ra c te r is  to  examine h is  e a r ly  l i f e  and i n i t i a l  independent p o l i t i c a l  
success.
A ccord ing  to  B a r te r  P re s id e n ts  may be c la s s i f ie d  accord ing  to  t h e i r  
placem ent a long  two d im ensions, f i r s t l y ,  " a c t iv e "  o r  "p a s s iv e "; second ly , 
" p o s it iv e "  o r  "n e g a tiv e " depending on t h e i r  fe e lin g s  re g a rd in g  th e  work o f  
being P re s id e n t. Using these  c la s s i f ic a t io n s .  B a r te r  deve lops a ty p o lo g y  
w ith  fo u r  typ e s : a) a c t iv e - p o s it iv e ,  b) a c t iv e -n e g a tiv e , c ) p a s s iv e -
p o s i t iv e ,  d) p a s s iv e -n e g a tiv e . What i t  is  v i t a l  t o  know about a P re s id e n t o r  
a s p ira n t  is  where he f i t s  among these  typ e s . One must ask, how a c t iv e  th e  
P re s id e n t is  and w hether o r  n o t he g ive s  th e  im press ion  th a t  he en joys  h is  
p o l i t i c a l  l i f e .  The a c t iv e - p o s it iv e  P re s id e n t wants most to  ach ieve  re s u lts .  
A c tiv e -n e g a tiv e  P re s id e n ts  aim to  g e t and keep power. A p a s s iv e -p o s it iv e
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P re s id e n t crave  lo ve , w h ile  th e  P re s id e n t who is  p a s s iv e -n e g a tiv e  emphasizes 
c iv ic  v ir tu e .* * ®  Thus Barber contends th a t  dec is ion -m ak ing  s ty le s  can be 
id e n t i f ie d  f o r  c e r ta in  typ e s , and he is  concerned p a r t ic u la r ly  w ith  th e
a c tiv e -n e g a tiv e  P re s id e n t d e a lin g  w ith  a pro longed c r is i s .  He contends th a t
t h is  P re s id e n t may " r i g id i f y "  in  such a c r is i s ,  and th a t  t h i s  r ig id i f i c a t io n  
can be observed when a P re s id e n t works to  e xhaus tion , is o la te s  h im s e lf from  
a l l i e s  and su bo rd in a te s , succumbs to  s e l f - p i t y  and looks f o r  scapegoats.**?
B a r t e r : A C r i t iq u e
P ious p o in ts  o u t* * ® th a t  B a rbe r’ s ty p o lo g y  may s im p ly  be a re a c tio n  to  th e  
N ixon A d m in is tra t io n . However, P ious concedes, " i f  th e  s im p le  te s t  th a t  th e  
v a l id i t y  o f  any hypo thes is  is  i t s  use in  w inn ing  barroom b e ts , then B a r te r  
can w in  a p ile " . * * ®  I t  is  c le a r  th a t  placement o f  P re s id e n ts  need n o t be, 
and was n o t in  N ixon ’ s case, p o s t hoc. The best ev idence to  suggest th e  
im portance o f  B a r te r ’ s work is  i t s  p re p a ra tio n  and p u b lic a t io n  p r io r  to  
W atergate: Barber p laced  N ixon in  th e  a c t iv e  -  n eg a tive  ca tegory  and
p re d ic te d  th a t  he would r i g i d i f y  in  h is  second te rm . "The ty p o lo g y  and
th e o ry  about r i g id i f i c a t io n  break im p o rta n t new g ro u n d ...T h e  s im p l ic i t y  o f  
B a rbe r’ s th e o ry  p ro v ide s  i t s  e legance, and i t s  re se a rch a b i1i t y  dem onstrates 
i t s  u t i l i t y " . *20 I f  B a r te r  is  c o r re c t ,  then  f a i lu r e  can be in t e l l ig e n t ly  
managed o n ly  by c e r ta in  p e rs o n a lity  typ e s .
The Postmodern P re s id e n t
Rose argues th a t ,  " th e  d e f in in g  c h a r a c te r is t ic  o f  th e  postmodern P re s id e n t 
is  s im p ly  s ta te d : th e  resources o f  th e  W hite House a re  n o t s u f f ic ie n t  to  
meet a l l  th e  P re s id e n t’ s in te rn a t io n a l re s p o n s ib il i t ie s " * ® *  A postmodern 
P re s id e n t cannot secure  success s im p ly  by in f lu e n c in g  Congress and p u b lic  
o p in io n ; th e  P re s id e n t must a ls o  in f lu e n c e  leade rs  o f  o th e r n a tio n s  and
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even ts  in  th e  in te rn a t io n a l env ironm ent. The g lo b a l scope o f  A m erica ’ s 
p o l i t i c a l  commitments makes th e  W hite House v u ln e ra b le  to  even ts in  th e  
in te rn a t io n a l system. A ccord ing  to  Rose, "w h ile  th e  t r a d i t io n a l  P re s id e n t 
d id  n o t p a r t ic ip a te  in  th e  in te rn a t io n a l system and th e  modern P re s id e n t 
cou ld  dom inate i t ,  th e  postmodern P re s id e n t has no ch o ice  b u t to  coopera te  
and compete, s in ce  economic and n a tio n a l s e c u r ity  problems a re  n o t con ta ined  
w ith in  n a tio n a l b o u n d a rie s ".*2® The C a rte r  A d m in is tra t io n  was bedev iled  by 
in f la t io n  a t  home, th e  o i l  p r ic e  r is e s ,  th e  s ie z u re  o f  American hostages in  
Ira n  and th e  S o v ie t U n ion ’ s in va s io n  o f  A fg h a n is ta n . Reagan successes were 
dependent on the  response o f  o th e r n a tio n s  to  W hite House in i t i a t i v e s ,  th e
I .N .F .  agreement be ing  th e  c la s s ic  example. However,American arms cou ld  n o t 
secure  W hite House aims in  N icaragua. The postmodern P re s id e n t is  synonymous 
w ith  b a rg a in in g , co m p e tit io n  and in terdependence.
The P re s id e n t today face s  th re e  im p e ra tiv e s . F i r s t l y ,  in  o rd e r to  ho ld  
o f f ic e  th e  P re s id e n t needs pop u la r su p p o rt. Secondly, in  o rd e r to  d i r e c t  th e  
government he must in f lu e n c e  th e  power h o ld e rs  in  W ashington. T h ird ly ,  to  
m a in ta in  A m erica ’ s n a tio n a l s e c u r ity  and economy, th e  P re s id e n t must
in f lu e n c e  th e  in te rn a t io n a l system.*®® Each im p e ra tive  is  a response to  a
d i f f e r e n t  p o l i t i c a l  audience.
A lthough  every  P re s id e n t would l i k e  to  take  charge, t h i s  can o n ly  occur i f  
two c o n d it io n s  a re  met: a) th e  re la t io n s h ip  between th e  d i f f e r e n t  p o l i t i c a l  
audiences is  f u l l y  understood. I t  i s  v i t a l  th a t  measures needed to  s a t is f y  
one audience do n o t c re a te  to o  g re a t d is s a t is fa c t io n  w ith  ano the r; b) th e
W hite House can a c tu a l ly  in f lu e n c e  even ts and in s t i tu t io n s ,* ® *
Any response th a t  a P re s id e n t makes to  a p o l i t i c a l  im p e ra tiv e  is  l i k e ly  to
impose c o s ts  as w e ll as b e n e f its .  However, because th e  P re s id e n t’ s m ajor
r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  a re  im p e ra tiv e s , he is  fo rc e d  to  make cho ices in
un favou rab le  as w e ll as fa v o u ra b le  c ircum stances. W ith  t h i s  la s t  p o in t ,  we 
re tu rn  to  N eustad tian  model, "cho ices  a re  th e  means by which he [th e
P re s id e n t] d is s ip a te s  h is  power".*®®
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..................... C h u te r  3 :_ The Fa] 1 and R ise  and F a ] ]  o f  C ongress ..........................
“You g u y s . . .A l l  you guys in  th e  media. A l l  o f  p o l i t i c s  has changed because 
o f  y o u .. .
In  th e  wake o f  th e  Vietnam War and th e  perce ived  abuses o f  power by th e  
Johnson and N ixon P re s id e n c ie s , c u lm in a tin g  in  W atergate, Congress passed a 
s e r ie s  o f  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  le g is la t io n ,  th a t  r e s t r ic te d  th e  P re s id e n t’ s range 
o f  o p tio n s  in  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  issues . A lthough perhaps w e ll in tended , th e  
le g is la t io n  has proved to  be u n c o n s tit u io n a l , i l l  -  conceived and 
d e tr im e n ta l to  th e  o v e ra ll success to  American fo re ig n  p o l ic y .
V ie tn a m :T h e  P r e s i d e n o n t h e  Ranpage.
D uring  th e  Kennedy A d m in is tra t io n  in te rv e n t io n  in  Vietnam was l im ite d  and 
ra is e d  no g re a t c o n s t i tu t io n a l q u e s tio n s . The d isp a tch  o f  " a d v i s e r s " ^  too k  
p lace  under th e  usual arrangements f o r  m i l i t a r y  a ss is ta n ce  based upon 
Congressional le g is la t io n  and a p p ro p r ia t io n . However, when f o r  example, 
American h e lic o p te rs  l i f t e d  South Vietnamese tro o p s  to  th e  f i e l d  o f  b a t t le ,  
t h i s  was c le a r ly  beyond express Congressional in s t ru c t io n .  But th e re  were 
few American deaths^ and Congress concurred w ith  E xecu tive  p o l ic y .  Thus, 
American invo lvem ent in  a c tu a l f ig h t in g  drew l i t t l e  a t te n t io n .  The rem ainder 
o f  American commitment in  t h i s  p e r io d  was c o v e r t and th u s , fo llo w e d  th e  
Eisenhower p recedent w ith  t a c i t  b u t e x p l i c i t  Congressional consent, and 
immune to  le g is la t iv e  s c ru t in y .*
"Lyndon Johnson", S ch les in g e r s ta te s ,  "came to  th e  P residency w ith  an o ld  
and honest b e l ie f  in  spac ious P re s id e n t ia l a u th o r ity  to  dep loy fo rc e  abroad 
in  th e  s e rv ic e  o f  American fo re ig n  p o lic y " .®  The c o n f l i c t  in  Vietnam was 
extended to  th e  N orth  in  1964. In  J u ly  o f  th a t  year, an American d e s tro y e r, 
o p e ra tin g  w ith  South Vietnamese sea and land fo rc e s  a g a in s t N orth  Vietnam
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was supposedly h i t  by to rpedo  boats in  th e  Bay o f  Tonk in . P re s id e n t Johnson 
used t h i s  ep isode , " te n d e n tio u s ly  exp la ined ",®  to  o b ta in  from  Congress the  
a u th o r ity  to  employ fo rc e s  in  open naval combat. A ccord ing  to  the  "Pentagon 
P apers", which D aniel E lls b e rg , a Defence Department a n a ly s t leaked to  th e  
p ress in  June 1971, Johnson had had a re s o lu t io n  ready and w a it in g  f o r  such 
a p ro vo ca tio n  months b e fo re ,  ^ which once Congress s igned i t ,  would g iv e  him 
extended powers to  deal w ith  th e  Vietnam c r is is .®  Thus began th e  f i r s t  
bombing a tta c k s  o f  N orth  Vietnam.
S ch le s in g e r contends, "The Tonkin  G u lf R eso lu tion® . . .rushed th rough 
Congress in  August 1964 in  a stampede o f  m is in fo rm a tio n  and m isconcep tion , 
i f  n o t o f  d e lib e ra te  d e c e p tio n ." i®  The re s o lu t io n  passed th e  House 
unanim ously; in  th e  Senate, o n ly  Morse (Rep. Mass) and Gruening (Dem.
A laska) d isse n te d . As M aorid is  p o in ts  o u t a t  th e  tim e  i t  was assumed th a t  
passage o f  t h is  re s o lu t io n  would s tre n g th e n  th e  P re s id e n t’ s  b a rg a in in g  
p o s it io n  by g iv in g  th e  im press ion  o f  a u n ite d  n a tio n  behind him. However, as 
th e  Pentagon Papers revea led , th e  U n ited  S ta te s  had a c tu a l ly  been waging a 
lo w - le v e l c o v e r t war a g a in s t N orth  Vietnam f o r  fo u r  years and, th e re fo re , 
"N orth  V ietnam ’ s a c tio n  in  th e  Tonkin  G u lf was e ith e r  r e t a l ia t o r y  o r  
p re c a u tio n a ry " . ^ '
The ro le  o f  Congress under Johnson re g a rd in g  war-making power was n o t to  
sa n c tio n  b u t to  su pp o rt th e  war. Hodgson argues, " th e  c o n s t itu t io n a l ro le  o f  
Congress had thus  been reduced to  a p u re ly  c o n s u lta t iv e  ro le ,  to  be 
exe rc ised  o n ly  when th e  P re s id e n t decided i t  would be ^ p r o p r ia te  f o r  
Congress to  be co n su lte d : o r  in  e f f e c t ,  v i r t u a l l y  to  z e r o " . 2
The Dom in ic a n R e p u b lic .
The fa c t  th a t  P re s id e n t ia l c o n s u lta t io n  w ith  Congress was an i l lu s io n  is  
w e ll dem onstrated by th e  American tro o p  in c u rs io n  o f  th e  Dominican R epub lic . 
In  th e  s p r in g  o f  1965, Johnson ordered  22,000 American tro o p s  to  th e  is la n d
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w ith o u t seeking C ongressional a u th o r is a t io n .  The reason he gave was th e  
p ro te c t io n  o f  American l i v e s . ”*® However, th e  number o f  tro o p s  was f a r  in  
excess o f  th e  amount re q u ire d . I t  was armed in te rv e n t io n  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  
purposes; Johnson was determ ined to  stand  up to  Communist i n f i l t r a t i o n .
The idea  th a t  a s i tu a t io n  in  any co rn e r o f  th e  w o rld  m igh t so th re a te n  th e  
U n ited  S ta te s  th a t  th e  P re s id e n t cou ld  go to  war on h is  own, g re a t ly  
expanded d o c tr in e  o f  d e fe n s ive  w ar. However, " i f  Johnson construed  th e  h igh  
p re ro g a tiv e  more in  th e  E ig h te e n th - C entury s ty le  o f  th e  B r i t is h  monarch 
than o f  th e  Republican e x e c u tiv e  envisaged by th e  C o n s t itu t io n ,  h is  
successor c a r r ie d  th e  in f la t io n  o f  P re s id e n t ia l a u th o r ity  even fu r th e r .  For 
P re s id e n t N ixon s tr ip p e d  away th e  f i g  leaves which h is  predecessor had 
draped over h is  a s s e r tio n  o f  u n i la te r a l  P re s id e n t ia l pow er". 1 ®
N ixon.
Contending th a t  h is  power as Commander-in-Chief*® a u th o r ise d  him to  use 
American ground tro o p s  to  invade Cambodia, and to  do so w ith o u t re fe ren ce  to  
o r  even th e  knowledge o f  Congress, P re s id e n t Nixon extended P re s id e n t ia l 
war-m aking to  excess. N ixo n ’ s p redecessors , who had s treng thened  th e  
e xe c u tiv e  power in  th e  p a s t, had done so in  th e  face  o f  v is ib le  and d ir e  
th r e a t  to  th e  n a tio n a l s u rv iv a l:  L in c o ln  was co n fro n ted  by C iv i l  War; 
R ooseve lt, th e  T h ird  R eich. Each, moreover, had done what he f e l t  he had to  
do w ith o u t c la im in g  c o n s t itu t io n a l s a n c tio n . However, in  ju s t i f y in g  th e  
commitment o f  American tro o p s  to  re im te  and n e u tra l Cambodia, N ixon c ite d  no 
emergency th a t  denied tim e  f o r  C ongressional debate, expressed no doubt 
about th e  le g a l i t y  o f  h is  own i n i t i a t i v e  and showed no d e s ire  f o r  
r e t ro a c t iv e  Congressional r a t i f i c a t i o n . ”*'^  The commitment o f  American tro o p s  
to  Cambodia was no more, he im p lie d , than  th e  ro u tin e  employment o f  
P re s id e n t ia l power, i t  re q u ire d  no s p e c ia l C ongressional a s s e n t.®”* 
S ch le s in g e r w r i te s ,  "th e  government th u s  committed armed fo rc e s  to
a
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h o s t i l i t i e s  f i r s t  in  Cambodia then  in  Laos'*® and N orth  V ie tn a m .. .on th e  
b as is  o f  a th e o ry  o f  d e fe ns ive  war so e la s t ic  th a t  a P re s id e n t cou ld  f r e e ly ,  
and on h is  own in i t i a t i v e ,  o rd e r armed in te rv e n t io n  in  any c o u n try  housing 
any tro o p s  th a t  m igh t in  any conce ivab le  c ircum stance be used in  an a tta c k  
on American t ro o p s " . 1 ®
The E f fe c t  o f  Vietnam on American Fore ign  Pol ic y .
Vietnam had severa l d i r e c t  e f fe c ts  on A m erica ’ s a t t i tu d e s  and e s p e c ia lly  
on b roader concep tions o f  Am erica ’ s ro le  in  th e  w o rld . S pan ie r and Nogee 
no te , f o r  exaiTiple, th a t  p r io r  to  V ietnam, th e  e f fe c t iv e  conduct o f  American 
fo re ig n  p o l ic y  was equated w ith  a s tro n g  Presidency,®® b u t th a t  th e  war 
produced a w ide-spread d is i l lu s io n m e n t w ith  th e  " Im p e ria l P res idency" which 
was perce ived  to  be c h a ra c te r is e d  by needless invo lvem ent where v i t a l  
in te r e s ts  were n o t a t  s ta ke , many and expensive fo re ig n  commitments, a 
f a i lu r e  to  d e fin e  areas o f  u tm ost and le s s e r im portance and a general 
d is p o s it io n  to  m i l i t a r y  and c o v e r t action.® ? Growing in te rn a l u n re s t about 
A m erica ’ s ro le  in  Vietnam led  many people to  que s tio n  th e  b a s ic  prem ises o f  
American fo re ig n  p o l ic y .  The “ c r e d ib i l i t y  gap" b rough t a grow ing d is t r u s t  o f  
th e  P residency and p o l i t i c a l  in s t i t u t io n s  in  g en e ra l, and increased cyn ic ism  
re g a rd in g  American p o l i t i c s .  T e le v is io n  re layed  th e  s ta rk  images o f  war in to  
th e  n a t io n ’ s l i v in g  rooms.
These changes in  p u b lic  a t t i tu d e s  were p a r a l le l le d  by changes in  e l i t e  
a t t i tu d e s ,  e s p e c ia lly  in s id e  Congress. From 1955 on th e  Dem ocratic P a rty  had 
m a in ta ined  c o n s is te n t c o n tro l ove r both houses o f  Congress. Vietnam p rov ided  
a m a jo r new p o l ic y  wedge th a t  d iv id e d  th e  m a jo r ity  Democrats, exace rb a ting  
th e  e x is t in g  f r i c t i o n ,  f o r  example, ove r c i v i l  righ ts.® ®
Sim ultaneous w ith  Vietnam, S ecre ta ry  o f  S ta te  K is s in g e r ’ s d ip lom acy, 
which both employed and depended upon secrecy, re v ive d  th e  o ld  su s p ic io n  o f  
"E u ro p e a n -s ty le " s e c re t d ip lom acy. C overt in te rv e n t io n  a g a in s t th e  A lle nd e  
government was th e  most d is tu rb in g  exanp le  o f  t h is  apparent tre n d .
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Chi le .
In  O ctober 1973 P re s id e n t Sa lvador A lle n d e  was overthrow n in  a m i l i t a r y  
coup. Rumours spread th a t  th e  C .I .A .  had helped overth row  t h i s  e le c te d  
S o c ia l is t  leader.®® Under oa th  American o f f i c i a l s ,  in c lu d in g  K is s in g e r, 
assured Congress th a t  th e  a lle g a t io n s  were fa ls e .  However, in  A p r i l  1974,
C .I .A .  D ire c to r  W illia m  Colby adm itted  to  a c losed  sess ion  o f  th e  
in te rn a t io n a l in te l l ig e n c e  subcommittee o f  th e  House Armed S e rv ices  
Committee, th e  agency 's  e x te n s iv e  c o v e r t  programme to  ove rth row  A lle n d e . In  
f a c t ,  o f  th e  t h i r t y - t h r e e  C .I .A .  c o v e r t p ro je c ts  in  C h ile  d u r in g  th e  p e r io d , 
1963 -  1973 o n ly  e ig h t  had been re p o rte d  to  th e  a p p ro p r ia te  Congressional 
com m ittees.®*
W atergate.
Debate a t  th e  tim e  concern ing  th e  abuse o f  P re s id e n t ia l power must be 
cons ide red  in  th e  c o n te x t o f  W atergate. Hodgson no tes, "as what N ixon ’ s 
f r ie n d  and A tto rn e y  General John M itc h e ll c a lle d  "th e  W hite House h o rro rs "  
began to  u n fo ld  in  1973, i t  became c le a r  th a t  th e  h ig h  view  N ixon and h is  
c i r c le  took  o f  P re s id e n t ia l p re ro g a tiv e  was o n ly  exceeded by th e  low view  
th e y  too k  both o f  th e  s p i r i t  and th e  le t t e r  o f  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n .  The 
conven ien t use o f  th e  word, ’ W aterga te ’ as shorthand f o r  th e  
A d m in is tra t io n ’ s tra n s g re s s io n s  can obscure th e  g ra v ity  o f  what Nixon d id .
I t  tends to  suggest th a t  he was d r iv e n  to  re s ig n  because a team o f  b u rg la rs  
w ork ing  f o r  th e  committee to  r e - e le c t  him was found in s id e  th e  Dem ocratic 
N a tio na l Committee’ s o f f ic e s .  That was, in  th e  end, th e  le a s t  o f  it" .® ®  For 
example, a f t e r  c r im in a l in v e s t ig a t io n ,  V ic e -P re s id e n t Agnew was fo rc e d  to  
re s ig n  h is  o f f ic e  in  1973.®®
72
N ixon ’ s A d m in is tra t io n  was based on a huge l i e .  Hodgson w r i te s  " th e  
fundam ental fa lsehood  o f  th e  A d m in is t ra t io n ’ s stance on V ie tn a m .. .made 
necessary th e  decep tion  o f  Congress and th e  American people about th e  
bombing o f  Vietnam and Cambodia. W ith  th e  passage o f  t im e , decep tion  became 
n o t so much a t a c t ic  to  be used as need as a s tra te g y  and a h a b it . . . "® ?  That 
one m ajor l i e  led  to  numerous "s m a lle r"  decep tions .
The s tra te g y  o f  decep tion  abroad f i l t e r e d  back in to  th e  A d m in is tra t io n ’ s 
p ra c t ic e  a t  home. I t  was to  p re ve n t leaks  about i t s  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  th a t  th e  
"p lum bers ’ u n i t "  was in i t ia t e d .  Had n o t W atergate in te rve n e d , th e  "Huston 
P lan" would have led  to  th e  e s ta b lish m e n t o f  an American s e c re t p o lic e  
fo rc e .  " In  s h o r t" ,  Hodgson m a in ta in s , "N ixon from  tim e  to  tim e  cla im ed 
powers and im m un ities  f o r  h is  o f f ic e  th a t ,  i f  s u c c e s s fu lly  a sse rte d , would 
have had the  e f f e c t  o f  r a d ic a l ly  u p s e tt in g  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l system o f  
checks and balances and o f  re p la c in g  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l P re s id e n t w ith  a new 
s t y le  o f  C h ie f E xecu tive  whose v i r t u a l l y  a bso lu te  power was ju s t i f i e d  by th e  
supposed requ irem ents o f  ’ n a tio n a l s e c u r i t y ’ , and q u a l i f ie d  o n ly  by th e  need 
to  w in  a ’ mandate’ from  th e  v o te rs  every  fo u r  years".®®
The Resurgence o f  Ctongress
"We want a s tro n g  and in t e l l ig e n t  P re s id e n t, b u t he has to  bear in  mind -  
we g o t e le c te d  too".®®
"Congress a lre a d y  has enormous power, i f  i t  o n ly  had th e  g u ts  to  use it" .® ®
"The C o n s t itu t io n  ass igns  to  th e  P re s id e n t, n o t to  Congress, th e  d u ty  to  
’ ta ke  ca re  th a t  th e  Laws be f a i t h f u l l y  e x e c u te d . . . ’ Y e t th ro u g h o u t th e  
h is to r y  o f  th e  Union, Congress has devised one way o r  ano the r to  look  over 
th e  P re s id e n t’ s shou lde r to  see w hether th e  execu tio n  o f  th e  laws is  being 
c a r r ie d  o u t f a i t h f u l ly " ® ? .
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When th e  93rd Congress convened in  January 1973 many members were in  angry 
mood. The Speaker o f  th e  Dem ocratic c o n tro lle d  House o f  R e p resen ta tives , 
C arl A lb e r t  o f  Oklahoma warned, th e  Congress must check and reve rse  th e  
’ a c c e le ra t in g ’ u s u rp tio n  o f  power by th e  E xecu tive  b ranch . . . these  w ho lesa le  
e x e c u tiv e  in va s io n  o f  le g is la t iv e  powers and re s p o n s ib ilit ie s .® ®  In  th e  
Senate, th e  Dem ocratic M a jo r ity  Leader, M ike M a n s fie ld  o f  Montana c a lle d  f o r  
a ’ re in fo rce m e n t o f  C o n s t i tu t io n ’ s system o f  checks and ba lances ’ .®®
Four issues d iv id e d  th e  P re s id e n t and Congress: a) impoundment o f  
a p p ro p ria te d  funds : N ixon had impounded a t  le a s t  $8.7 b i l l i o n  th a t  Congress 
had a p p ro p ria te d  the re b y  u n i la t e r a l ly  appea ling  laws th a t  Congress, w ith  th e  
P re s id e n t’ s  a p p ro va l, had enacted. Through impoundment, A lb e r t  argued, N ixon 
had acqu ired  an item  veto®* ; b) conduct in  th e  war in  Vietnam; w h ile  
Congress was in  recess, N ixon w ith o u t c o n s u lta t io n  C ongressional leade rs  had 
in te n s i f ie d  bombing o f  N orth  Vietnam and o rdered  th e  m in ing  o f  th e  p o r t  o f  
Haiphong; c ) e x e cu tive  p r iv i le g e :  under th e  d o c tr in e  o f  e x e c u tiv e  p r iv i le g e ,  
th e  P re s id e n t asserted  u n lim ite d  power to  w ith h o ld  any in fo rm a tio n  f ra n  
Congress, s o le ly  a t  h is  own d is c re t io n ;  d) government re o rg a n is a tio n : Nixon 
p u t in to  e f f e c t  th e  b a s ic  fe a tu re s  o f  a p lan  f o r  re o rg a n is in g  th e  e xe cu tive  
departm ents th a t  Congress had s p e c i f ic a l ly  re jected.®®
Among c e r ta in  members a mood o f  a n x ie ty  reg a rd in g  th e  expansion o f  
P re s id e n t ia l power a t  th e  expense o f  Congress dominated C a p ito l H i l l .  As 
S undqu is t notes t h i s  mood o f  a n x ie ty  re f le c te d  th e  p e rva s ive  fe e l in g  th a t  
th e  problem  la y  f a r  deeper than  N ixon and h is  agg ress ive  u su rp a tio n  o f  
power. W h ile  Congress condemned th e  P re s id e n t, i t  a ls o  looked inward and 
asked many p rob ing  q u e s tio n s  o f  i t s e l f .  Why had th e  le g is la t iv e  branch 
a llow ed  i t s e l f  t o  s in k  to  such a low e s ta te ?  Did i t  have th e  w i l l  and 
c a p a c ity  to  re g a in  i t s  p lace?  A p e r io d  o f  in tro s p e c t io n  ensued. Monbers 
observed th a t  Congress had been d e c l in in g  f o r  a long t im e ; indeed, th a t
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le g is la tu re s  w o rld -w ide  had been d e c l in in g  in  fa v o u r o f  th e  e x e c u tiv e . Few 
regarded th e  imbalance as som ething new th a t  began w ith  N ixon.
Congress re a lis e d  th a t  i t  s tood  low in  p u b lic  esteem. From a p o s it iv e  
ra t in g  o f  s ix t y - f o u r  per c e n t in  a H a rr is  p o l l  in  1965, i t  had s lip p e d  to  
t h i r t y - e ig h t  pe r ce n t in  1973.®® Out o f  anger, a n x ie ty  and p u b lic  p ressure  
and contem pt emerged a new a s s e rtiv e n e s s . In  March 1973, a b ip a r t is a n  group 
o f  t h i r t y - f i v e  Senators and R ep rese n ta tive s  too k  th e  f lo o r  to  demand th a t  
th e  Congress f in d  a way to  impose i t s  own e f fe c t iv e  c e i l in g  on th e  budget.
In  A p r i l  seventeen freshman Democrats ke p t th e  House in  sess ion  to  make th e  
same p le a s . Thus, S undqu ist w r i te s ,  " th e  Congress achieved in  th e  e a r ly  
weeks o f  1973, something c lo se  to  a c o l le c t iv e  re so lve  -  a firm n e ss  and 
u n ity  o f  purpose e x t r a o r d in a r i ly  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a t ta in  in  a body as d i f fu s e  as 
th e  Congress -  to  re s to re  th e  balance between th e  e x e cu tive  and the  
le g is la t iv e  branches th a t ,  in  i t s  v iew , had p re va ile d ".® ?  But how cou ld  
Congress re -e s ta b lis h  i t s e l f  and what would be th e  consequences; what was 
th e  r ig h t  balance between th e  P re s id e n t and Congress?®®
A D e c a d e o fCongre s s io n a lR e y iy a l.
As Hodgson no tes , " i f  th e  Tonkin  G u lf was th e  h igh  w a te r mark, i t  was a ls o  
th e  tu rn in g  p o in t .  W ith in  a coup le  o f  years , resentm ent o f  th e  way Congress 
had been hoodwinked by Lyndon Johnson, re in fo rc e d  by re a l,  s lo w ly  grow ing 
concern ove r both th e  fo r tu n e s  and th e  ju s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  Vietnam War, 
began a process by which Congress g ra d u a lly  a sse rte d  a new c la im  to  be 
co nsu lte d  in  fo re ig n  p o l ic y ,  o r  more a c c u ra te ly  in  c o n s t i tu t io n a l te rm s, 
rea sse rte d  i t s  long eroded p re roga tives".® ®
T h e C a m p a ig n to E n d th e W a r I ts e lf .
Between 1966 and 1972, Congress in  one house o r  th e  o th e r ,  vo ted  n in e ty -  
fo u r  tim es  in  recorded vo te s  on issues re la te d  to  th e  war*®, and a t  le a s t  
ano the r fo u r  hundred and f i f t y - f i v e  tim e s  in  unrecorded vo tes .*?  The la rg e s t
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number o f  members eve r to  v o te  a g a in s t th e  war in  th e  House b e fo re  1973 was 
l i t t l e  more than  one t h i r d :  one hundred and seventy-seven on th e  10th o f  
August 1972. W hile  th e  s e r ie s  o f  vo te s  re f le c te d  grow ing disenchantm ent 
w ith  th e  war in s id e  and o u ts id e  Congress, v e ry  few Congressmen too k  t h is  to  
th e  le n g th  o f  a c tu a l ly  v o t in g  a g a in s t a p p ro p r ia t io n s  o f  money to  c a rry  on 
th e  war. From 1965 -  1972 on a l l  a p p ro p r ia t io n s  b i l l s  re la te d  to  th e  war, 
more than n in e ty - f iv e  pe r ce n t o f  a l l  members o f  th e  House p re sen t vo ted  in  
fa v o u r o f  th e  b i l l s  in  aggregate . I t  was n o t u n t i l  May 1973, two months 
a f t e r  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  f i n a l l y  p u lle d  i t s  la s t  tro o p s  o u t o f  South Vietnam 
th a t  th e  House vo ted  to  c u t  o f f  a l l  funds f o r  combat in  Southeast A s ia .
N eve rthe less , even i f  Congressmen were re lu c ta n t  to  la y  them selves open to  
th e  charge o f  f a i l i n g  to  su p p o rt American f ig h t in g  men in  th e  f i e ld ,
Congress d id  s lo w ly  and s u re ly  re a s s e r t i t s e l f  in  o p p o s it io n  t o  a perce ived  
P re s id e n t ia l war.*®
The N a tio na l Conmitments hea rings  began ju s t  as th e  Nixon A d m in is tra t io n  
had taken  over th e  re -n e g o t ia t io n  o f  th e  Spanish Bases Agreement, which had 
been s igned o r ig in a l ly  as an e x e c u tiv e  agreement in  1953.*® In  1969, General |
E a rle  W heeler, chairman o f  th e  J o in t  C h ie fs  o f  S ta f f ,  assured th e  Spanish 
th a t  th e  guarantee o f  American tro o p s  in  th e  Spanish bases was b e t te r  than  |
hav ing  a t r e a ty .  When such s ta tem en ts  were leaked to  th e  p ress , th e  new ly-
e s ta b lis h e d  Symington sub-com m ittee argued th a t  n o n -c o n s titu t io n a l 1y 
approved commitments cou ld  lead to  w a r.* *  The Senate Fore ign  R e la tio n s
Committee*® m a in ta ined  th a t  ra th e r  than  e xe cu tive  agreements m in im iz in g  th e  #
commitment, i t  c rea ted  one w h ich , w ith o u t p rope r o v e rs ig h t,  cou ld  e s c a la te  
in to  armed c o n f l i c t .  The N a tio n a l Commitments R esolution*®  attem pted to  
d e fin e  what th e  Senate cons ide red  to  be genuine n a tio n a l commitments, in  
c o n tra s t  to  P re s id e n t ia l agreements which i t  considered  d id  n o t conm it th e  
n a t io n . A bsh ire  argues th a t ,  a lthough  th e  re s o lu t io n  d id  n o t have th e  fo rc e  
o f  law, i t  made ve ry  c le a r  th e  sense o f  th e  Senate th a t  a "n a tio n a l
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commitment" cou ld  n o t e x is t  by P re s id e n t ia l a c tio n  a lo ne , b u t re q u ire d  
C ongressional a u th o r is a t io n  a ls o .*?
The campaign p rope r to  end th e  war began w ith  a p ro v is io n  in  th e  Defence 
A p p ro p r ia tio n s  A c t o f  1970 which s t ip u la te d  th a t ,  "none o f  th e  funds 
a p p ro p ria te d  by t h is  A c t s h a ll be used to  f in a n c e  th e  in t ro d u c t io n  o f  ground 
tro o p s  in  Laos and T h a ila n d ".*®  The Cambodian in c u rs io n  in flam ed  Congress 
and th e  p u b lic ,  however. The Cooper-Church Amendment to  th e  supplem ental 
Fore ign  A u th o r is a tio n  A c t o f  1971 s ta te d : "none o f  th e  funds a u th o r ise d  o r  
a p p ro p ria te d  persuan t t o  t h i s  o r  any o th e r  A c t may be used to  fin a n c e  th e  
in tro d u c t io n  o f  U n ited  S ta te s  ground combat tro o p s  in to  Cambodia, o r  to  
p ro v id e  U n ited  S ta te s  a d v is e rs  to  o r  f o r  Cambodian m i l i t a r y  fo rc e s  in  
Cambodia".*®
An h is t o r ic  process had begun to  ta ke  p la ce . F i r s t l y ,  th e  le g is la t iv e  
debate and p u b lic  a t te n t io n  on C a p ito l H i l l  o b v io u s ly  a ffe c te d  th e  
P re s id e n t’ s freedom o f  a c t io n .  Secondly, a p recedent was e s ta b lis h e d  whereby 
Congress had e f f e c t iv e ly  e xe rc ise d  th e  power o f  th e  purse and th e  a b i l i t y  to  
r e s t r i c t  m i l i t a r y  o p e ra tio n s  and s e c u r ity  a ss is ta n c e . Once t h i s  p recedent 
had been e s ta b lis h e d , momentum mounted f o r  s im i la r  e f f o r t s  in  o th e r a reas.
In  th e  p as t th e  a u th o r is a t io n  and a p p ro p r ia t io n  process had been used to  
rubber-stam p th e  P re s id e n t’ s requests  o r  t o  c u t those  requests  f o r  reasons 
o f  economy. Now a new methodology was developed whereby th e  P re s id e n t’ s 
a c tio n s  cou ld  be r e s t r ic te d  th rough  amendment to  th e  a u th o r is in g  o r  
a p p ro p r ia t in g  b ills .® ®  As a r e s u l t  o f  th e  success o f  th e  m o d ifie d  Cooper- 
Church Amendment,®? th e  a n t i-w a r  fo rc e s  in  th e  Senate moved w ith  increased 
d e te rm in a tio n  to  impose a c u t - o f f  da te  on th e  P re s id e n t. The M a n s fie ld  
Amendment to  th e  Defence Procurem ent A u th o r is a tio n  A c t o f  1971®® read: i t  
must be " th e  p o l ic y  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  to  te rm in a te  a t  th e  e a r l ie s t  
p ra c t ic a b le  da te  a l l  m i l i t a r y  o p e ra tio n s  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  in  Indoch ina , 
and to  p ro v id e  f o r  th e  prompt and o rd e r ly  w ithd raw a l o f  a l l  U n ited  S ta te s  
m i l i t a r y  forces".® ®  In  1973 th e  Eagleton Amendment to  th e  supplem ental
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A p p ro p r ia t io n s  b i l l® *  s ta te d : ‘‘n o tw ith s ta n d in g  any o th e r  p ro v is io n  o f  law, 
on o r  a f t e r  August 15, 1973, no funds h e re in  o r  h e re to fo re  a p p ro p ria te d  may 
be o b lig a te d  o r  expended to  f in a n c e  d i r e c t ly  o r  in d i r e c t l y  combat a c t i v i t i e s  
by th e  U n ited  S ta te s  m i l i t a r y  fo rc e s  in  and over o r  from  th e  shores o f  N orth  
V ietnam , South V ietnam , Laos o r  Cambodia".
In  an a tte m p t to  p re ve n t fu tu re  V ie tnam ’ s , in  1973 Congress passed th e  War 
Powers Resolution®® ove r P re s id e n t N ixo n ’ s v e to . The re s o lu t io n  s t ip u la te d  
th a t  b e fo re  American tro o p s  a re  in tro d u ce d  " in to  h o s t i l i t i e s  o r  s itu a t io n s  
where imm inent invo lvem ent in  h o s t i l i t i e s  is  c le a r ly  in d ic a te d  by th e  
c ircu m sta n ces", th e  P re s id e n t was to  c o n s u lt  w ith  Congress " in  every 
p o s s ib le  in s ta n c e ". The P re s id e n t was to  n o t i f y  Congress and subm it a re p o r t  
w ith in  f o r t y - e ig h t  hours a f t e r  armed fo rc e s  a re  se n t abroad, " s e t t in g  fo r t h  
th e  c ircum stances n e c e s s ita t in g  th e  in tro d u c t io n  o f  U n ited  S ta te s  fo rc e s "  
and th e  "es tim a ted  scope and d u ra tio n  o f  th e  h o s t i l i t i e s  o r  invo lvem ent" 
A f te r  an i n i t i a l  tw o-day p e r io d , th e  P re s id e n t had s ix t y  days to  w ithd raw  
those  fo rc e s  o r  re ce ive  a C ongressional a u th o r is a t io n  f o r  an e x te n s io n , o r  a 
cong ress iona l d e c la ra t io n  o f  war.®®
C ongressional a s se rtive n e ss  a ls o  extended to  cover w id e r fo re ig n  p o l ic y  
issu e s . The Case A c t o f  1972®? re f le c te d  a lo n g -s ta n d in g  d e s ire  to  c o n tro l 
th e  use o f  e x e c u tiv e  agreements w ith  o th e r nations.®® The A c t re q u ire s  th e  
S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  to  subm it t o  Congress w ith in  s ix t y  days th e  t e x t  o f  any 
in te rn a t io n a l agreement made by th e  e x e c u tiv e  branch. Congressmen had long 
s in c e  o b je c te d  to  th e  e x te n s iv e  use o f  e x e c u tiv e  agreements, which were used 
ra th e r  than t r e a t ie s  to  conclude in te rn a t io n a l agreements p re c is e ly  because 
the y  c ircum vented th e  need f o r  Senate adv ice  and consen t. They argued th a t  
th e  P re s id e n t had used e x e c u tiv e  agreements to  deny th e  Senate i t s  
c o n s t i tu t io n a l r ig h t  to  r a t i f y  o r  r e je c t  t r e a t ie s  and th u s  the y  kep t 
Congress and th e  p u b lic  in  th e  da rk  as to  t h e i r  c o n te n t.
Commercial sa le s  and m i l i t a r y  a ss is ta n ce  g ra n ts  amounted to  $10.6 b i l l i o n  
in  1975, w ith  re c ip ie n ts  in  71 countries.® ®  In  th e  wake o f  th e  Vietnam War,
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Congress concluded th a t  arms s a le s  were b u t one ro u te  in to  th e  m ire  o f  
fo re ig n  war. When th e  U n ited  S ta te s  s o ld  h ig h  techno logy  defence equipment 
to  a c o u n try , i t  u s u a lly  c o n tra c te d  to  in s t a l l  and m a in ta in  i t ,  and to  
t r a in  lo c a ls  how to  use i t  e tc .  Thus, th e  U n ited  S ta te s  became in d i r e c t ly  
in v o lv e d  w ith  th a t  n a t io n ’ s s e c u r ity .  The Nelson -  Bingham Amendments,®® 
beg inn ing  w ith  th e  1974 F ore ign  A ss is tan ce  A c t, re q u ire d  th e  P re s id e n t to  
g ive  advance n o t ic e  to  Congress o f  any o f f e r  to  s e l l  to  fo re ig n  s ta te s  
defence a r t ic le s  and s e rv ic e s  va lued  a t  $25 m i l l io n  o r  more and empowered 
Congress to  d isapprove  such sa le s  w ith in  tw en ty  ca lenda r days by co n cu rre n t 
re so lu tio n .® ?
In  1974 th e  Hughes -  Ryan Amendment to  th e  Fore ign  A ss is tance  A c t 
p ro v ide d , " th a t  no funds a p p ro p ria te d  in  t h i s  o r  any o th e r A c t may be 
expended by o r  on th e  b e h a lf o f  th e  C e n tra l In te l l ig e n c e  Agency f o r  
o p e ra tio n s  in  fo re ig n  c o u n tr ie s  o th e r than  a c t i v i t i e s  in tended s o le ly  f o r  
o b ta in in g  necessary in te llig e n c e ".® ®  Congress a ls o  e s ta b lis h e d  two 
com m ittees: one in  th e  House ch a ire d  by Congressman, O t is  Pike®® (Democrat, 
New Y o rk ); th e  o th e r in  th e  Senate under Frank Church (D em ocra t,Idaho ). The 
Church Committee, by i t s  h ea rin g s  and re p o r ts ,  succeeded in  1975 and 1976 in  
persuad ing th e  consensus in  Congress th a t  i t s  s u sp ic io n s  were n o t w h o lly  
unfounded, in  o th e r words, th a t  secrecy had indeed led  to  many abuses in  th e  
conduct o f  U n ited  S ta te s  in te l l ig e n c e  o pe ra tio ns .® * As a re s u lt ,  
in te l l ig e n c e  agencies were la id  under a s ta tu to r y  o b l ig a t io n  to  keep a 
s p e c ia l Senate in te l l ig e n c e  com m ittee in fo rm ed, n o t m ere ly to  respond 
t r u t h f u l l y  to  Congressional inqu iry.® ®
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment C o n tro l A c t o f  1974®® was passed 
in  response to  p as t P re s id e n t ia l impoundment o f  a p p ro p ria te d  fun d s , th e  
o rd e r in g  o f  th e  bureacracy n o t to  spend money a p p ro p ria te d  by Congress.®? 
N ixon based h is  expansive impoundments, which exceeded $18 b i l l i o n  in  
F in a n c ia l Year 1973 a lo ne , on vague language in  th e  A n t id e f ic ie n c y  A c t 
a u th o r is in g  th e  P re s id e n t to  e f f e c t  sa v ings  re s u lt in g  from  u n s p e c if ie d
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"o th e r  developm ents" fo l lo w in g  th e  a v a i la b i l i t y  o f  a p p ro p r ia t io n s . The 
Impoundment C o n tro l A c t narrowed th e  b a s is  f o r  impoundments by removing th e  
ambiguous "o th e r  developm ents" phrase from  th e  A n t id e f ic ie n c y  A c t, le a v in g  
o n ly  p ro v id in g  con tingency rese rves . I t  a ls o  e s ta b lis h e d  procedures f o r  
C ongressional rev iew  and c o n tro l o f  impoundments.®®
In  1970 P re s id e n t N ixon th rough  a re o rg a n is a tio n  p la n  en la rged  th e  o ld  
Bureau o f  Budget in to  th e  more pow erfu l O f f ic e  o f  Management and Budget. 
A lthough  th e  d ir e c to r  and deputy d ir e c to r  o f  th e  O.M.B. e xe rte d  f a r  more 
a u th o r i ty  than  C ab ine t o f f ic e r s  th e y  were appo in ted  by th e  P re s id e n t w ith o u t 
th e  adv ice  and consent o f  th e  Senate. However, t h i s  changed in  1974 when 
P re s id e n t N ixon approved an Amendment to  th e  Budget and A ccounting  A c t o f  
1921. The new measure exempted incum bents, b u t re q u ire d  fu tu re  d ir e c to r s  and 
deputy d ir e c to r s  o f  th e  O.M.B. to  re c e iv e  Senate confirm ation .® ®
Increased C ongressional in f lu e n c e  a ls o  in c lu de d  s ig n i f ic a n t  fo re ig n  
a f f a i r s  in i t i a t i v e s  in  m a tte rs  o f  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness. For example, in  
th e  Tax Reform A c t o f  1976 Congress determ ined th a t  fo re ig n  ta x  c r e d i t  would 
be denied to  f irm s  th a t  coopera ted w ith  th e  Arab b o y c o tt a g a in s t I s r a e l .
A fu r th e r  C ongressional a c t io n  in tended  to  cu rb  P re s id e n t ia l powers was 
th e  N a tio n a l Emergencies A c t (N .E .A .) o f  1976.?® Focusing on th e  e x te n s ive  
g ra n ts  o f  power to  th e  P re s id e n t in  n a tio n a l emergencies d a tin g  as f a r  back 
as th e  1930s, t h i s  le g is la t io n  te rm in a te d , e f f e c t iv e  in  September 1978, th e  
s ta te s  o f  emergency dec la red  on March 1933 to  deal w ith  th e  G reat 
D epression; December 1950, to  respond to  Chinese in te rv e n t io n  in  th e  Korean 
War; March 1970, to  handle a p o s ta l s t r ik e  and, August 1971, to  implement 
cu rrency  r e s t r ic t io n s  due to  an in te rn a t io n a l m onetary c r i s i s .  The powers 
based on these  emergencies in c lu de d  th e  s e iz u re  o f  p ro p e rty  and com m odities, 
th e  im p o s it io n  o f  m a r t ia l law and th e  s e iz u re  and c o n tro l o f  a l l  means o f  
t ra n s p o r ta t io n  and com m unication. Together these  fo u r  emergencies had g iven  
th e  U n ited  S ta te s  f o r t y  -  one years o f  emergency ru le  and were th e  b a s is  o f  
f o r t y  s ta tu te s  adm in is te re d  by th e  e x e c u tiv e  branch. The purpose o f  th e
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N a tio na l Commitments A c t was to  r e s t r i c t  th e  P re s id e n t’ s use o f  emergency 
powers to  a c tu a l emergencies.??
I t  i s  in te re s t in g  to  no te  th a t  th e  N .E.A. resembled th e  War Powers 
R e so lu tio n  in  severa l im p o rta n t ways: (1 ) T i t l e  I  in  e f f e c t  te rm in a te d  a l l  
fo u r  e x is t in g  P re s id e n t ia l 1y dec la red  emergencies, p ro v id in g  a two -  year 
p e r io d  o f  grace to  a llo w  f o r  o rd e r ly  ad jus tm en t. T h is  p ro v is io n  p a ra lle d  
S ec tion  8 (a ) o f  th e  War Powers R e so lu tio n  which s im i la r ly  c re a te d  a "c lea n  
s la te "  by d e c la r in g  th a t  no p a s t p ro v is io n s  o f  laws o r  t r e a t ie s  cou ld  be 
in fe r re d  to  bestow a u th o r ity  on th e  P re s id e n t to  in tro d u c e  U n ited  S ta tes  
fo rc e s  in to  h o s t i l i t i e s .  H ence fo rth , both  n a tio n a l emergencies and 
undeclared wars were to  occur w ith in  th e  p rocedura l framework newly 
e s ta b lis h e d  by Congress, (2 ) T i t l e  I I  o f  th e  N.E.A. p re s c r ib e s  dual 
C ongressional c o n tro ls  on fu tu re  p roc lam a tions  o f  emergencies us ing  th e  
approach o f  th e  War Powers R e so lu tio n , I t  p rov ides  f o r  th e  repeal o f  any 
s ta te  o f  emergency by Congressional approval o f  a co n cu rre n t re s o lu t io n .  I t  
a ls o  co n ta in s  an au tom a tic  te rm in a tio n  o f  any n a tio n a l emergency one year 
a f t e r  i t s  d e c la ra t io n . In  th e  la t e r  case, however, w ith in  n in e ty  days o f  
te rm in a tio n , th e  P re s id e n t can s im p ly  d e c la re  the  emergency w i l l  s ta y  in  
e f f e c t  f o r  ano the r p e r io d  o f  t im e , up to  one yea r. (3 ) The N.E.A. co n ta in s  
ru le s  s im i la r  to  those  in  th e  War Powers R e so lu tio n  f o r  g iv in g  co ncu rren t 
re s o lu t io n s  s w i f t  c o n s id e ra tio n  in  Congress: un less  waived by a m a jo r ity  
v o te , th e  ru le s  p ro te c t  th e  re s o lu t io n  a g a in s t being he ld  up in  committee in  
both Houses, o r  f i l ib u s te r e d  in  th e  Senate.
In  1976 th e  C la rk  Amendment?^ to  th e  In te rn a t io n a l S e c u r ity  A ss is tance  and 
Arms E xpo rt C on tro l A c t denied funds f o r  m i l i t a r y  o p e ra tio n s  in  Angola 
"un less  and u n t i l . . .Congress enacts  a j o i n t  re s o lu t io n  approv ing  th e  
fu rn is h in g  o f  such a s s is ta n c e ".
The War Powers R e so lu tio n , th e  N a tio n a l Emergencies A c t and th e  
Impoundment C on tro l A c t a l l  c o n ta in  a form  o f  C ongressional v e to . The
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Congressional v e to  i s  a typ e  o f  procedure whereby Congress, w ith o u t passing 
new le g is la t io n ,  seeks to  p re ven t th e  im p lem enta tion  o f  e xe c u tiv e  o r  
a d m in is tra t iv e  a c tio n s  persuan t to  e x is t in g  s ta tu to r y  a u th o r ity .  The 
C ongressional v e to , which may be in c lu de d  in  th e  a u th o r iz in g  le g is la t io n ,  
may be exe rc ised  by co n cu rre n t re s o lu t io n ,  o r  by a re s o lu t io n  o f  e i th e r  
house, o r  by one o r  more des igna ted  com n ittees . U su a lly  th e  v e to  must be 
e xe rc ise d  w ith in  s ix t y  o r  n in e ty  days. The o b je c t iv e  o f  th e  le g is la t iv e  v e to  
i s  t o  ensure g re a te r o v e rs ig h t o f  th e  e x e cu tive  a d m in is tra t io n  o f  
programmes.?®
"W ith  re v o lu t io n ,  come those  q ue s tio n s  c h a r a c te r is t ic  o f  ra d ic a l breaks 
w ith  an e s ta b lis h e d  o rd e r: Can th e  re v o lu t io n a r ie s  g e t o rgan ised  o r  w i l l  
th e y  them selves be th e  v ic t im s  o f  th e  d iso rde re d  new energy?"?*
By th e  tim e  Congress was ready to  c la im  i t s  f i r s t  v ic to r ie s  in  i t s  d r iv e  to  
ach ieve  "coequa l" s ta tu s ,  as e a r ly  as 1974, many in  Congress i t s e l f  were 
w arn ing a g a in s t c a rry in g  t h e i r  s tru g g le  to  excess. Republican Barbara Jordan 
o f  Texas argued, ’ th e  r e v i t a l is a t io n  o f  Congress need n o t r e s u l t  in  a weak 
P res idency. The need f o r  a s tro n g  P re s id e n t in  th e  years ahead is  beyond 
c h a l1enge’ .?® Lee Hami1to n , ( Democrat, In d ia n a ) even denied th e  o b je c t i ve o f  
c o e q u a lity ,  a rgu ing  th a t  th e  e f f o r t  o f  Congress to  re a s s e r t i t s e l f  should  
n o t be m isunderstood to  mean th a t  Congress cou ld  t r u l y  become an equal 
branch o f  government. However, as Laski so r ig h t ly  contended. Congress " i s  
a lways lo o k in g  f o r  occasions to  d i f f e r  from  th e  P re s id e n t and i t  never fe e ls  
so r e a l ly  c o n fo r ta b le  as when i t  has found such an occasion f o r  d if fe re n c e . 
In  do ing  so, i t  has th e  sense th a t  i t  is  a f f irm in g  i t s  own essence".?® 
N a tio na l in te r e s t  can be s e v e re ly  im pa ired  by th e  s ta lem ates th a t  occur 




"The b e s t - la id  schemes o ' M ice an ’ Men 
Gang a f t  a g le y "
Burns.
i:"R e vo lu tio n s  occur when people lose  p a tie n ce  and, a c tin g  in  anger, se iz e  th e  ÿ
c o n tro ls .  I t  is  n o t th e  p re fe rre d  method o f  o p e ra tin g  a sh ip ".? ? J
The 1970s w itnessed a rash o f  C o n g re s s io n a lly - in i t ia te d  fo re ig n  p o l ic y $
le g is la t io n  which sought to  l i m i t  th e  P re s id e n t’ s range o f  o p tio n s  on a
number o f  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  issu e s . The th r u s t  o f  the  le g is la t io n  was to  I
r e s t r i c t  th e  P re s id e n t’ s a b i l i t y  to  d is p a tc h  tro o p s  abroad in  a c r is i s  and 
to  p re s c r ib e  h is  a u th o r ity  in  arms s a le s , tra d e , human r ig h ts ,  fo re ig n  i
a ss is ta n ce  and in te l l ig e n c e  o p e ra tio n s . Szamuely contends, " th e  le g is la t iv e  
p ro h ib it io n s  were n o t m ere ly meant to  f e t t e r  th e  P re s id e n t’ s  d is c re t io n a ry  
powers, th e y  were a c tu a lly  meant to  lead to  d i f f e r e n t  p o l ic y  outcomes from  %
those  which th e  P re s id e n t as th e  ’ C o n s t itu t io n a l re p re s e n ta tiv e  o f  th e  
n a t io n ’ had in tended".?®  However w e ll in tended t h is  le g is la t io n  may have 
been, i t  has proved co u n te rp ro d u c tiv e  and d e tr im e n ta l to  th e  o v e ra ll success 
o f  American fo re ig n  p o l ic y  as w i l l  be dem onstrated.
The Eagle ton Amendment, f o r  example, barred  a l l  use o f  funds f o r  any 
m i l i t a r y  a c t i v i t ie s  in ,  o ve r, o r  o f f  V ietnam , Laos and Cambodia. Thus, th e  
l e t t e r  o f  th e  law a ls o  p ro h ib ite d  th e  use o f  m arines to  evacuate th e  embassy 
in  Saigon. The Eagleton Amendment c e r ta in ly  had n o t had t h i s  r e s t r ic t io n  in  
m ind. I t s  purpose, ra th e r ,  had been to  p re ven t R ichard  N ixon ever ta k in g  th e  
U n ited  S ta te s  back in to  th e  Indoch ina  c o n f l i c t .  Franck and Weisband p o in t  
o u t, " th a t  Eagleton p robab ly  in tended  no such consequence m ere ly i l l u s t r a t e s  
a hazard o f  c o n t r o l l in g  fo re ig n  r e la t io n s  w ith  in f le x ib le  -  and case 
s p e c i f ic  -  le g is la t io n " .? ®
By 1973 th e  p a tte rn  was c le a r :  th e  Senate would in tro d u c e  one amendment 
a f t e r  another,®® s ig n a l l in g  to  N orth  Vietnam th a t  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  would 
e v e n tu a lly  le g is la te  i t s e l f  o u t o f  V ietnam . The A d m in is tra t io n  lo s t
*i
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Keeping Congress in  th e  dark appears to  have been th e  th e  A d m in is tra t io n ’ s 
d e l ib e ra te  p o l ic y .  I t  c a lc u la te d  th a t  th e  b es t way to  g e t th e  deal p as t 
Congress was to  p re sen t i t  w ith  a f a i t  accam pli. A re s o lu t io n  o f  in q u ir y
I
c r e d ib i l i t y  and f l e x i b i l i t y .  By making i t  c le a r  to  N orth  V ietnam th a t  
Congress would p re ven t th e  P re s id e n t from  fu r th e r  pe rsu ing  th e  war, o r  from  
e n fo rc in g  even tua l peace, Congress re la yed  to  th e  enemy th a t  i t  would w in  in  
th e  end.
The repercuss ions o f  th e  Nelson-Bingham Amendments have been th a t  every 
ma,jor arms s a le  agreement has been p layed o u t am idst v o c ife ro u s  n a tio n a l 
debate. O ften  th e  m e r its  o f  th e  s a le  and i t s  lo n g -te rm  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  
consequences a re  overlooked  as le g is la to r s  a re  p u t in  th e  p o s it io n  o f  
p o s tu r in g  f o r  dom estic p o l ic y  c o n s id e ra tio n s . Arms sa le s  command so much |
media a t te n t io n  and le g is la to r s  a re  rushed to  adopt a s tance , the reby  o fte n  
p a in t in g  them selves in to  a c o rn e r. P re s id e n t Fo rd ’ s agreement to  s e l l  HAWK 
s u r fa c e - to - a ir  m is s ile s  to  Jordan i l l u s t r a t e s  both th e  p o s i t iv e  and n e g a tive  , |
aspects  o f  th e  Amendments. There were v a l id  reasons f o r  doubts reg a rd in g  th e  
s a le ; f o r  example, s t a b i l i t y  in  th e  M idd le  East. However, th e  neg a tive  
aspects  more than outweighed th e  p o s it iv e .
In  November 1974 S ec re ta ry  K is s in g e r, d u r in g  a bou t o f  s h u t t le  d ip la n a c y , 
pa id  a v i s i t  to  K ing Hussein in  Amman. The K ing s tre ssed  th e  s ta te ’ s 
m i l i t a r y  v u ln e r a b i l i t y  and argued th a t  th e  la ck  o f  modern equipment was 
d ra in in g  th e  lo y a lty  o f  th e  Jo rdan ian  armed fo rc e s . The W hite House d ire c te d  
th e  J o in t  C h ie fs  o f  S ta f f  t o  s tud y  Jo rdan ian  a i r  defences and to  make 
recommendations. I t  recommended th e  s a le  o f  HAWKs and s tre sse d  th e  m orale 
problems o f  th e  Jo rdan ian  government, a rg u in g  th a t  Hussein would be under 
p ressure  to  seek a lte r n a t iv e  sources o f  arms i f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  re fused .
The W hite  House c le a re d  th e  Defence Department to  n e g o tia te  th e  s a le  o f  an 
a i r  defence system. However, aware o f  th e  c r i t ic is m  th e  t ra n s a c t io n  would 
encoun te r, i t  in s tru c te d  th e  n e g o tia to rs  t o  de-emphasize th e  HAWK m is s ile s  1
and h ig h l ig h t  le ss  s o p h is t ic a te d  systems such as th e  Vulcan. Î
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moved in  June by R e p rese n ta tive  Rosenthal rece ived  a b land , u n in fo rm a tiv e  
re p ly  from  W hite House a id e , Max F r ie n d e rs d o r f f . However, F r ie n d e rs d o r f f ’ s
re p ly  d id  in d ic a te  th a t  a l e t t e r  o f  o f f e r  was being prepared which would be 
re p o rte d  to  Congress ju s t  in  tim e  f o r  th e  C ongressional summer recess -  when 
n o th in g  cou ld  be done about i t .
An acrim on ious n a tio n a l debate ensued. In  September, a f t e r  a f l u r r y  o f  |
n e g o tia t io n s  among th e  S ta te  Department, Defence, th e  W hite House, th e  I
Jordan ians and Congress,®? a compromise was achieved: a le t t e r  would be se n t 
to  Congress by P re s id e n t Ford c o n ta in in g  assurances th a t  th e  HAWK m is s ile s  
would be used o n ly  f o r  d e fe ns ive  purposes and s p e c ify in g  a l l  agreed 
l im ita t io n s  on th e  weapons system to  be o ffe re d  f o r  s a le .
In  Congress th e re  was genera l s a t is fa c t io n  th a t  th e  P re s id e n t cou ld  no 
lo n ge r on h is  own, supp ly  la rg e  q u a n t i t ie s  o f  s o p h is t ic a te d  weapons abroad.
The HAWK episode dem onstrated th a t  th e  A d m in is tra t io n  shou ld  seek 
C ongressional adv ice  much e a r l ie r  in  th e  process b e fo re  a d e c is io n  is  
reached reg a rd in g  th e  s a le  o f  la rg e -s c a le  weapons systems to  a fo re ig n  
government. However, th e  open C ongressional e v a lu a tio n s  o f  fo re ig n  n a tio n s  
seek ing  to  do business w ith  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  tend  to  have th e  e f fe c t  o f  
c a n c e llin g  whatever g o o d w ill th e  tra n s a c t io n s  were in tended to  ach ieve . K ing 
Hussein was c le a r ly  o ffended  ove r Congress’ p u b lic  in q u e s t in to  th e  m e r its  
o f  h is  regim e. A f te r  th e  S ta te  Department and Congress had reached 
agreement, Hussein ca n ce lle d  th e  whole d e a l, and f o r  a tim e  a fte rw a rd  was 
co u rte d  by th e  S o v ie t Union.®%
The T u rk ish  arms embargo is  a c la s s ic  i l l u s t r a t io n  o f  th e  d is ru p t iv e  
e f fe c ts  o f  an e th n ic  m in o r ity  upon Congress. A lthough concerned about th e  
drug t r a f f i c  emanating from  Turkey, th e  la rg e r  goal o f  th e  A d m in is tra t io n  
had been to  keep Turkey a v ia b le  member o f  N .A .T.O . The m a jor consequence o f  
th e  arms embargo was a re -e xa m in a tio n  by Turkey o f  i t s  t ie s  to  th e  U n ited  
S ta te s . From th e  T u rk is h  p e rs p e c tiv e , a lo y a l a l l y  shou ld  n o t s u f fe r  th e
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in d ig n i t ie s  o f  an embargo -  even a p a r t ia l  o r  sym bo lic  one. As a re s u lt ,  th e  
T u rk is h  government too k  c o n tro l o f  tw e n ty - fo u r  American m i l i t a r y  
in s ta l la t io n s  in  Turkey, concluded a t r e a ty  o f  f r ie n d s h ip  w ith  th e  S o v ie t 
Union and accepted a la rg e  S o v ie t loan . S pan ier and Nogee n o te , " in s te a d  o f  
encouraging Greek -  T u rk ish  n e g o tia t io n s  over Cyprus, th e  embargo o n ly  made 
Turkey more adamant".®®
Concerning th e  Hughes -  Ryan Amendment, by conducting  a p u b lic  in q u ir y  
in to  th e  C . I .A . ,  i t  exposed n o t o n ly  i t s  supposed b lunde rs , b u t a ls o  
im p o rta n t in fo rm a tio n  as to  how th e  C .I .A .  is  o rgan ised , how i t  ga thers  
in te l l ig e n c e  and what k in d  o f  sources and methods i t  uses. The Hughes -  Ryan 
Committee hea rings  confirm ed to  Am erica ’ s a d ve rsa rie s  th a t  c la n d e s tin e  
o p e ra tio n s  would be s e v e re ly  c u r ta i le d  in  th e  fu tu re .  The Amendment a ls o  
shook th e  con fidence  o f  those  f r ie n d ly  s ta te s  which had cooperated w ith  th e  
U n ited  S ta te s  in  in te l l ig e n c e  g a th e r in g  and led  many to  reassess t h e i r  
re la t io n s h ip  w ith  A m erica ’ s in te l l ig e n c e  canm unity.
I t  is  in te re s t in g  to  no te  th a t  th e  Hughes -  Ryan Amendment imposed th e  
f i r s t  re a l C ongressional c o n tro l ove r c o v e r t a c t i v i t ie s .  Y et i t  was much 
le ss  s t r in g e n t  than a v e rs io n  passed by th e  Senate, which would have 
re q u ire d  th e  P re s id e n t to  re p o r t  a l l  c o v e r t c o v e r t a c t i v i t ie s  to  th e  
re le v a n t Congressional com m ittees p r io r  to  t h e i r  commencement. P r io r  
n o t i f ic a t io n  was m o d ifie d , a t  th e  House in s is te n c e , to  a vaguer o b l ig a t io n  
o f  " t im e ly  re p o r t in g " .  In  a dop ting  th e  Hughes -  Ryan Amendment, th e  Senate 
a ls o  re je c te d  a f a r  more ra d ic a l amendment, proposed by Senator Abourezk 
(Dem. D ak.) th a t  would have p ro h ib ite d  any agency o f  th e  government engaging 
in  any a c t i v i t y  w ith in  any fo re ig n  c o u n try  which v io la te d  o r  was l i k e ly  to  
v io la te ,  th e  laws o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  o r  o f  such c o u n tr ie s . Under th e  
Hughes -  Ryan Amendment, s ix  com m ittees and subcommittees had to  be g iven  
" t im e ly "  in fo rm a tio n  on c o v e r t  a c t i v i t ie s ,  b u t th e  mechanisms f o r ,  and th e  
p ra c t ic e  o f ,  Congressional o v e rs ig h t a re  inadequate.®*
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The Amendment i t s e l f  had se ve ra l shortcom ings. F i r s t l y ,  th e  C .I .A .  d id  n o t
f
I %3have to  re p o r t  to  o v e rs ig h t bod ies b e fo re  im plem enting an o p e ra tio n ; I%
second ly , th e  re p o r ts  d id  n o t have to  be tho rough ; and t h i r d ly ,  a f t e r  
re c e iv in g  c la s s i f ie d  in fo rm a tio n  in  a vague ly  mentioned " t im e ly  fa s h io n " .
Congressional overseers  had no ve to  power un less  the y  were bo ld  enough to  
v io la te  th e  pledge o f  secrecy and h a l t  C . I .A .  a c t i v i t y  by denying funds 
th rough  a v o te  o f  th e  e n t i r e  Congress.
The Hughes -  Ryan Amendment encountered i t s  f i r s t  m a jo r t e s t  w ith  th e  
issue  o f  C .I .A .  c o v e r t a c t io n  in  Angola, th e  A fr ic a n  n a tio n  ju s t  about to  be 
l ib e ra te d  from  th e  c o lo n ia l bondage o f  P ortuga l and a lre a d y  r id d le d  w ith  
c i v i l  w ar. B efore  1975 th e  U n ited  S ta te s  had backed one fa c t io n ,  U .N .I .T .A .,  
and th e  S o v ie ts  a no the r, th e  M .P .L.A . In  January 1975 th e  Ford 
a d m in is tra t io n  decided to  in c rease  th e  s takes  th rough  more c o v e r t p o l i t i c a l  
a id .  In  th e  fo l lo w in g  months th e  leade rs  o f  th e  s ix  Congressional com m ittees 
rece ived  n o t i f ic a t io n .  They made no o u tc ry ;  members who had been b r ie fe d  
f e l t  them selves co n s tra in e d  by t h e i r  commitment to  those  b r ie f in g  them.
Then in  J u ly  th e  A d m in is tra t io n  opted f o r  c o v e r t m i l i t a r y  a ss is ta n ce  to  two 
A fr ic a n  fa c t io n s .  S en io r members o f  th e  Congressional com m ittees d u ly  
rece ived  C . I .A .n o t ic e s .  T h is  tim e  however. S enator D ick C la rk  (Dem. Iowa) o f  
th e  A fr ic a n  A f fa i r s  Subcommittee o f  th e  Fore ign  R e la tio n s  Committee asked 
f o r  lYJore d e ta i l .  C la rk  was concerned th a t  th e  U n ited  S ta tes  was re je c t in g  a 
v ia b le  d ip lo m a tic  a l te r n a t iv e  and e xagge ra ting  th e  S o v ie t th r e a t  in  Angola.
In  September Ford n o t i f ie d  th e  a p p ro p r ia te  com m ittees th a t  m i l i t a r y  a id  
was be ing ra ise d  to  th e  le v e l o f  $25 m i l l io n .  When in  December the  
A d m in is tra t io n  in form ed th e  com m ittees th a t  an a d d it io n a l seven m i l l io n  
d o l la r s  was being se n t as c o v e r t m i l i t a r y  a id  to  Angola, C la rk  persuaded h is  
Fo re ign  R e la tio n s  co lle ag u es  to  re p o r t  an Amendment to  th e  1976 Fore ign 
A ss is tan ce  b i l l  t o  p r o h ib i t  any funds f o r  c o v e r t a c tio n  in  Angola. The 
Tunney Amendment®® to  th e  Defence A p p ro p r ia tio n s  b ill® ® , by a coun t o f  54:22 
in  th e  Senate barred c o v e r t a c t i v i t i e s  in  Angola; th e  House agreed by
87
323:99. A determ ined Congress had h a lte d  a c tio n  as w e ll as exposed th e  
inadequacies o f  th e  Hughes -  Ryan o v e rs ig h t .8?
However, th e  debate su rro u nd in g  American c o v e r t invo lvem ent in  Angola se n t 
a c le a r  s ig n a l to  th e  S o v ie ts  and t h e i r  Cuban p ro x ie s . They cou ld  see th a t  
th e  r is k  o f  American in te rv e n t io n  was low and th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  con tinued  
American a ss is tan ce  to  th e  p ro  -  West fa c t io n ,  slim.®® Post 1975, th e  number 
o f  Cubans in  Angola doubled. The S o v ie t Union increased i t s  m i l i t a r y  
ass is ta n ce  to  th e  M .P .L.A . and s ta t io n e d  w arsh ips in  th e  v i c in i t y  o f  Angola. 
Successfu l S o v ie t in te rv e n t io n  in  Angola bestowed on th e  S o v ie ts  and Cuba 
th e  image o f  dependable a l l i e s  and su p p o rte rs  o f  ra d ic a l movetænts in  
Southern A f r ic a .  T h is  i s  in  sharp c o n tra s t  t o  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  which was 
seen as having lo s t  i t s  ta s te  f o r  fo re ig n  invo lvem ent in  th e  wake o f  Vietnam 
and as being d iv id e d  d o m e s tic a lly  ove r fo re ig n  p o l ic y .  Hoxie no tes , "w hether 
Congress o r  th e  P re s id e n t was r i g h t . . . i s  here n o t th e  issu e . What was wrong 
was th e  seeming i n a b i l i t y  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  to  adopt a p o l ic y  when 16,000 
Cuban proxy tro o p s  o f  th e  S o v ie ts  decided th e  fa te  o f  a new -  born 
n a t io n " .8®
The Jackson -  Vanick Amendment a ttached  c o n d it io n s  to  tra d e  w ith  th e  
S o v ie t Union on a most favoured  n a tio n  s ta tu s  u n t i l  i t  re laxed  e m ig ra tio n  
r e s t r ic t io n s  on i t s  n a t io n a ls .  Increased doubts ove r th e  in t e g r i t y  o f  Nixon 
-  K is s in g e r fo re ig n  p o l ic y  f r o n  c o n se rva tive s  as w e ll as l ib e r a ls  grew.
W hile  l ib e r a ls  fo u g h t to  re s t ra in  K is s in g e r f r o n  b e l l ic o s i t y  in  Southeast 
A s ia , C onserva tives  suspected him o f  conceding to o  much and g a in in g  to o  
l i t t l e  in  h is  d e a lin g s  w ith  th e  S o v ie t Union. There was a ls o  grow ing concern 
in  Congress about th e  M idd le  E ast. L a rg e ly  i t  was concern th a t  th e  U n ited  
S ta te s  was n o t do ing  enough, o r  m igh t n o t do enough, to  sa feguard  Is r a e l .  
These two concerns came to g e th e r in  su pp o rt f o r  th e  Jackson -  Vanick 
Amendment.
The Jackson -  Vanick case a ls o  i l l u s t r a t e s  th e  p o te n t ia l 1y c lo se  
re la t io n s h ip  between d a n e s tic  p o l i t i c s  and fo re ig n  p o l ic y .  D esp ite  th e
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in te n t io n  o f  those  who supported  th e  Amendment, i t s  passage reduced S o v ie t -  
Jewish e m ig ra tio n ; th e  d ra m a tic  d e c lin e  o f  S o v ie t -  Jewish e m ig ra tio n  is  
undoubted ly a t t r ib u ta b le  to  th e  passage o f  th e  Amendment.®® P r io r  to  i t s  
passage, th e  S o v ie ts  had in d ic a te d  to  K is s in g e r th a t  th e y  would a llo w  a 
minimum o f  35,000 Jews pe r year to  em ig ra te . Had t h is  occu rre d , a t  le a s t  
175,000 Jews would have l e f t  th e  S o v ie t Union in  th e  p e r io d , 1975 -1979. 
Ins te a d  o n ly  139,000 were a llow ed  to  leave.s'*
The 1972 Trade Agreement and th e  expansion o f  S o v ie t -  American tra d e  had 
been an in te g ra l p a r t  o f  th e  N ixon -  K is s in g e r approach to  th e  S o v ie t Union, 
and i t s  d e fe a t marked a s e r io u s  re ve rsa l in  th e  e xe cu tive  b ra n ch 's  design 
and im p lem enta tion  o f  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  and de te n te  i t s e l f .  The purpose o f  th e  
tra d e  agree iæ nt had been to  use American tra d e  and techno logy , both o f  which 
th e  S o v ie ts  needed, as an in c e n t iv e  f o r  th e  S o v ie ts  to  re s t ra in  them selves 
p o l i t i c a l l y  and n o t to  u n i la t e r a l ly  e x p lo i t  a l l  th e  a v a i la b le  o p p o r tu n it ie s  
to  expand t h e i r  in f lu e n c e . However, as a r e s u l t  o f  th e  Jackson -  Vanick 
Amendment, when P re s id e n t C a rte r sought to  p e n a lise  th e  S o v ie ts  f o r  t h e i r  
in v a s io n  o f  A fg h a n is ta n , th e re  were r e la t iv e ly  few ways in  which he cou ld  do 
so. Had American -  S o v ie t tra d e  grown to  th e  le v e l o f  $5 b i l l i o n  -  $8 
b i l l i o n  by 1980, America would c le a r ly  been in  a b e t te r  p o s it io n  to  
in f lu e n c e  th e  S o v ie t Union and to  ach ieve  i t s  own fo re ig n  p o l ic y  goa ls , 
S pan ie r and Nogee w r i te ,  " th e  p o in t  is  th a t  Congress, in  push ing f o r  a 
r e la t iv e ly  l im ite d  though d e s ira b le  o b je c t iv e  je o p a rd ize d  a la rg e r  and more 
im p o rta n t p o lic y " .® ^
S im ila r  problems arose w ith  th e  H a rk in  Amendment®®, which s t ip u la te d  th a t  
no a ss is ta n ce  cou ld  be p rov ided  to  "any co u n try  which engages in  a 
c o n s is te n t p a tte rn  o f  g ross v io la t io n s  o f  in te r n a t io n a l ly  recogn ised human 
r ig h ts " ,  un less  th e  P re s id e n t "de term ines th a t  such a ss is ta n ce  w i l l  d i r e c t ly  
b e n e f i t  th e  needy people in  such c o u n tr ie s  and re p o r ts  such d e te rm in a tio n  to  
Congress". The Amendment a ls o  p rov ided  th a t  w ith in  t h i r t y  days e i th e r  House 
o f  Congress by re s o lu t io n ,  co u ld  o v e r r id e  t h is  P re s id e n t ia l d e te rm in a tio n .
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S ince 1976, th e re  have been in c re a s in g ly  d e ta ile d  annual re p o r ts  on a l l  82 
re c ip ie n t  s ta te s .  M i l i t a r y  sa le s  c re d its  to  A rg e n tin a  were c u t from  th e  $32 
m i l l io n  a u th o r ise d  by Congress to  $15 m i l l io n .  M i l i t a r y  a id  was reduced f o r  
E th iopa  and Uruguay, and in  1977 th e  C a rte r A d m in is tra t io n  c ite d  human 
r ig h ts  v io la t io n s  in  re fu s in g  to  s ig n  a new s e c u r ity  a ss is ta n ce  agreement 
w ith  N icaragua. In  response N icaragua re je c te d  fu r th e r  m i l i t a r y  a id  , as d id  
Uruguay. B ra s il re fused  m i l i t a r y  c r e d its  and ca n ce lle d  a 25 -  year o ld  
m i l i t a r y  a ss is tan ce  t r e a ty  w ith  th e  U n ited  S ta te s . El Sa lvador and Guatemala 
ended t h e i r  m i l i t a r y  a id  r e la t io n s h ip  w ith  America. E th iopa  tu rned  
in c re a s in g ly  to  th e  S o v ie t Union and Cuba f o r  m i l i t a r y  su pp o rt in  fa c in g  th e  
S o m li and E r it re a n  g u e r i l la s .  Thus, th e  u n ite d  S ta te s  excluded i t s e l f  from  
v i t a l  and u ns ta b le  areas o f  th e  g lobe  when i t  was e s p e c ia lly  im p o rta n t th a t  
America p la y  a le a d e rsh ip  ro le  and p ro v id e  some degree o f  co n s is te n cy .
U n c e r ta in t ie s  about where C e n tra l America was going c o n tr ib u te d  to  
c o n f l i c t  in  Washington ove r P re s id e n t C a r te r 's 's  p o l ic y  o f  re lin q u is h in g  
c o n tro l o f  th e  Panama C ana l. The fa c to rs  shaping American canal p o l ic y  were 
d iv e rs e . O f concern were American s t r a te g ic  needs, U n ited  S ta te s  s e c u r ity  
o b l ig a t io n s  to  i t s e l f  and i t s  a l l ie s ,  th e  naval pos tu re  o f  th e  S o v ie t Union 
in  th e  A t la n t ic  and th e  Caribbean, th e  S o v ie t -  Cuban m i l i t a r y  a l l ia n c e ,  th e  
f lo w  o f  raw m a te r ia ls  from  L a t in  America to  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  and th e  e f f e c t  
o f  p o s s ib le  war on th e  t e r r i t o r y  which cou ld  lead to  th e  sabotage o f  th e  
o p e ra tio n  o f  th e  c a n a l.
However, what is  in te r e s t in g  to  no te  reg a rd in g  th e  Panama Canal t r e a t ie s  
is  th a t  even though Congress was in vo lve d  in  th e  fo rm u la tio n  and n e g o tia t io n  
o f  th e  t r e a t ie s  to  a g re a t degree, th e  t r e a t ie s  passed w ith  a m argin o f  o n ly  
one vo te  to  spare. A lthough th e  Senate le a d e rsh ip  from  both p a r t ie s  favoured  
t r e a ty  passage, a la rg e  number o f  Senators remained uncommitted r ig h t  up to  
th e  f in a l  days when th e  vo te s  were take n . T h is  s i tu a t io n  fo rc e d  P re s id e n t 
C a rte r and h is  s t a f f  t o  make numerous personal co n ta c ts  w ith  these  Senators. 
Hours o f  debate and com pranise, th e  problems c rea ted  by Senate changes in
2
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th e  t r e a t ie s  and th e  open a tta c k s  on Panama, i t s  people and P re s id e n t 4
T o r r i jo s  c rea ted  n e g a tive  re s u lts .  The P re s id e n t’ s p o s it io n  in  n a tio n a l and 
in te rn a t io n a l le a d e rsh ip  was weakened by th e  whole process. He cou ld  n o t 
marshal 1 th e  Senate v o te s . The t r e a t ie s  e v e n tu a lly  passed,®* b u t as S pan ier 
and Nogee p o in t  o u t, "perhaps in  o u r tro u b le d  tim e s , th e  t r e a ty  process may 
be to o  d i f f i c u l t .  W ith  s tro n g  p u b lic  o p in io n  based on ignorance, a 
p r o l i f e r a t io n  o f  s tro n g  and a c t iv e  in te r e s t  groups, weak le a d e rsh ip  in  
Congress and a weakened e x e c u tiv e ; th e  whole t r e a ty  process may be so 
onerous th a t  c o n tro v e rs ia l t r e a t ie s  in  th e  fu tu re  w i l l  seldom be a b le  to  be 
ra t if ie d " .® ®
Those opposed to  o r  s k e p t ic a l about S .A .L .T . were so because o f  t h e i r  
a n x ie ty  about th e  m ix tu re  o f  e x p a n s io n is t S o v ie t -  Cuban behaviour in  A f r ic a  
and th e  grow ing S o v ie t m i l i t a r y  a rs e n a l. The S o v ie ts  had, s in c e  S .A .L .T . I  
rep laced  t h e i r  o ld  m is s ile s  w ith  an e n t i r e  new g en e ra tion  o f  m is s ile s .
A lthough  th e  SS-19 was cons ide red  by th e  Defence Department as the  more 
dangerous m is s i le  because o f  i t s  g re a t accuracy, th e  c r i t i c s  focused on th e  
huge SS-18 and th e  C a rte r A d m in is tra t io n ’ s f a i lu r e  to  g e t Moscow to  accep t 
f a r  few er than ju s t  ove r 300 heavy m is s ile s .  By c o n tra s t.  C a rte r had 
c a n ce lle d  th e  B-1 bomber in tended as a replacem ent f o r  th e  ag ing  B-52, 
slowed th e  development o f  th e  new T r id e n t submarines and T r id e n t  I  and I I
S .L .B .M .s .
Whether S .A .L .T . I I  would f i n a l l y  have rece ived  Senate approval o r  n o t, 
had th e  S o v ie ts  n o t invaded A fgh a n is ta n  in  la te  December, 1979, w i l l  never |
be known. However, most obse rve rs  f e l t  t h a t  th e  " r e a l" reason P re s id e n t 
C a rte r " te m p o ra r ily "  w ithd rew  th e  t r e a ty  from  Senate c o n s id e ra tio n  a t  th e  
tim e  was n o t to  pun ish  Moscow f o r  i t s  agg ress ion , b u t to  save h im s e lf from  
p robab le  d e fe a t and a p o l i t i c a l  se tback in  th e  Senate."As one Russian 
obse rve r asked d u r in g  th e  American S a lt  I I  debate: ’ W ith  whom in  America can 
we have dea lin g s?  I f  th e  P re s id e n t needs to  co o rd in a te  h is  a c tio n s  and stand
I
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w ith  th e  Congress, why i s n ' t  t h i s  done b e fo re  and in te rn a t io n a l agreement is  
concluded?” '
The e ra  o f  C ongressional re v iv a l was long overdue. However, Franck and 
Weisband p o s i t ,  [e xp e rie n ce ] poses " c ru c ia l q ue s tio ns  a b o u t. . . th e  a b i l i t y  o f  
th e  U n ited  S ta te s  to  p la y  a cohe re n t, e f fe c t iv e  ro le  as a superpower in  th e  
new e ra  o f  C ongressional a c tiv ism ".® ?
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C hapter 4 The Wa rs  Powers Res o lu t io n :  o r  Substance?
"War is  n o th in g  b u t th e  c o n t in u a t io n  o f  p o l i t i c s  w ith  th e  adm ix tu re  o f  o th e r  
means" i
C lausew itz
"O f a l l  th e  ca res  o r  concerns o f  government, th e  d ir e c t io n  o f  war most 
p e c u l ia r ly  demands those  q u a l i t ie s  which d is t in g u is h  th e  e x e rc is e  o f  power 
by a s in g le  hand".®
H am ilton , F e d e ra lis t  74.
"The c ircum stances th a t  endanger th e  s a fe ty  o f  n a tio n s  a re  i n f i n i t e ,  and 
f o r  t h i s  reason, no C o n s t i tu t io n a l shack les  can w is e ly  be imposed on th e  
power to  which th e  care  o f  i t  i s  com m itted".®
H am ilton , F e d e ra lis t  23.
In  in te r p r e t in g  th e  C ongressional paver t o  d e c la re  w ar, th e re  a re  two 
c o n s id e ra tio n s  to  bear in  m ind: f i r s t l y ,  a t  th e  tim e  o f  th e  C o n s t itu t io n a l 
C onvention, a fo rm a l d e c la ra t io n  o f  war was n e ith e r  re q u ire d  by co nve n tion a l 
in te rn a t io n a l law nor p ra c tic e d  as such*; second ly , th e  Founding Fa the rs 
drew a d is t in c t io n  between o f fe n s iv e  and d e fe ns ive  h o s t i l i t i e s .
The August 1787 d r a f t  C o n s t itu t io n  o f  th e  Canm ittee o f  D e ta il®  would have 
g iven  th e  le g is la t iv e  branch th e  power to  "make" war. I t  p rov ided  th a t  th e  
" le g is la tu r e  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  s h a ll have th e  p o w e r.. .To make w a r.. ."®  
T h is  bore a s t r ik in g  resemblance to  th e  A r t ic le s  o f  C on fe d e ra tio n , which 
vested  th e  "s o le  and e x c lu s iv e  r ig h t  o f  power o f  d e te rm in in g  on peace and 
w ar" t o  th e  C o n tin e n ta l Congress.?
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When th e  war c lause  was cons ide red  in  debate on August 17 1787, C harles 
P inckney o f  South C a ro lin a  opposed p la c in g  th e  power in  Congress: " I t s
p roceed ings were to o  s lo w ...T h e  Senate would be th e  b es t d e p o s ito ry , being 
more acqua in ted  w ith  fo re ig n  a f f a i r s ,  and most capable o f  p rope r 
r e s o lu t io n s " .
P ie rce  B u t le r  o f  South C a ro lin a  proposed v e s tin g  th e  power in  th e  
P re s id e n t, who would have a l l  th e  re q u is i te  q u a l i t ie s ,  and would n o t make 
war b u t when th e  n a tio n  would su p p o rt i t .  B u t le r ’ s o p in io n  shocked G erry o f  
M assachusetts who "never expected to  hear in  a re p u b lic  a m otion to  empower 
th e  E xecu tive  a lone  to  d e c la re  w a r". On th e  m otion o f  James Madison and 
E lb r id g e  G erry , however, Congress’ power to  "make war" was changed to  g iv e  
Congress o n ly  th e  power to  “ d e c la re  w a r" , th a t  is ,  i n i t i a t e  war, le a v in g  th e  
E xecu tive  th e  power to  repe l sudden a ttacks .®
A s tu d y  o f  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n  prepared by th e  Congressional Research S e rv ice  
o f  th e  L ib ra ry  o f  Congress concluded in  1973, "The sen tim en t o f  th e  
C onvention, as b es t we can dete rm ine  from  th e  l im ite d  notes o f  th e  
p roceed ings, [was] th a t  th e  p o te n t ia l ly  momentous consequences o f  i n i t i a t i n g  
armed h o s t i l i t i e s  shou ld  o n ly  be c a lle d  up by th e  concurrence o f  th e  
P re s id e n t and both  Houses o f  C ongress.. .A lthough  th e  change from  "make" to  
"d e c la re " cou ld  be read to  g iv e  Congress th e  mere fo rm a l fu n c t io n  o f  
re co g n is in g  th e  s ta te  o f  h o s t i l i t i e s , . . . i t  appears more l i k e ly  th a t  th e  
change was in tended to  in s u re  th a t  th e  P re s id e n t was empowered to  repe l 
sudden a tta c k s  w ith o u t a w a it in g  C ongressional a c tio n  and to  make c le a r  th a t  
th e  conduct o f  th e  war was vested  e x c lu s iv e ly  in  th e  P res iden t".®
The W a rP o w e rP ro v is io n  o f th e C o n s t i t u t io n .
As approved by th e  C o n s t itu t io n a l Convention and r a t i f i e d  by th e  s ta te s ,  
th e  war power p ro v is io n  o f  th e  C o n s t itu t io n ,  A r t ic le  1, S ec tion  8, c lauses 
10 -  15 is  as fo l lo w s :




To d e fin e  and pun ish  p ira c ie s  and fe lo n ie s  committed on th e  h igh  seas, and 
o ffe n ce s  a g a in s t th e  law o f  n a tio n s .
To d e c la re  w ar, g ra n t le t t e r s  o f  marque and r e p r is a l,  and make ru le s  
conce rn ing  ca p tu re s  on land and w a te r.
To ra is e  and su pp o rt a m ie s ,  b u t no a p p ro p r ia t io n  o f  money to  th a t  use s h a ll 
be f o r  a lo n ge r te rm  than  two years .
To p ro v id e  and m a in ta in  a navy.
To make ru le s  f o r  th e  government and re g u la t io n  o f  th e  land  and naval fo rc e s  
To p ro v id e  f o r  c a l l in g  f o r t h  th e  m i l i t i a  t o  execute th e  laws o f  th e  Union,
suppress in s u r re c t io n s ,  and repe l in v a s io n s .
To p ro v id e  f o r  o rg a n is in g , a m in g , and d is c ip l in in g  th e  m i l i t i a ,  and f o r  
govern ing  such p a r t  o f  them as may be employed in  th e  s e rv ic e  o f  th e  U n ited  ::|
jS ta te s , re s e rv in g  to  th e  s ta te s  re s p e c t iv e ly ,  th e  appoin tm ent o f  th e  
o f f ic e r s ,  and th e  a u th o r ity  o f  t r a in in g  th e  m i l i t i a  acco rd ing  to  th e
d is c ip l in e s  described  by C o n g re s s ..."
R e la ted  to  t h i s  is  th e  Com m ander-in-Chief p ro v is io n .  A r t ic le  I I ,  S ec tion  
2 , th e  purpose o f  which was to  p ro v id e  c i v i l i a n  command o f  th e  armed fo rc e s ,
a c tio n  in  an emergency, and u n i f ie d  a c t io n  in  tim e  o f  war."*®
S cho la rs  have long d isagreed  whether t h i s  m erely co n fe rs  a t i t l e  upon, o r  
im p lie s  a d d it io n a l powers f o r  th e  P re s id e n t. However, H am ilton  appeared to  
o f f e r  a modest d e f in i t io n .  In  F e d e ra lis t  69 he s ta te d  th e  o f f ic e  "would 
amount t o  n o th in g  more than  th e  supreme command and d ir e c t io n  o f  th e
m i l i t a r y  and naval fo rc e s , as f i r s t  genera l and adm ira l o f  th e
C o n fe d e ra c y ..."  He co n tra s te d  t h is  l im ite d  a u th o r ity  to  th e  u n c o n tro lle d
m i l i t a r y  powers o f  th e  B r i t is h  K ing , who was f re e  to  d e c la re  war and ra is e
and re g u la te  th e  f le e t s  and a rm ies, " a l l  o f  w hich, by th e  C o n s t i tu t io n  under 
c o n s id e ra t io n , would a p p e rta in  t o  th e  le g is la tu r e " . il
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Thus Congress was n o m in a lly  empowered t o  d e c la re  war, b u t o n ly  f i v e  wars 
have been dec la red  and in  o n ly  one, ( th e  war o f  1812), d id  members o f  
Congress a c tu a l ly  debate th e  m e r its  o f  e n te r in g  in to  h o s t i l i t i e s .
The R ise  o f  P res iden t ia lW a r
j^ G C u t iy e P r e r o g a t iv e ......
The idea  o f  gubernaculum’*® has s u rv iv e d  in  th e  fo rm  o f  e x e c u tiv e  
p re roga tive .""®  Locke argued th a t  cases a r is e  where th e  e x e c u tiv e  o f f i c i a l  
has to  use power " f o r  th e  good o f  th e  s o c ie ty "  u n t i l  th e  le g is la tu r e  can 
g a th e r to  pass law . Locke m a in ta ined  th a t  a r ig id  observance o f  th e  laws may 
prove more d e tr im e n ta l than  th e  te r rp o ra r i ly  v e s tin g  in  th e  e x e cu tive  th e  
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  to  ta ke  a c t io n  f o r  th e  p u b lic  good. Thus Locke, h im s e lf,  th e  
g re a t in f lu e n c e  o f  th e  American C o n s t i tu t io n  and in te l le c tu a l  champion o f  
l im ite d  government, had acknovledged th a t  in  tim es o f  d ir e  n e c e s s ity , " th e  
laws them selves s h o u ld . . .g iv e  way to  th e  e x e cu tive  pow er".
A f te r  Congress had recessed in  1807, a B r i t is h  vesse l f i r e d  on th e  
American s h ip  Chesapeake. J e ffe rs o n  o rdered m i l i t a r y  purchases f o r  th e  
emergency, re p o r t in g  h is  a c tio n s  t o  Congress a f t e r  i t  had convened. L in c o ln  
fo llo w e d  s u i t  in  h is  e x tra o rd in a ry  C iv i l  War a c tio n s . In  A p r i l  1861 w ith
Congress in  recess, L in c o ln  issued p ro c lam a tio n s  c a l l in g  f o r t h  th e  s ta te  J
'im i l i t i a s ,  suspending th e  w r i t  o f  habeus corpus, and im posing a b lockade on 
re b e ll io u s  s ta te s . F is h e r w r i te s ,  "under these  e x tra o rd in a ry  c ircum stances,
L in c o ln  b e lie ve d  i t  more im p o rta n t t o  p reserve than  to  observe th e  
C o n s t i tu t io n " ;  R ooseve lt d u r in g  W orld War I I  o rdered ove r 100,000 Japanese'"® ,
in to  " re lo c a t io n  c e n tre s " and Truman in  1951 d ispa tched  tro o p s  to  Korea |
Iw ith o u t C ongressional a p p r o v a l . j
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D efensive  War
between to  "make" and "d e c la re " w ar, b u t th roughou t th e  N ine teen th  C entury 
th e  concept o f  d e fe ns ive  war was l im ite d  la rg e ly  to  p ro te c t iv e  a c tio n s  a long  
th e  borders  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s . ^? However, P re s id e n t P o lk  " in v i te d "  war in  
1846 by sending tro o p s  in to  d isp u te d  t e r r i t o r y  a long  th e  Mexico -  Texas 
b o rde r. Such a c t io n  s e t  th e  p a tte rn  f o r  fu tu re  P re s id e n ts . For 
exam p le ,P res iden t M cKinley defended in te rv e n t io n  in  Cuba in  1898 by 
d e s c r ib in g  th e  c o n f l i c t  as ’ r ig h t  a t  ou r d o o r’ .""®
Post W orld War I I ,  w ith  American bases s c a tte re d  around th e  w o rld  and as 
m i l i t a r y  commitments became embedded as defence t r e a t ie s ,  th e  A d m in is tra t io n  
no lo n ge r co n fin e d  th e  n o tio n  o f  " r e p e l l in g  sudden a tta c k s "  t o  m i l i t a r y  
a c tio n s  r ig h t  a t  ou r door. As F is h e r no tes , " th e  idea  o f  a s h r in k in g  g lobe 
has been p a r t  o f  th e  conceptua l s h i f t  behind th e  enlargem ent o f  P re s id e n t ia l 
p o w e r . . .C o n s t itu t io n a lly ,  i t  s h r in k s  n o t m ere ly the  g lobe  b u t C ongressional 
powers as w e ll".""®  In  1962, upon th e  d isc o v e ry  o f  m is s i le  s i te s  in  Cuba, 
P re s id e n t Kennedy announced th a t  th e  launch ing  o f  any n u c le a r m is s i le  from  
Cuba a g a in s t any n a tio n  in  th e  Western Hemisphere would be regarded as 
c o n s t i tu t in g  "an a tta c k  by th e  S o v ie t Union on the  U n ited  S ta te s  re q u ir in g  
f u l l  r e t a l ia t o r y  response upon th e  S o v ie t Union".z®
L ife  a n d P ro p e rty  A c t ions.........
W ith  n e ith e r  le g a l a u th o r ity  n o r a d e c la ra t io n  o f  w ar, P re s id e n ts  have 
used fo rc e  abroad,^^ in  th e  name o f  p ro te c t in g  l i f e  and p ro p e rty . They have 
j u s t i f i e d  t h e i r  a c tio n s  on th e  b a s is  o f  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n ’ s e x e c u tiv e  
responsi b i l i t i e s .
In  1860 an American vesse l had been d ispa tched  to  Greytown^^ in  N icaragua 
a f t e r  an in s u l t  t o  an American d ip lo m a t and some p ro p e rty  losses in c u rre d  by
T hat th e  Founding Fa the rs drew a d is t in c t io n  between d e fe ns ive  and 
o ffe n s iv e  h o s t i l i t i e s  i s  dem onstrated by th e  C ongressional d is t in c t io n  *
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an American bus iness. When th e  Commander o f  th e  s h ip  judged th a t  lo c a l 
a u th o r i t ie s  had f a i le d  to  make a p p ro p r ia te  amends, he bombed th e  town and |
se n t in  tro o p s  and a Greytown re s id e n t sued f o r  damage to  h is  p ro p e rty . The 
C ou rt in  Durand v H o ll in s  came to  th e  Commander’ s defence: "as i t  respec ts  
th e  in te r p o s it io n  o f  th e  E xecu tive  abroad, f o r  th e  p ro te c t io n  o f  l iv e s  and 
p ro p e rty  o f  th e  c i t iz e n ,  th e  d u ty  must, o f  n e c e s s ity , re s t  in  th e  d is c re t io n  
o f  th e  P re s id e n t. A c ts  o f  la w le ss  v io le n c e , o r  o f  th rea tened  v io le n c e  to  th e  
c i t iz e n  o r  h is  p ro p e rty , cannot be a n t ic ip a te d  and p rov ided  f o r ,  and th e  
p ro te c t io n  to  be e f fe c tu a l o r  o f  any a v a i l ,  may, n o t in f re q u e n t ly ,  re q u ire  
th e  most prompt and d e c is iv e  action".^-®
W ilson fo llo w e d  th e  G reytovn bombing example and o rdered  American tro o p s  
to  V eracruz, Mexico in  1914 and Eisenhower se n t tro o p s  in to  Lebanon in  1958,
" to  p ro te c t  American l iv e s  and by t h e i r  presence th e re  to  encourage th e  
Lebanese government in  th e  defence o f  Lebanese s o v e re ig n ty  and in te g r i ty " .® *
N ixon ju s t i f i e d  th e  Cambodian in c u rs io n  in  1970 by c la im in g  th a t  enemy 
a c tio n s  c le a r ly  endangered th e  l iv e s  o f  Americans who were in  Vietnam and 
would c o n s t itu te  an unacceptab le  r is k  to  those  who would be th e re  a f t e r  th e  
w ithd raw a l o f  ano the r 150,000,®® S im ila r ly ,  i t  was to  p ro te c t  American l iv e s  
th a t  th e  N ixon A d m in is tra t io n  defended Anerican  su p p o rt f o r  th e  South 
Vietnamese in va s io n  o f  Laos in  1971.
Delega te d Emergency Powers ..j
R ooseve lt dec la red  t h i r t y - n in e  emergencies in  th e  space o f  s ix  years.®®
T h is  is  im p o rta n t f o r  once th e  n a tio n  is  engaged in  war, f o r  exa iip le . 
Congress de lega tes  new r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  t o  th e  E xecu tive  branch; o fte n  
la c k in g  in  any re a l d ir e c t io n  and th e  C ourts re g u la r ly  uphold these  
s ta tu te s .  These d e le g a tio n s  o f  a u th o r ity  remain in  th e  hands o f  th e
■ii
P re s id e n t long a f t e r  h o s t i l i t i e s  have ended and th e  tro o p s  a re  home: f o r  |
example, th e  P re s id e n t has th e  power to  determ ine when a s ta te  o f  war is
i
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o ve r. By 1971 th e  U n ited  S ta te s  had been in  a s ta te  o f  dec la red  n a tio n a l 
emergency f o r  t h i r t y - e ig h t  yea rs . ®?
!5®l®!i§!^ tign| o f War-Making Power.
In  th e  wake o f  P re s id e n t Truman’ s d e c la ra t io n  o f  "p o lic e  a c tio n "  in  Korea, 
th e  issue  o f  th e  l im i t s  o f  P re s id e n t ia l war-making arose c o n t in u a l ly  in  
Congress. However, in  a s e r ie s  o f  moves, Congress removed i t s e l f  from  th e  
dec is ion -m ak ing  process co m p le te ly . S undqu is t no tes , " th e  power o f  d e c is io n  
o ve r war and peace -  h e ld  in  such t i g h t  and r ig id  c o n tro l by th e  Congress in  
th e  p e r io d  o f  s e l f  a s s e r tio n  in  th e  decade b e fo re  W orld War 11 -  s lip p e d  
v i r t u a l l y  w h o lly  from  i t s  grasp".®®
The G reat Debate
In  1951 Truman s e n t fo u r  d iv is io n s  o f  tro o p s  to  Europe to  se rve  in  th e  
in te rn a t io n a l army to  be e s ta b lis h e d  under N .A .T.O . and p laced  under th e  
command o f  General Eisenhower. As in  th e  case o f  Korea s ix  months p r io r ,  th e  
P re s id e n t d id  n o t share h is  d e c is io n  w ith  Congress.®® T h is  proved 
u n s a t is fa c to ry  f o r  R epublican le a de rs  o f  th e  Senate and Senator T a f t  (Rep. 
O hio) opened th e  debate w ith  a d e n u n c ia tio n  o f  ’ s e c re t e x e c u tiv e  agreem ents’ 
th a t  had led  th e  n a tio n  to  danger. Republican f lo o r  le a d e r, Senator Wherry 
(Nebraska) in tro du ce d  a re s o lu t io n  express ing  th e  sense o f  th e  Senate th a t  
no tro o p s  be d ispa tched  u n t i l  Congress had approved th e  p o l ic y .  However, 
Congress evaded th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l q u e s tio n . The Senate d id  n o t t r y  to  s e t 
Am erica ’ s defence p o l ic y  by s ta tu te  b u t o n ly  expressed i t s  v iew s by 
reso lu tion® ® , and th e  House d e c lin e d  th e  Senate ’ s in v i t a t io n  to  jo in  in  th a t  
e xp ress io n . The re s o lu t io n  d id  n o t have th e  fo rc e  o f  law and th e  P re s id e n t 
co u ld  s t i l l  a c t acco rd ing  to  h is  own in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  h is  powers.
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V ie tn am, 1954.
Eisenhower b e lie ve d  th a t  Truman had made a t a c t ic a l  e r r o r  in  u n i la t e r a l ly  
com m itting  American tro o p s  to  Korea. Thus upon th e  v i t a l  c o n fro n ta t io n  
between th e  c o lo n ia l army and Communist re b e ls  in  Dien B ien Phu, Eisenhower 
made Congressional approval a p re re q u is ite  f o r  involvement.®""
Lyndon B. Johnson (Dem. Texas) ra is e d  th e  issue  o f  su p p o rt f r o n  A m erica ’ s 
European a l l i e s  b e lie v in g  C ongressional approva l shou ld  depend on th e  
p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f  o th e r  European n a tio n s . However, Eisenhower f a i le d  to  
secure th a t  su pp o rt and f o r  th e  manent America remained o u t o f  th e  w ar. But 
i t  i s  im p o rta n t to  no te  th a t  w h ile  th e  re s e rv a tio n s  expressed by Congress 
undoubted ly c o n tr ib u te d  to  th e  P re s id e n t’ s  d e c is io n  to  s ta y  o u t o f  th e  war 
in  1954, E isenhower’ s s in g le  m eeting w ith  f i v e  Senators and th re e  
R ep resen ta tives  cannot be construed  as a s ig n i f ic a n t  s h i f t  in  th e  balance o f  
P re s id e n t ia l and C ongressional dec is ion -m ak ing  in  th e  fa v o u r o f  th e  
e x e c u tiv e .
T heF ornqsa  R e s q ^ t h e f i r s t b l a n k c h e q u e .
In  1955 Chinese Communists began to  th re a te n  th e  N a t io n a l is t  -  le d  is la n d s  
o f  Quemoy and Matsu. A lthough  Eisenhower perce ived  h is  a u th o r ity  to  defend 
Formosa and o th e r t e r r i t o r ie s  under N a t io n a lis t  c o n tro l as in h e re n t in  h is  
c a p a c ity  as Commander - in - C h ie f , th e  P re s id e n t sought C ongressional approval 
in  o rd e r to  remove any doubt re g a rd in g  Am erica ’ s w il l in g n e s s  to  f i g h t .  The 
re s o lu t io n  drew o n ly  th re e  d is s e n t in g  vo te s  in  each House.
The M idd le  East R e so lu tio n
C it in g  S o v ie t expansion in  th e  M idd le  East and th e  i n s t a b i l i t y  o f  th e  
re g io n , p o s t Suez (1956), Eisenhower requested a g ra n t o f  a u th o r ity  to  
employ American fo rc e s  th e re  as m igh t be necessary. In  th e  absence o f  
im m inent danger, Eisenhower met w ith  s tro n g  o p p o s it io n  to  such a proposal.®®
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However, aga in  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n a l q u e s tio n  was s idestepped as had been th e  
case in  th e  G reat Debate. In  th e  Senate, in s te a d  o f  a u th o r is in g  th e  
P re s id e n t t o  use armed fo rc e s , an amendment by Humphrey (Rep.M innesota) and 
M a n s fie ld  s ta te d  th a t ,  " i f  th e  P re s id e n t determ ines th e  n e c e s s ity  th e re o f,  
th e  U n ited  S ta tes  is  prepared to  use armed fo rc e  to  a s s is t " .  Two b lank  
cheques had been s igned : th e  Formosa and M idd le  East R e so lu tio n s  The
P re s id e n t had asked Congress to  d e leg a te  to  him th e  power t o  decide  whether 
to  take  th e  co u n try  in to  war. Congress w i l l i n g l y  succumbed.®®
The Cuba R e so lu tio n .
Fear o f  Cuban Communism le d  to  th e  Cuba R e so lu tio n  o f  1962. S undqu ist 
notes th a t  t h is  one evaded th e  C o n s t itu t io n a l q ue s tio n  a lto g e th e r  by s im p ly  
d e c la r in g  th e  d e te rm in a tio n  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  to  p re ve n t th e  spread o f  
Communism in  th e  hem isphere. How th e  d e c is io n  would be made, in  an 
emergency, was l e f t  t o  be dete rm ined . But th e  P re s id e n t had asse rted  th a t  
’ as P re s id e n t and Com m ander-in-Chief’ he had a l l  th e  a u th o r ity  he needed to  
use m i l i t a r y  fo rc e  in  any way th a t  m igh t be necessary. Congress d id  n o t 
r e je c t  t h is  v iew .
The B e r lin  R esq ju t^ %..l-i%
Soon a f t e r  t h i s  Congress passed a s im i la r  re s o lu t io n  to  deal w ith  th e  
B e r l in  c r is is .® *  Y e t aga in  Congress evaded th e  C o n s t itu t io n a l q u e s tio n . As 
in  th e  Cuba R e s o lu tio n , th e  B e r l in  sta tem ent made no re fe ren ce  to  
P re s id e n t ia l power b u t d ec la re d  th a t  ’ th e  U n ited  S ta te s  is  determ ined to  
p re ven t by whatever means may be necessary, in c lu d in g  th e  use o f  arms, any
v io la t io n  o f  [ i t s ]  r ig h ts  by th e  S o v ie t Union d i r e c t ly  o r  th rough  o th e rs ’ .
S undqu is t th e re fo re  suggested th a t  " by t h is  tim e  a w e a lth  o f  precedent had
been e s ta b lis h e d , th rough  a dozen years o f  success ive  c r is e s ,  th a t  in  th e
p o l ic y ,  th e  Congress to  su p p o rt. In  i t s  b lank-cheque re s o lu t io n s ,  th e
w o rld  w ide c o n fro n ta t io n  w ith  Communism i t  was f o r  th e  P re s id e n t to  s e t  th e  i%
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Congress agreed in  advance to  whatever he m igh t d o " T h e  Formosa 
R e so lu tio n  de lega ted  war-m aking power; th e  M idd le  East R e so lu tio n  gave 
advance commitment to  su pp o rt w hatever th e  P re s id e n t dec ided , and th e  Cuba 
R e so lu tio n  de lega ted  to  th e  P re s id e n t how and when th e  term s o f  th e  
R e so lu tio n  be a p p lie d .
The Tonkin  G u lf Resolution.®®
I t  was th u s  a s h o r t  s te p  f o r  Congress to  a b d ica te  fo rm a lly  from  w a r- 
making. In  th e  wake o f  th e  Tonkin  G u lf in c iden t® ? , F u lb r ig h t  (Rep. A rk ) 
rushed a R e so lu tio n  th rough  th e  Senate Fore ign  R e la tio n s  Corrm ittee a f t e r  
b r ie f  te s tim o n ie s  from  th e  S e c re ta r ie s  o f  S ta te  and Defence. The R e so lu tio n  
drew o n ly  two d is s e n tin g  vo te s  in  th e  Senate and n o t one in  th e  House. In  
F u lb r ig h t ’ s o p in io n , th e  R e so lu tio n  would a u th o r is e  whatever th e  Commander- 
in -C h ie f  f e l t  necessary.®®
Thus as S ch le s in g e r contends, " in  th e  decade a f t e r  Korea, Congress receded 
n o t o n ly  from  th e  e f f o r t  to  c o n tro l war-making power b u t a lm ost in  th e  
e f f o r t  t o  p a r t ic ip a te  in  i t " .  ®®
The War  Powers Reso lu t i on
The L e g is la t iv e  H is to ry  o f  th e  War R e s o lu tio n ........................
The American in c u rs io n  in to  Canbodia p laced  th e  issue  o f  war power a t  th e  
f o r e f r o n t  o f  Senate and House debate. In  June 1970 th e  f i r s t  Senate b i l l  
(S .3964, 9 1s t Cong.) was in tro d u ce d  by Senator J a v its  and s t ip u la te d  th a t  
th e  P re s id e n t co u ld  use th e  armed fo rc e s  w ith o u t p r io r  a pp ro va l, o n ly  to  
repe l an a tta c k  on th e  U n ite d  S ta te s  i t s e l f  o r  on American fo rc e s  on th e  
h ig h  seas o r  le g a l ly  s ta t io n e d  abroad, o r  to  f u l f i l l  n a t io n a l commitments to  
which both  th e  e xe c u tiv e  and le g is la t iv e  branches were p a r ty .  In  1970, a war 
powers re s o lu t io n  was in tro du ce d  by Z ab lock i (Dem. W isconsin) in  th e  House
jj(H .J . Res. 1355, 9 1 s t C ong.), and passed by a v o te  o f  289 -  39. I t
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recogn ised th a t  th e  P re s id e n t " in  c e r ta in  e x tra o rd in a ry  and emergency 
c ircum stances has th e  a u th o r ity  to  defend th e  U n ite d  S ta te s  and i t s  
c i t iz e n s  w ith o u t p r io r  a u th o r is a t io n  from  Congress". However, th e  P re s id e n t 
would be re q u ire d  "whenever fe a s ib le " ,  to  c o n s u lt w ith  Congress b e fo re  
sending American tro o p s  in to  armed c o n f l i c t .  He was a ls o  to  re p o r t  th e  
c ircum stances n e c e s s ita tin g  th e  a c t io n ;  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n a l,  le g a l and t r e a ty  
p ro v is io n s  a u th o r is in g  th e  a c t io n ,  to g e th e r f o r  h is  reasons f o r  n o t seeking  
C ongressional a u th o r is a t io n  beforehand; and th e  es tim a ted  scope o f  
a c t i v i t ie s .  The re s o lu t io n  o m itte d  to  d e fin e  th e  e xa c t c o n d it io n s  under 
which th e  P re s id e n t m igh t a c t .  In  1971 th e  House passed a s im i la r  re s o lu t io n  
(H .J . Res. 1, 92nd C ong.). However, i t  o m itte d  th e  q u a l i f in g  phrase 
"whenever fe a s ib le " .
The Senate re fused  to  lo o k  a t  these  weak e f f o r t s  and in s te a d  p u t fo rw a rd  
b i l l  S .2956, th e  re v ise d  J a v its  b i l l ,  which c o n s t itu te d  an a tte m p t to  l i s t  
and, th e re fo re ,  l im i t ,  th e  s i tu a t io n s  in  which th e  P re s id e n t cou ld  use fo rc e  
on h is  own a u th o r ity .  The s i tu a t io n s  c ite d  were:
a) re p e ll in g  o r  a n t ic ip a t in g  an armed a tta c k  upon th e  U n ited  S ta te s , i t s  
t e r r i t o r ie s  and possessions ,
b) responding to  an armed a tta c k  a g a in s t th e  armed fo rc e s  o f  th e  U n ited  
S ta te s , whether a t  home o r  abroad, o r  f o r e s ta l l in g  an imminent th r e a t  
a g a in s t them,
c ) p ro te c t in g  American c i t iz e n s  and n a t io n a ls  w h ile  th e y  a re  being evacuated 
from  abroad,
d) e x e rc is in g  h is  d is c re t io n  under a p r io r  s ta tu to r y  g ra n t o f  a u th o r ity .  
R egard less, th e  P re s id e n t would o n ly  be a llow ed  t h i r t y  days o f  w a r- 
making,even when a c tin g  w ith in  one o f  th e  fo u r  c a te g o r ie s , a f t e r  which tim e  
he would have to  o b ta in  th e  consent o f  Congress.
As a r e s u l t  o f  th e  v a s t d if fe re n c e s  between th e  House j o i n t  re s o lu t io n  and 
th e  Senate b i l l ,  much p o l i t i c a l  manouevering ensued. The House aga in  passed 
H .J . Res. 1 in s tea d  o f  S. 2956 and a lthough  confe rees were appo in ted  th e y
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met o n ly  once tow ard th e  end o f  th e  Congress and th e  d if fe re n c e s  were n o t 
re so lved .
The e f f o r t  to  c o d ify  P re s id e n t ia l war-powers e n ta ile d  a number o f  r is k s :  
f o r  example, th e re  was th e  danger th a t  due to  ambiguous language, 
le g is la t io n  m igh t a c tu a lly  widen P re s id e n t ia l power in s te a d  o f  r e s t r ic t in g  
i t .  In  1973 th e  Senate preceded w ith  a new b i l l  (S. 440, 93rd Cong.) which 
was v i r t u a l l y  id e n t ic a l t o  S .2956, and th e  House passed H .J .542 p u t fo rw a rd  
by (M organ,[Dem .Pa.] -  Z a b lo c k i, [D em .W isconsin ]) ,  which p rov ided  th a t  any 
P re s id e n t ia l war cou ld  be ended by a co n cu rre n t re s o lu t io n  o f  both th e  House 
and Senate. The House v e rs io n  a ls o  s t ip u la te d  th a t  P re s id e n t ia l war-m aking 
a u th o r ity  would a u to m a tic a lly  end a f t e r  120 days un less  renewed by a 
C ongressional d e c la ra t io n  o f  w ar; and re q u ire d  th e  P re s id e n t t o  c o n s u lt w ith  
Congress, when p o s s ib le , p r io r  t o  d ep lo y in g  American tro o p s , and to  re p o r t  
to  Congress w ith in  48 hours o f  th e  canmencenent o f  h o s t i l i t i e s .  However, 
H .J .542 d id  n o t a tte m p t t o  d e fin e  th e  c ircum stances in  which th e  P re s id e n t 
co u ld  use fo rc e  w ith o u t a d e c la ra t io n  o f  war. The House and Senate passed 
t h e i r  re s p e c tiv e  b i l l s  and th e  two went to  confe rence  committee where 
compromise was reached.
The f in a l  re s o lu t io n  was more l i k e  th e  House than th e  Senate v e rs io n . The 
con fe rees adopted th e  broad approach o f  th e  House b i l l ,  b u t w ith  two 
im p o rta n t d if fe re n c e s . They dropped th e  p ro v is io n  th a t  gave Congress a 
c o n cu rre n t re s o lu t io n  v e to  on m a jo r peace fu l fo re ig n  deploym ents, a lthough  
the y  ke p t th e  requ irem ent th a t  th e  P re s id e n t re p o r t  t o  Congress on these  
deploym ents. The con fe rees a ls o  abandoned th e  s e c tio n  o f  th e  Senate b i l l  
which s t ip u la te d  th e  c ircum stances in  which American fo rc e s  can be in vo lve d  
in  h o s t i l i t i e s .
To secure  s u f f ic ie n t  su p p o rt f o r  th e  R e s o lu tio n ’ s passage, e s p e c ia lly  
w ith  a P re s id e n t ia l v e to  loom ing, i t s  sponsors tra de d  away much o f  th e  
substance o f  th e  re so lve  u n t i l  l i t t l e  b u t symbol remained. What was l e f t  was 
ju s t  enough to  r a l l y  th e  necessary su p p o rt to  overcome th e  P re s id e n t’ s
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v e to . * ’* N ixon vetoed th e  b i l l  la rg e ly  because he regarded i t  as 
im p ra c tic a b le  and dangerous to  f i x  in  a s ta tu te  th e  procedures by which th e  
P re s id e n t and Congress shou ld  share th e  war power.*® He a ls o  perce ived  th e  
le g is la t io n  as encroach ing  on h is  power as Com m ander-in-Chief. However, th e  
House by 284 -  135 and th e  Senate by 75 -  18 overrode  th e  ve to .*®
The War Powers R eso lu tion  In  P ra c tic e .
W h ils t  H am ilton  argued in  F e d e ra lis t  23, " th e  a u th o r i t ie s  e s s e n tia l t o  
th e  common d e fe n c e ...o u g h t t o  e x is t  w ith o u t l im i t a t io n ,  because i t  is  
im poss ib le  to  fo rese e  o r  d e fin e  th e  e x te n t and v a r i t y  o f  n a tio n a l 
em ergencies, o r  th e  co rresponden t e x te n t and v a r ie ty  o f  th e  means which may 
be necessary to  s a t is f y  th e m ",**  C ra ig  has noted th a t  th e  War Powers 
R e so lu tio n  a c tu a lly  p i t s  "Congress and th e  P re s id e n t a g a in s t each 
o th e r . . . [a n d ]  i t  does so re so un d ing ly  and be fo re  th e  e n t i r e  w o rld  -  w ith  
understandab ly  d e tr im e n ta l e f fe c t" .* ®
The A d m in is tra t io n s  o f  N ixon and Ford e s ta b lis h e d  the  p a tte rn  o f  
P re s id e n t ia l com pliance, o r  ra th e r ,  non com pliance w ith  th e  R e so lu tio n .
The h ^ q r  Instances o f Pre s id e n tia l Nm Compl i ance: The Nixon and Ford 
A d m in is tra tio n s .
Evacua t io n o fA m e r ic a n C it iz e n s f r o n  Cyprus
In  J u ly  1974 Greek -  le d  n a tio n a l guardsmen t r ie d  to  ove rth row  th e  
government o f  A rchbishop M akarios and ach ieve  "e n os is " ( th e  u n i ty  o f  Cyprus 
and Greece). In  response T u rk is h  m i l i t a r y  u n its  invaded Cyprus to  p ro te c t  
T u rk is h  C y p r io ts . F ig h tin g  e sca la te d  and th e  U n ited  S ta te s  Ambassador to  
Cyprus requested m i l i t a r y  a ss is ta n ce  in  evacua ting  th e  American c i t iz e n s  who 
wished to  leave th e  is la n d . U n ited  S ta te s  m arine h e lic o p te rs  evacuated 384 
American c i t iz e n s  and 82 a l l ie d  n a t io n a ls . The fo l lo w in g  day, in  a j o i n t
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American and B r i t is h  rescue o p e ra tio n , a fu r th e r  135 Americans and t h i r d  
co u n try  n a t io n a ls  were evacuated.
There i s  no reco rd  o f  any s ig n i f ic a n t  p r io r  c o n s u lta t io n s  w ith  Congress 
no r was any War Powers R e so lu tio n  re p o r t  f i l e d .  The P re s id e n t argued th a t  a 
re p o r t  was n o t necessary because th e  areas where th e  h e lic o p te rs  landed were 
n o t p a r t  o f  a h o s t i le  zone; th e  m iss ion  was hum an ita rian  in  n a tu re  and; th e  
American fo rc e s  were n o t equipped f o r  combat.
The c o n s u lta t io n  requ irem ent o f  S ec tion  3 o f  th e  Resolution^®  a p p lie s  
"b e fo re  in tro d u c in g  U n ited  S ta te s  Armed Forces in to  h o s t i l i t i e s  o r  in to  
s i tu a t io n s  where imm inent invo lvem ent in  h o s t i l i t i e s  is  c le a r ly  in d ic a te d  by 
th e  c ircum stances". The Cyprus evacua tions  a re , th e re fo re ,  n o t a p p lic a b le . 
W h ile  i t  was fe a s ib le  th a t  th e  e vacua tion  h e lic o p te rs  m igh t come under f i r e  
under th e  fa ls e  assum ption th a t  th e y  were h o s t i le ,  such an in c id e n t cou ld  
n o t be described  as " in d ic a te d  by th e  c ircum stances".
Evacuations from  Indoch ina .
E a r ly  in  1975 i t  became in c re a s in g ly  apparent th a t  N orth  Vietnam and th e  
Khmers Rouges fo rc e s  were c lo s e  to  d e fe a tin g  th e  noncommunist governments in  
Saigon and Phnom Penh. The Cooper -  Church Amendment r e s t r ic te d  American 
a ss is ta n ce  to  Cambodia and Congress a ls o  re fused  to  supp ly  South Vietnam 
w ith  spare p a r ts  and am m unition. South Vietnam w ithd rew  southward in  th e  
fa ce  o f  a Communist o f fe n s iv e .  The q u e s tio n  became when, n o t i f ,  American 
n a t io n a ls  would be evacuated.
P re s id e n t Ford b e lie ve d  he had independent C o n s t i tu t io n a l a u th o r ity  as 
C om m ander-in-chief to  dep loy  American tro o p s , " to  p ro te c t  American l iv e s "  
and was, th e re fo re ,  n o t r e s t r ic te d  by th e  War Powers R e so lu tio n . -  Most 
members o f  Congress concu rred . D uring  debate on th e  Cooper -  Church 
Amendment in  1973, th e  p ro v is io n s  sponsors acknowledged th a t  Congress cou ld  
n o t d e p riv e  th e  P re s id e n t o f  h is  C o n s t itu t io n a l powers -  in c lu d in g  th e  power 
t o  rescue th rea tened  American c i t iz e n s .  T h e re fo re , th e  P re s id e n t had th e
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power to  o rd e r th e  use o f  U n ited  S ta te s  Armed Forces to  rescue endangered 
Americans. However, Ford decided to  seek fo rm a l Congressional a u th o r is a t io n
A lthough in  th e  case o f  th e  Danang, Phnom Penh and Saigon evacua tions , th e  
P re s id e n t d id  re p o r t  w ith in  th e  re q u ire d  48 hours, t h i s  is  so o n ly  i f  th e  
c lo c k  is  taken  to  run when A jre rican  fo rc e s  en te red  fo re ig n  a i r  space, ra th e r  
than  when th e  fo rc e s  were d ispa tched  o r  when th e  d e c is io n  to  commit was 
made. As a r e s u l t  o f  t h i s ,  in  each in s ta n ce , th e  re p o r t  reached Congress 
o n ly  a f t e r  each m i l i t a r y  o p e ra tio n  was com pleted. As Franck and Weisband 
no te , " th e  re p o r t in g  requ irem en t th u s  conduced n o t one w h it  to  Congressional 
co d e te rm in a tio n  o f  w hether, when, o r  how to  use fo r c e " .
TheM ayaguez......
On May 12 1975 Cambodian naval p a tro l boats f i r e d  upon and s iezed  th e  S.S. 
Mayaguez -  a U n ited  S ta te s  m erchant s h ip  en ro u te  from  Hong Kong to  T ha iland  
th rough  in te rn a t io n a l w a te rs . A s ide  f r o n  h is  concern f o r  th e  s a fe ty  o f  
t h i r t y - n in e  American crew members. Ford a ls o  viewed th e  in c id e n t  as an 
o p p o r tu n ity  t o  re a f f irm  A m erica ’ s re s o lv e , p o s t Vietnam.
The f i r s t  invo lvem ent o f  U n ited  S ta te s  armed fo rc e s  came w ith in  a few 
hours when a reconnaissance p lane  was d ispa tched  from  T h a iland  to  lo c a te  th e  
s h ip , when sh ip s  o f  th e  7 th  F le e t were o rdered  in to  th e  G u lf o f  Siam, and 
when th e  3rd  M arine D iv is io n  on Okinawa were p u t on combat a le r t .  On May 12 
/Vnerican reconnaissance a i r c r a f t  lo ca te d  th e  Mayaguez which was be ing 
e sco rted  by Cambodian gunboats. The a i r c r a f t  was h i t  by g u n f ire .  On May 13 
Ford, determ ined to  p re ven t th e  s h ip  and crew being taken  to  th e  Cambodian 
m ain land where recovery  would be more d i f f i c u l t ,  o rdered  th a t  Koh Tah Is la n d  
be is o la te d  and th a t  movement o f  th e  s h ip  be p ro h ib ite d .  In  th e  course o f  
im plem enting o rd e rs  American a i r c r a f t  sank th re e  Cambodian p a tro l boats and 
damaged fo u r  o th e rs . Hcwever, t h i s  d id  n o t p reven t th e  t r a n s fe r  o f  th e  crew 
to  th e  m ain land.
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D ip lo m a tic  e f f o r t s  th rough  th e  P eople ’ s R epub lic  o f  China, th e  S ecre ta ry  
General o f  th e  U .N ., and P rem ier Pramor o f  T h a ila n d , t o  secure th e  re le ase  
o f  th e  s h ip  proved u nsu cce ss fu l, and on May 14 Ford o rdered  an a s s a u lt on 
Koh Tang is la n d , th e  board ing  o f  th e  Mayaguez, and a tta c k s  a g a in s t a i r f i e ld s  
and o th e r  m i l i t a r y  ta rg e ts  on th e  m ain land.
The m arines a tta c k in g  Koh Tang ran in to  heavy f i r e .  The Mayaguez board ing  
p a r ty  found th e  s h ip  empty, (unbeknown to  them, th e  crew had s a fe ly  boarded 
th e  U n ited  S ta te s  d e s tro y e r, W ils o n ). Naval a i r c r a f t  destroyed  seventeen 
Cambodian a i r c r a f t  and a number o f  am phibious c r a f t .  F o rty -o ne  men o f  th e  
U n ited  S ta te s  armed fo rc e s  were k i l l e d .
"Taking  no te " o f  S ec tion  4 (a ) (1 )  o f  th e  War Powers R eso lu tion *® , th e  
P re s id e n t re p o rte d  to  Congress e a r ly  on May 15. However, i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
conclude th a t  th e  c o n s u lta t io n  p ro v is io n s  o f  S ec tion  3®® were conrplied w ith  
d u r in g  th e  Mayaguez o p e ra tio n : th e  re s o lu t io n  re q u ire s  c o n s u lta t io n  w ith  
Congress b e fo re  th e  in tro d u c t io n  o f  American fo rc e s  in to  a p o te n t ia l ly  
h o s t i le  s i tu a t io n .  Ford o rdered  U n ited  S ta te s  sh ip s  and a i r c r a f t  in to  th e  
a rea where s ie z u re  had taken  p la ce  in  th e  e a r ly  a fte rn o o n  o f  May 12 and th e  
f i r s t  sho ts  were f i r e d  on May 13. Congress was n o t in form ed u n t i l  la te  May 
13.
However, one o f  th e  most in te r e s t in g  aspects o f  the  Mayaguez a f f a i r  was 
Congressional re a c tio n . I t  is  s ig n i f ic a n t  th a t  th e  m a jo r ity  in  Congress 
supported  th e  P re s id e n t and b e lie ve d  th a t  h is  a c tio n  was p rope r under th e  
Commander - in - C h ie f  c lause  o f  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n .
E vacuation o f  Amer i can C it iz e n s f r o m  Lebano
In  th e  s p r in g  o f  1976 th e  Lebanese C iv i l  War in te n s if ie d  and an am phibious 
ta s k  fo rc e  was s ta t io n e d  near th e  Lebanese co a s t in  th e  even t o f  having  to  
evacuate th e  1400 Americans in  th e  c o u n try . In  June th e  U n ited  S ta te s  
Ambassador Meloy and Counselor o f  th e  Embassy, W aring, were murdered. Ford 
in s tru c te d  th e  American Bnbassy to  h e lp  American c i t iz e n s  who wished to
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d e p a rt Lebanon by ove rlan d  convoy a t  th e  tim e . The s i tu a t io n  d e te r io ra te d  
and Ford ordered  U n ited  S ta te s  naval ve sse ls  to  a s s is t  in  th e  e vacu a tion , 
which occurred  w ith o u t in c id e n t .  A month la t e r  a second evacua tion  too k  
p lace  as th e  s i tu a t io n  fu r th e r  worsened.
A lthough Ford argued th a t  th e  War Powers R e so lu tio n  d id  n o t a p p ly , he d id  
subm it two re p o r ts  t o  Congress. However, Ford encountered s im i la r  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  as in  th e  Danang in c id e n t:  "We t r ie d  so hard to  reach a t h i r d  
member o f  Congress th a t  ou r re s o u rc e fu l W hite House o p e ra to rs  had th e  lo c a l 
p o l ic e  leave a note  on th e  Congressman’ s beach co tta g e  doo r: ’ P lease c a l l  
th e  W hite House" (F o rd ). R egardless T u rner no tes, "once aga in , th e re  was 
le s s  than  f u l l  ’ c o n s u lta t io n ’ -  b u t once aga in , th e re  was l i t t l e  concern 
expressed because th e  o p e ra tio n  had been a success"
The C a rte r  Admi n i s t r a t io n .
The Z a ire  Rescue M iss ion .
In  May 1978 a group o f  ex-Katangan gendarmes a tta cke d  th e  copper m in ing  
town o f  Kolwezi in  sou the rn  Z a ire , th re a te n in g  th e  s a fe ty  o f  th e  
in h a b ita n ts ,  in c lu d in g  French, Belgium  and American n a t io n a ls .  The U n ited  
S ta te s  se n t t ra n s p o r t  a i r c r a f t  to  su pp o rt French and Belgium rescue 
o p e ra tio n s . The o p e ra tio n  la s te d  about one month and C a rte r d id  n o t subm it a 
re p o r t  under th e  War Powers R e s o lu tio n .
In  August th e  House Fore ign  A f fa i r s  Committee h e ld  h ea rings  on th e  issue  
o f  P re s id e n t ia l c a rp iia n c e  w ith  th e  War Powers R e so lu tio n . The 
A d m in is tra t io n  argued th a t  th e  a i r c r a f t  were n o t in v o lv e d  in  h o s t i l i t i e s  
because the y  landed in  secure areas more than one hundred m ile s  from  th e  
s i te s  o f  c o n f l i c t ;  no r were American personnel equipped f o r  combat. In  
g e n e ra l. Congress was s a t is f ie d  w ith  th e  A d m in is tra t io n ’ s  stance.®®
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The Ira n  Rescue A ttem pt
I
In  November 1979 a band o f  I ra n ia n  Is la m ic  fu n d a m e n ta lis ts  se ized  c o n tro l
o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  Embassy compound in  Tehran and vowed to  ho ld  American i
d ip lo m a ts  and o th e r  personnel c a p t iv e  u n t i l  th e  Shah o f  I ra n  was re tu rne d
f o r  t r i a l .  P re s id e n t C a rte r re p o rte d  to  Congress on A p r i l  26, 1980, th a t  on ^
A p r i l  24, an unsuccessfu l a tte m p t had been made to  rescue th e  hostages in  
Tehran. C a rte r re p o rte d  to  Congress w ith in  f o r t y - e ig h t  hours o f  in tro d u c in g  
combat fo rc e s  in to  a fo re ig n  c o u n try . He c ite d  h is  a u th o r ity  under th e  
C o n s t itu t io n  as th e  C h ie f E xecu tive  and th e  C anm ander-in -C h ie f, and in  
a d d it io n  S ec tion  8 (d ) (1 )  o f  th e  R esolution® * which s ta te s  th a t  n o th in g  in  
i t  " i s  in tended to  a l t e r  th e  C o n s t itu t io n a l a u th o r ity  o f  th e  Congress o r  o f  
th e  P re s id e n t" . In  o th e r words, rescue o p e ra tio n s  conducted under th e  
P re s id e n t’ s in h e re n t C o n s t itu t io n a l a u th o r ity  cannot be l im ite d  by 
p ro v is io n s  in  th e  War Powers R e s o lu tio n . ®®
The Reagan A ^ i  n is tra t^^
A d v is e r s to  El Sal va d o r.
In  1981 th e  Reagan A d m in is tra t io n  in troduced  U n ited  S ta te s  armed fo rc e s  
in to  El S alvador as "a d v is e rs " . Congress argued th a t  th e  El Sa lvador 
s i tu a t io n  re q u ire d  com pliance under th e  th e  R e so lu tio n  and c r i t i c i s e d  th e  
A d m in is tra t io n  f o r  f a i l i n g  t o  c o n s u lt  f u l l y  w ith  Congress b e fo re  com m itting  
th e  a d v is e rs . The S ta te  Department argued th a t  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  armed 
fo rc e s  in  El S alvador had n o t been in vo lve d  in  a c tu a l o r  imm inent 
h o s t i l i t i e s .  The a d v is e rs  were n o t equipped f o r  combat and would be armed 
o n ly  w ith  personal s idearm s. They would n o t go on p a tro l w ith  S a lvado rian  
fo rc e s  o r  o th e rw ise  be p laced in  s i tu a t io n s  where combat was l i k e ly .  As 
such, S ec tio n  8 (c )  o f  th e  Resolution®® was n o t app licab le .® "^
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A Mu l t in a t io n a l  Force and Observ e rs  f o r  S in a i...................
P re s id e n t Reagan re p o rte d  on March 19 1982 th a t  American m i l i t a r y
personnel would be used as p a r t  o f  th e  M u lt in a t io n a l Forces and O bservers 
(M .F .O .) t o  h e lp  execute th e  peace t r e a ty  between Egypt and Is ra e l in  th e  
wake o f  th e  Camp David peace process. When th e  U.N. proved unable to  p ro v id e  
th e  M .F .O ., th e  U n ited  S ta te s  agreed to  p ro v id e  th e  ground tro o p s  f o r  t h i s  
purpose and th e  Reagan A d m in is tra t io n  committed i t s e l f  t o  re p o r t in g  under 
S ec tio n  4 (a ) (2 )  o f  th e  Resolution®® im m ed ia te ly  on th e  in tro d u c t io n  o f  
American fo rc e s  in to  S in a i.
In  th e  re p o r t  th e  P re s id e n t emphasised th a t  th e re  was no in te n t io n  o r  
e x p e c ta tio n  th a t  these  members o f  th e  American Armed Forces would become 
in vo lve d  in  h o s t i l i t i e s .  C ongressional approva l f o r  th e  M.F.O. was s tro n g  
and , th e re fo re ,  th e re  was l i t t l e  c r i t ic i s m  f o r  th e  P re s id e n t’ s a c tio n s , 
e i th e r  in  substance o r  on p rocedura l grounds, and th e  a u th o r is a tio n  was 
le g a l ly  approved in  both  Houses.®®
A.,...k!y.ltinatim Peacekeepi ng Force in  Lebanon.
In  June 1982 in  response f o r  th e  sh o o tin g  o f  th e  I s r a e l i  Ambassador to  
B r i t a in ,  I s r a e l i  Defence Force tro o p s  en te red  Lebanon f o r  a m ajor o ffe n s iv e  
a g a in s t th e  P.L.O . In  an e f f o r t  t o  promote a peace fu l re s o lu t io n  o f  e ven ts . 
P re s id e n t Reagan expressed a w il l in g n e s s  to  dep loy a c o n tin g e n t o f  U n ited  
S ta te s  M arines as p a r t  o f  an in te rn a t io n a l fo rc e  f o r  s u p e rv is in g  th e  
peace fu l d e p a rtu re  o f  P .L.O . forces f r o n  Lebanon. In  August, in  response to  
a fo rm a l request from  th e  Lebanese government, a pp ro x im a te ly  e ig h t  hundred 
m arines, armed w ith  normal in fa n t r y  weapons a r r iv e d . S ince th e  m arines had 
been in v ite d  by th e  le g it im a te  government o f  th e  co u n try  and th e  d ep a rtu re  
p la n  had been approved, th e  A d m in is tra t io n  too k  th e  s tance  th a t  American 
fo rc e s  were n o t be ing  in tro du ce d  in to  a h o s t i le  environm ent. However, keen 
to  avo id  a c o n fro n ta t io n  w ith  key Congressional le a d e rs , th e  P re s id e n t
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subm itted  a re p o r t  im m ed ia te ly  fo l lo w in g  deployment w ith o u t s p e c ify in g  under 
which sub paragraph th e  a c tio n  was being taken . Indeed, as i t  tu rn e d  o u t, 
d u r in g  th e  few weeks o f  t h e i r  deploym ent, th e re  were no American c a s u a lt ie s  
and no invo lvem ent in  h o s t i l i t i e s .
However, w ith in  days o f  th e  in te rn a t io n a l peacekeeping fo r c e ’ s w ithd raw a l 
from  B e iru t,  P re s id e n t -  e le c t  Gemayel was assass ina ted . M i l i t a r y  fo rc e s  
lo y a l to  Gemayel en te red  two re fugee  camps o u ts id e  B e iru t  and murdered 
hundreds o f  people who were a lle g e d  to  be P .L.O . sym pa th ise rs . In  September, 
th e  Lebanese C ab ine t requested th e  th re e  c o u n tr ie s  th a t  had p a r t ic ip a te d  in  
th e  o r ig in a l  peace-keeping fo rc e  to  re tu rn  to  B e iru t  to  re s to re  o rd e r. The 
Reagan A d m in is tra t io n  com plied w ith  th e  re q ue s t. There was l i t t l e  re a l 
c o n s u lta t io n ,  b u t i f  one accep ts th e  A d m in is tra t io n ’ s c o n te n tio n  th a t  th e  
m arines were n o t e n te r in g  a h o s t i le  s i tu a t io n ,  th e re  was no fo rm a l 
requ irem ent under th e  R e so lu tio n  to  c o n s u lt .  On September 29 1982 tw e lve  
hundred m arines began a r r iv in g  in  B e iru t  and Reagan subm itted  h is  war power 
re p o r t  t o  Congress.
The m arines were to  se rve  f o r  an u n s p e c if ie d  tim e  and would n o t engage in  
combat. They w ould, however, be equipped to  e x e rc is e  th e  r ig h t  o f  s e l f -  
defence. The P re s id e n t s ta te d  th a t  th e  deployment was w ith in  h is  
C o n s t itu t io n a l a u th o r ity  to  conduct fo re ig n  a f f a i r s  as Commander - in - C h ie f .  
By n o t re p o r t in g  under S ec tio n  4(a)(1)®® o r  p rom is ing  to  remove th e  m arines 
by a s p e c if ie d  d a te , P re s id e n t Reagan had dep rived  Congress o f  i t s  r ig h t  to  
a u th o r is e  w ithd raw a l a f t e r  60 o r  90 days. Reagan’ s d e c is io n  n o t to  subm it a 
re p o r t  under S ec tion  4 (a ) (1 )  was c o n s is te n t w ith  th e  a t t i t u d e  o f  p r io r  
A d m in is tra t io n s . Reagan f i l e d  th re e  re p o r ts  under th e  War Powers 
R e s o lu tio n . Not once d id  he re p o r t  th a t  th e  fo rc e s  were being in tro du ce d  
in to  a c tu a l o r  imminent h o s t i l i t i e s .
A f te r  much debate, however, Congress passed th e  M u lt in a t io n a l Force in  
Lebanon R eso lu tion® ^, which invoked S ec tio n  4 (a ) (1 )  o f  th e  Resolution®^ as 
o f  August 29, 1983, a u th o r is in g  th e  p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f  th e  M arines in  th e
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M.N.F. f o r  e igh teen  months a t  th e  most. The compromise invoked key s e c tio n s  
o f  th e  War Powers R e so lu tio n  f o r  th e  f i r s t  tim e  s in ce  i t  was enacted in to  
law . R egard less, th e  P re s id e n t was a b le  t o  m a in ta in  th e  m arines in  Lebanon 
f o r  e ig h teen  months -  th e  m o d ifie d  re s o lu t io n  a u th o r is e d  th e  P re s id e n t, 
f o r  th e  purpose o f  S ec tio n  5 (b ) o f  th e  Resolution®®, t o  keep th e  U n ited  
S ta te s  Armed Forces in  th e  M.N.F. in  Lebanon .®*
Grenada.
On 25 O ctober 1983 Reagan adv ised  th e  Speaker o f  th e  House and th e  
P re s id e n t p ro  tempore o f  th e  Senate th a t  he had deployed a pp ro x im a te ly  1900 
M arines and Army a irb o rn e  tro o p s  in  Grenada. The deployment was o rdered  
under th e  P re s id e n t’ s  C o n s t i tu t io n a l a u th o r ity  to  conduct fo re ig n  a f f a i r s  
and as Com m ander-in-Chief. In  re p o r t in g  to  Congress, P re s id e n t Reagan s ta te d  
th a t  he was a c t in g  c o n s is te n t w ith  th e  War Powers R e so lu tio n  b u t was n o t 
c i t in g  S ec tion  4 (a )(1 )® ® , which would app ly  when tro o p s  a re  in troduced  in to  
a c tu a l o r  imminent h o s t i l i t i e s .  T h e re fo re , h is  re p o r t  d id  n o t t r ig g e r  th e  
S ec tion  5(b)®® tim e  l im i t .  In  response, th e  House passed H .J.Res 402 th a t  
d ec la red  th a t  sending tro o p s  in to  Grenada tr ig g e re d  S ec tio n  4 (a ) (1 )  o f  th e  
War Powers R e so lu tio n . T h is  S ec tio n  would re q u ire  th a t  American fo rc e s  be 
w ithdraw n a f t e r  s ix t y  days un less  Congress a u th o r ise d  t h e i r  con tinued  
presence under S ec tion  5 (b ) o f  th e  R e so lu tio n . The Senate a ttem pted s im i la r  
a c t io n  b u t th e  b i l l  f a i le d  to  pass.
However, in  th e  e ven t, th e  C ongressional le a d e rsh ip  d id  n o t w ish  to  fo rc e  
th e  War Powers R e so lu tio n  is su e . They re a lis e d  th a t  th e  p u b lic  was s t ro n g ly  
in  fa v o u r o f  Reagan’ s a c t io n ,  which became a m i l i t a r y  success. 
"C ongressional re a c tio n  to  th e  P re s id e n t’ s use o f  tro o p s  to  rescue th e  
U n ited  S ta te s  c i t iz e n s  in  Grenada was a re a f f irm a t io n  o f  th e  r ig h t  o f  th e  
P re s id e n t to  a c t in  such circum stances".® '^
120
IOperat io n  P r a ir ie - F i r a   I
In  a p a tte rn  re m in is c e n t o f  th e  d e c is io n  to  invade Grenada, th e  Reagan 
A d m in is tra t io n  v io la te d  both  th e  l e t t e r  and th e  s p i r i t  o f  S ec tio n  3®® o f  th e  
War Powers R e so lu tio n  when i t  used a i r  power to  r e t a l ia t e  a g a in s t Lybian 
te r ro r is m . As F a sce ll has s ta te d , "any reasonable person would have 
concluded th a t  th e re  m igh t be h o s t i l i t i e s "  and t h i s  ought to  have tr ig g e re d  
th e  c o n s u lta t io n  requ irem en t. However, a f t e r  th e  Lybian -  American c lashes 
below th e  "L in e  o f  D eath", o n ly  two le g is la to r s  p u b l ic ly  defended th e  |
C o n s t itu t io n a l v a l id i t y  o f  th e  War Powers R e so lu tio n . ®® Rubner no tes , 
"C ongressional acquiescence in  th e  u s u rp tio n  o f  th e  war power can be 
a t t r ib u te d  in  la rg e  measure to  th e  p re v a le n t p e rce p tio n  th a t  in  t h i s
in s ta n ce , Am erica ’ s m igh t was s u c c e s s fu lly  b rough t to  bear a g a in s t an 
immensely unpopu la r, m i l i t a r i l y  weak and p o l i t i c a l l y  is o la te d  fo e " .7®
Thus, from  th e  Mayaguez to  th e  Grenada in c id e n ts , even w ith  th e  War Powers 
R e so lu tio n  having th e  fo rc e  o f  law , P re s id e n ts  have managed to  keep th e  
i n i t i a t i v e ,  und e rtak ing  l im ite d  m i l i t a r y  o p e ra tio n s  and re p o r t in g  to  





Uni te d  S ta te s  Troop Cgimitmen^  1974 ~ 1986 .
Deployment
Cyprus E vacuation(1974)
Cambodian R esupp ly(1974)
Cambodi an Reconnai ssance(1974)
Danang S e a l i f t ( 1975)
Cambodian E vacua tion (1975)
V i  etnam Evacuât i on(1975)
Mayaguez(1975)
Lebanon Evacuati on(1976)
Korean Rei n fo rce m e n t(1976)
Z a ire  A i r ! i f t ( 1978)
Ira n ia n  Rescue M is s io n (1980)
A dv ise rs  in  El S a lvador(1981)
B in a i M u lt in a t io n a l F o rc e d 982)
Lebanon-PLO E vacuations(1982)
Lebanon-U. S. E vacua tion (1982)
Chad Reconnai ssance(1983)
Lebanon Peace-Keeping Force(1983)
AWACS to  Chad(1983)
Grenada In v a s io n (1983)
G u lf o f  S id ra (1986)
L i  byan R e ta li a t i  on(1986)
W arPowers A p p l i c a d .......
No re p o r t  
No re p o r t  
No re p o r t  
R e p o rt/S e c t.4 (a )(2 ) 
R e p o rt/S e c t.4 (a )(2 )  
R e p o rt/S e c t.4 
R e p o rt/S e c t.4 (a )(1 )
No re p o r t  
No re p o r t 
No re p o r t
Report/No s e c t . s p e c if ie d  
No re p o r t
R e p o rt/S e c t.4 (a )(2 ) 
Report/No s e c t. s p e c if ie d  
Report/No s e c t. s p e c if ie d  
R e p o rt/S e c t.4 
R e p o rt/S e c t.4 
R e p o rt/S e c t.4 
R e p o rt/S e c t.4 (a )(1 ) 
Report/No s ta tu te  c ite d  
Report/No s ta tu te  c ite d
Source: D aniel Paul F ra n k lin ,  "War Powers in  th e  Modern C o n te x t", Congress 
and P re s id e n t, V o l .14, P a r t 1, p .80
M ....Asœ saæ nt......
The War Powers R e so lu tio n  is  supposedly th e  ce n tre p ie ce  o f  th e  Vietnam /  
W atergate ch a llen g e  to  P re s id e n t ia l a u th o r ity .  However, w e ll ove r a decade 
a f te r  th e  War Powers R e s o lu tio n , a f t e r  Lebanon, Grenada and th e  Supreme 
C o u rt’ s d e c is io n  in  th e  Im m ig ra tio n  and N a tu ra lis a t io n  S e rv ice  v ’ s Chadha^^, 
i t  i s  now apparent th a t  whatever Congressional in te n t  unde rlay  th e  
R e so lu tio n , any e x p e c ta tio n  th a t  i t s  methodology would a c tu a lly  lead to  th e  
a p p lic a t io n  o f  j o i n t  P re s id e n t ia l -  C ongressional judgment in  th e  war-making 
process was mistaken."^®
The N ixon A d m in is tra t io n  v i r t u a l l y  ignored  th e  War Powers R e so lu tio n  due 
to  th e  A d m in is tra t io n ’ s narrow d e f in i t io n  o f  what c o n s t itu te d  s itu a t io n s  
where imminent invo lvem ent in  h o s t i l i t i e s  was c le a r ly  in d ic a te d  by th e
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c ircum stances. The Ford A d m in is tra t io n  regarded o n ly  a c le a r  p o te n t ia l f o r  
armed c o n f l i c t  p r io r  t o  th e  in t ro d u c t io n  o f  tro o p s  as n e c e s s ita tin g  re p o r t.  
Regarding th e  C a rte r A d m in is tra t io n , th e  re p o r t  issued pe rsuan t to  th e  
R e so lu tio n  in  th e  case o f  th e  I ra n ia n  rescue m iss ion  f a i le d  t o  s p e c ify  th e  
subsec tion  under which th e  re p o r t  was be ing made, and was subm itted  to  
Congress two days a f t e r  American fo rc e s  l e f t  I ra n ia n  t e r r i t o r y .  Reagan was 
c o n s is te n t w ith  th e  p re v io u s  P re s id e n t in  h is  d is re g a rd  f o r  th e  R e s o lu tio n .
Analysis o f the War P p ^rs  Resolution.
I t  was hoped th a t  th e  e f f ic a c y  o f  th e  R e so lu tio n  would re s t  on th re e  b as ic  
dev ices  th a t  would l in k  th e  P re s id e n t to  Congress: P re s id e n t ia l
c o n s u lta t io n ,  P re s id e n t ia l re p o r ts  to  Congress, and th e  Congressional 
te rm in a tio n  o f  m i l i t a r y  a c t io n .
a) C o n s u lta t io n .......
"C o n s u lta tio n  as a p ro c e s s .. . re q u ire s  as much a c t iv e  invo lvem ent on th e  
p a r t  o f  Congress as on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  e x e c u tiv e . F a ilu re  to  c o n s u lt  i s  a 
co n s ta n t co m p la in t from  Congress, b u t th e  f a u l t  q u ite  o fte n  l ie s  w ith  th e  
members o f  Congress ra th e r  than  th e  e x e c u tiv e .D u r in g  th e  p e r io d , 1969 -  ’ 73, 
f o r  in s ta n ce , th e  N a tio na l S e c u r ity  C ouncil had a s tan d in g  o f f e r  to  b r ie f  
any member o f  Congress on w hatever fo re ig n  p o l ic y  issue  he d e s ire d . The 
ground ru le s  f o r  such b r ie f in g s  were to  p ro v id e  th e  f u l l e s t  and most h ig h ly  
c la s s i f ie d  in fo rm a tio n  on th e  is s u e . . .A ccord ing  to  th e  reco rds  o f  th e  
N .S .C ., t h i s  o f f e r  was taken up o n ly  th re e  tim e s  in  f iv e  years"
The m a jo r ity  o f  Congress’ o b je c t io n s  to  th e  e x e c u tiv e ’ s im p lem enta tion  o f  
th e  R e so lu tio n  focu s  on th e  re lu c ta n c e  o f  th e  P re s id e n t to  c o n s u lt  w ith  
C ongressional leade rs  b e fo re  c o n m itt in g  tro o p s  to  conbat. However, th e  
concept o f  p r io r  c o n s u lta t io n  is  a f a l la c y  because Congress f a i le d  t o  make 
th e  p ra c t ic e  com pulsory o r  to  e s ta b lis h  procedures f o r  emergency i
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c o n s u lta t io n .  In  a d d it io n ,  th e re  is  no agreement as to  what c o n s t itu te s  
a p p ro p r ia te  and adequate c o n s u lta t io n :  what o r  who is  meant by "w ith
Congress"? What is  th e  d e f in i t io n  o f  c o n s u lta tio n ?  However, t h i s  is  n o t to  
say th a t  th e  R e so lu tio n  has a b s o lu te ly  no e f f e c t  on th e  p r io r  p la nn in g  and 
e xe cu tio n  f o r  as A l l is o n  no tes , th e  s ix t y  -  day l i m i t  g ive s  th e  P re s id e n t an 
in c e n t iv e  to  p lan  in te rv e n t io n s  in  such a way as to  be b r ie f
b) R e p o rtin g ......
The "compromise" R e so lu tio n  re s u lte d  in  a re p o r t in g  requ irem ent th a t  
a llo w s  th e  e x e c u tiv e  in  a l l  b u t th e  most extrem e in s tan ce s , th e  o p tio n  o f  
d e f in in g  th e  a p p lic a t io n  o f  law . Should (im m inent) h o s t i l i t i e s  n o t be 
c le a r ly  e v id e n t, th e  P re s id e n t can chose to  overcome C ongressional ve toes by 
re p o r t in g  persuan t to  S ec tion  4 (a )(2 )7®  o r  4 ( a ) ( 3 )"^7subsections th a t  do n o t 
t r ig g e r  th e  te rm in a tio n  o p tio n s . In  a d d it io n ,  because th e  re p o r tin g  
requ irem ent a llo w s  48 hours b e fo re  a re p o r t  must be made to  Congress, th e  
P re s id e n t has co n s id e ra b le  leeway in  th e  i n i t i a l  stages o f  deployment o f  
tro o p s , f o r  example, Grenada; s u f f ic ie n t  t im e  f o r  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  to  
become in e x t r ic a b ly  in vo lve d  in  a c o n f l i c t .
The re p o r ts  supposedly in c lu d e  an e x p la n a tio n  o f  th e  c ircum stances 
n e c e s s ita t in g  th e  in tro d u c t io n  o f  th e  armed fo rc e s , a l i s t  o f  th e  e n a b lin g  
C o n s t i tu t io n a l and le g is la t iv e  a u th o r ity ,  and an e s tim a te  o f  th e  scope and 
d u ra t io n  o f  invo lvem ent in  h o s t i l i t i e s .  However, re p o r ts  have la rg e ly  been 
one -  two page le t t e r s ,  " th a t  p r o f fe r  le s s  in fo rm a tio n  than  m igh t be gleaned 
from  read ing  p ress coverage o f  th e  events".?®  Indeed, th e  re p o r t  o f  th e  
Mayaguez o p e ra tio n  made no m ention o f  th e  number o f  c a s u a lt ie s  nor th e  fa c t  
th a t  bombing o f  a m i l i t a r y  a i r f i e l d  occurred  a f t e r  th e  s h ip  and crew were in  
/Vnerican custody. In  none o f  th e  re p o r ts  d id  th e  P re s id e n t acknowledge th a t  
he was m eeting th e  re p o r t in g  requ irem ents o f  S ec tio n  4 o f  th e  R eso lution .?®
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c ) Ter m in a tio n .
The le g is la t iv e  v e to  in  th e  War Powers R e so lu tio n  is  on th e  s u rfa c e , th e  
s tro n g e s t and most unambiguous s e c tio n  o f  th e  law. However, because a 
C ongressional v e to  ove r th e  Com m ander-in-Chief’ s use o f  tro o p s  once those  
tro o p s  a re  a lre a d y  deployed is  such a d ra s t ic  weapon, i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  
im agine a s i tu a t io n  in  which Congress would use such a t a c t ic .  H is to ry  shows 
th a t  i f  a P re s id e n t uses th e  armed fo rc e s  s w i f t l y  and s u c c e s s fu lly ,  Congress 
applauds; i f  o th e rw ise , then  Congress is  pow erless b e fo re  a f a i t  acconpli.®®
Vietnam and th e  War Powers R e s o lu tio n .
The u lt im a te  iro n y  o f  th e  War Powers R e so lu tio n  is  th a t  th e  Vietnam 
invo lvem ent would p robab ly  have met th e  e s s e n tia l c r i t e r i a  o f  th e  R e so lu tio n  
had i t  been in  e f f e c t  a t  th e  tim e .
1 .E ff e c t  on Americ a n E n t r y i n to  th e War.
Most Americans supported  th e  war e f f o r t  in  1965, and i t  seems c e r ta in  th a t  
i f  P re s id e n t Johnson had re p o rte d  to  Congress as re q u ire d  by th e  R e so lu tio n  
im m ed ia te ly upon th e  beg inn ing  o f  su s ta in e d  American bonbing o f  th e  N o rth , 
o r  th e  in t ro d u c t io n  o f  re g u la r  combat tro o p s  in  th e  South, Congress would 
have q u ic k ly  a u th o r ise d  a c o n t in u a t io n  o f  war.
2 .E ffe c t  on L e g it i im c y ..........
Had th e  War Powers R e so lu tio n  been in  e f f e c t  d u r in g  Vietnam, no lo n g e r 
would i t  have been so s ta r k ly  Johnson’ s o r  N ixon ’ s war.
3 .E f fe c t  on th e  Conduct o f  th e  War.
The R e so lu tio n  would have com pelled th e  P re s id e n t in to  t a i lo r in g  h is  
s t ra te g ie s  more c lo s e ly  to  th e  need to  o b ta in  Congressional a pp ro va l. Thus,
.1
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th e  R e so lu tio n  ra is e s  th e  C o n s t itu t io n a l issue  o f  C ongressional in te r fe re n c e  
in  th e  P re s id e n t’ s  ro le  as Commander-in -C h ie f.
A l l is o n  w r i te s  th a t  th e  p r in c ip a l s id e  e f fe c ts  o f  th e  War Powers 
R e so lu tio n  on th e  Vietnam War would have been: g re a te r  p ressure  to  e s c a la te , 
g re a te r  s tage  -  managing in  o rd e r to  w in  Congressional a pp ro va l, b u t, more 
im p o r ta n t ly ,  w ith  Congress v o t in g  up o r  down on th e  war every s ix  months, 
debate would have in te n s if ie d  and d iv is io n  in  th e  co u n try  exacerbated.®'*
Ill® of Constitut i ona lity ..
" I  lo ve  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n ,  b u t I  ha te  N ixon m ore".® 2
S ec tion  5 (b ) o f  th e  Resolution®® would d e p rive  th e  P re s id e n t o f  h is  
C o n s t itu t io n a l a u th o r ity  as C om m ander-in-chief d u r in g  a p e r io d  o f  
h o s t i l i t i e s  a f t e r  a p e r io d  o f  60 days i f  Congress remained s i le n t  on th e  
m a tte r. The n o tio n  th a t  Congress can by s ile n c e  o r  in a c tio n  deny th e  
P re s id e n t o f  h is  fundam ental C o n s t i tu t io n a l powers in  a tim e  o f  n a tio n a l 
emergency is  in  v io la t io n  o f  th e  system o f  se p a ra tio n  o f  powers.
S ec tion  5 (c )  o f  th e  R esolution® * would a llo w  Congress to  d e p riv e  th e  
P re s id e n t o f  h is  Commande r - in - C h ie f  powers a t  any tim e  by passing  a 
c o n cu rre n t re s o lu t io n .  Such a R e so lu tio n  does n o t have th e  e f fe c t  o f  law 
because i t  i s  n o t subm itted  to  th e  P re s id e n t f o r  h is  s ig n a tu re  o r  v e to  as 
s t ip u la te d  by th e  C o n s t i tu t io n ’ s p re s e n ta tio n  c lause .
The Supreme C o u rt, in  Im m ig ra tio n  and N a tu ra lis a t io n  S e rv ice  v . Chadha 
(dec ided  June 23,1983), h e ld  u n c o n s titu t io n a l th e  one -  house le g is la t iv e  
v e to  which a llow ed  e i th e r  House o f  Congress, by re s o lu t io n ,  to  o v e r ru le  an 
e x e c u tiv e  d e c is io n . The C ou rt based i t s  d e c is io n  on th e  b icam era lism  and th e  
p re s e n ta tio n  c lause  o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n .® ®
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The i r o n ic  and sad fa c t  is  th a t  th e  War Powers R e s o lu tio n , d e s p ite  a l l  i t s  
f a i l in g s ,  is  th e  o n ly  p o te n t ia l ly  e f fe c t iv e  le g a l v e h ic le  c u r re n t ly  
a v a i la b le  t o  secure a modicum o f  le g is la t iv e  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  d e c is io n s  to  
dep loy American fo rc e s  in  b a t t le .  In  th e o ry  a p p ro p r ia t io n s , th e  power o f  th e  
purse, is  a p o te n t weapon. In  p ra c t ic e ,  however, i t  has proved a paper t ig e r  
as can be w itnessed d u r in g  th e  Vietnam  War. D uring th e  p e r io d  1965 -  1972, 
on a l l  a p p ro p r ia t io n s  b i l l s  concerned w ith  th e  war, more than  95 pe r c e n t 
vo ted  in  fa v o u r o f  th e  b i l l s ,  w h ile  i t  was n o t u n t i l  May 1973, two months 
a f t e r  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  w ithd rew  i t s  la s t  tro o p s  from  South Vietnam th a t  th e  
House vo ted  to  c u t o f f  a l l  funds f o r  combat in  Southeast A s ia . One cou ld  
a ls o  draw th e  co n c lu s io n  th a t  i f  Congress was p ro v id in g  th e  money, i t  must 
have supported  th e  war. &
The F u tu re .
O p to n s  f o r  th e  F u tu re .
a) th e  a W l i t i^ D  o f  th e  R e s o lu tio n. T h is  movement is  led  by Senator 
G oldw ater (R e p .A r iz ) and argues th a t  th e  P re s id e n t shou ld  n o t be shackled by 
le g is la t iv e  r e s t r ic t io n s  th a t  a tte m p t to  r e s t r i c t  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  o p tio n s . 
Proponents m a in ta in  th a t  th e  repea l o f  th e  War Powers R e so lu tio n  would avo id  
th e  even t o f  a s e r io u s  and p o te n t ia l ly  d e s tru c t iv e  C o n s t i tu t io n a l c r i s i s  
th a t  may th re a te n  th e  n a tio n  a t  a tim e  when d e c is io n  and speed o f  a c t io n  a re  
o f  th e  essence. However in e f fe c t iv e  th e  R e so lu tio n  has proved, i t  re n a in s  
one o f  th e  few means a v a ila b le  to  Congress to  ensure le g is la t iv e  
p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  d e c is io n s  to  dep loy  American fo rc e s  in  combat,
b) th e  e n a c 1 % n e n to fn e w le g is la t io n .S e v e ra l c o n se rva tive  Congressmen such 
as Senators D o le (R ep.K an.) and D e n ton (R ep .Ind .) would p re fe r  to  enac t new 
le g is la t io n .  In  A p r i l  1986 in  th e  wake o f  th e  ra id  a g a in s t L ib ya , an 
id e n t ic a l A n t ite r ro r is m  b i l l  was in tro du ce d  in  th e  House by Joe Barton(Rep. 




J e rim ia h  Denton(Rep. A la ) .  T h is  measure re q u ire d  no p r io r  c o n s u lta t io n  w ith  
Congress, extended th e  re p o r t in g  p e r io d  from  fo r t y - e ig h t  hours to  te n  days, 
and removed th e  s ix t y  day l i m i t  on th e  deployment o f  tro o p s . Less 
in fo rm a tio n  would be subm itted  to  Congress, n o t more. However, i f  Congress 
is  t o  have more power, i t  nrust a ls o  have th e  in fo rm a tio n , th e re fo re ,  th e  
q u e s tio n  is  how th a t  in fo rm a tio n  can be a cqu ire d ,
c ) th e  e s ta b lishm ent o f  a permane n t co n s u l ta t iv e b o d y .A  g roup  o f  Dem ocratic 
Congressmen w ish to  s tre n g h te n  th e  law by e s ta b lis h in g  a pernmnent 
c o n s u lta t iv e  body to  which th e  P re s id e n t can tu rn  in  tim e s  o f  c r i s i s .  In  May 
1986 Senators R ogert Byrd(Dem.W.Va.) ,  C la irb o rn e  Pel 1(Dem. N .Y .) ,  Sam 
Nunn(Dem.Geo). and P a tr ic k  J . Leahy (D em .V t.) in tro du ce d  S .J ,R e s .340 th a t  
would amend S ec tio n  3 o f  th e  War Powers R e so lu tio n  and c re a te  a b ip a r t is a n  
body o f  e igh teen  members f o r  th e  purpose o f  c o n s u lta tio n  w ith  th e  e x e c u tiv e .
I t  would in c lu d e  th e  speaker o f  th e  House, th e  p re s id e n t p ro  tempore o f  th e  
Senate and th e  m a jo r ity  and m in o r ity  leade rs  o f  both  Houses. However, 
Congress remains d o u b tfu l ove r th e  wisdom o f  e s ta b lis h in g  a la rg e  fo rm a l 
c o n s u lta t iv e  com m ittee, perhaps even an independent com m ittee w ith  i t s  own 
s t a f f .  T h e o re tic a l and p ra c t ic a l problems may a r is e  frcxm c e n t ra l is in g  power 
and r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  in  such a manner in  an e le c te d  re p re s e n ta tiv e  body. S ince 
Congress is  a re p re s e n ta tiv e  body, making in fo rm a tio n  a v a ila b le  to  some 
members and n o t t o  o th e rs  appears to  v io la te  th e  s p i r i t  o f  member 
e q u a li ty ,  e xa ce rb a ting  th e  system o f  in e q u a lity  in h e re n t in  th e  com m ittee 
system ,
d) r e tu r n t o t h e S e n a t e v e r s i o n S . 2956 which p rov ided  f o r  a b in d in g  l i s t  
th a t  d e fin e s  th e  p e rm is s ib le  c ircum stances f o r  P re s id e n t ia l deployment o f  
tro o p s ,
e ) th e  a d d it io n  o f  purse -  s t r i n g r e s t r i c t i ons . V e t o  o f  th e  P re s id e n t’ s 
deployment by co n cu rre n t re s o lu t io n  would a t  th e  same tim e  p ro v id e  f o r  an 
immediate fu n d in g  c u t  o f f .  ®?
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"B u t i t  rem a ins", J a v its  n o te s , " th a t  th e  p ressure  o f  armed c o n f l i c t  i s  
such th a t  even I  found m yse lf w i l l i n g  to  compromise, to  lean in  th e  
d ir e c t io n  o f  th e  P res idency, by g iv in g  e i th e r  more tim e  o r  a w id e r la t i t u d e  
o f  d is c re t io n  to  P re s id e n t ia l a c tio n s  than  w arran ted  by th e  s p e c i f ic  
p ro v is io n s  o f  th e  War Powers R eso lution".® ®  The P re s id e n t s t i l l  r e ta in s  th e  
i n i t i a t i v e  in  m i l i t a r y  deploym ents, i t  is  recognised th a t  th e  fa te  o f  th e  
n a tio n  re s ts  in  h is  hands.
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Chapter 5:The Endemic Weakness o f Congress...................
"A n  P o l i t i c s  is  L o c a l" , T ip  O 'N e i l l . i
Over t h i r t y  years ago th e  a r c h ite c t  o f  th e  L e g is la t iv e  R eo rgan isa tion  A c t 
o f  1946, G alloway, w ro te , "Congress la cks  adequate in fo rm a tio n  and 
in s p e c tio n  f a c i l i t i e s .  I t  i s  a body w ith o u t a head. Leadership  is  s c a tte re d  
among chairmen o f  e ig h ty -o n e  l i t t l e  le g is la tu re s  who compete w ith  each o th e r  
f o r  ju r is d ic t io n  and power. I t s  s u p e rv is io n  o f  e x e c u tiv e  perform ance is  
s u p e r f ic ia l .  Much o f  i t s  t im e  is  consumed by p e t ty ,  lo c a l and p r iv a te  
m a tte rs  which d iv e r t  i t s  a t te n t io n  frcm  n a tio n a l p o l ic y  -  making. E lec ted  by 
th e  people to  p ro te c t  p u b lic  in te r e s t ,  i t  y ie ld s  to o  o fte n  to  im p o r tu n it ie s  
o f  lo b b y is ts  f o r  s p e c ia l in te r e s t  groups. I t  la cks  th e  machinery f o r  th e  
development o f  cohe ren t le g is la t iv e  programmes, and f o r  p rom oting p a r ty  
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  and a c c o u n ta b i l i ty .  I t s  posts  o f  power a re  he ld  on th e  b as is  
o f  p o l i t i c a l  age, re g a rd le ss  o f  a b i l i t y  o r  agreement w ith  p a r ty  p o l ic ie s .
And i t s  members are  overworked and u n d e rp a id " .%
Since Galloway w ro te . Congress has been tra n s fo r im d :
a) Congress has a cqu ired  co n s id e ra b le  s t a f f  and in fo rm a tio n  p rocess ing  
s e rv ic e s ,
b) increased  o v e rs ig h t o f  th e  E xecu tive ,
c )  increased p ro fe s s io n a l ism,
d) s e n io r i t y  is  no lo n ge r a guarantee o f  committee power,
e ) improvements have been made in  th e  system o f  com m ittees. j 
However, i t  remains a p e c u lia r  in s t i t u t io n :  th e  e le c to ra l connections and
in te re s ts  o f  th e  members a re  h ig h ly  personal and lo c a lis e d ; th e  
contem porary Congress is  a d e c e n tra lis e d  body, c h a ra c te r is e d  by autonomous, 
independent com m ittees; p a ro c h ia lis m  is  in h e re n t t o  th e  body; th e  p a r ty
"-mg1
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le a d e rs h ip  is  r e la t iv e ly  weak, th e  in te rn a l power s t ru c tu re  i s  h ig h ly  
d isp e rse d ; i t  f ig h t s  f ie r c e ly  f o r  i t s  independence; th e re  is  th e  problem  o f  
d is t r a c t io n ,  and o f  i r r e s p o n s ib i l i t y . . . " In  s h o r t" ,  no tes K ing, "Congress is  
an u n u su a lly  dem ocra tic  le g is la t iv e  in s t i t u t io n " . 3
TheR e- e le c t io n  Impe r at i ve.
U n lik e  th e  m a jo r ity  o f  P a rlia m e n ta ry  system s, th e  House is  e le c te d  by 
C ongressional d i s t r i c t  and th e  Senate by s ta te s . R e p resen ta tives  face  
co n s ta n t re -e le c t io n  b a t t le s ,  co m p e llin g  le g is la to r s  to  focus  more and more |
a t te n t io n  to  lo c a l concerns. I t  can a lm ost be argued th a t  th e  re -e le c t io n  
d r iv e  beg ins th e  day a f t e r  th e  p re v io u s  c o n te s t ends.*
Monbers o f  th e  House a re  a u th o r is e d  tw e n ty -s ix  t r i p s  back to  t h e i r  
d i s t r i c t s  a t  th e  government’ s  expense every year, b u t most members fe e l i t  
necessary to  re tu rn  home every  weekend. Senators a re  a u th o r is e d  f o r t y  t r i p s  
home. W hile  Senators may b e lie v e  th a t  th e y  can a f fo rd  to  pay le s s  a t te n t io n  
to  t h e i r  c o n s t itu e n ts  because th e y  a re  accountab le  to  th e  e le c to ra te  o n ly  
once every  s ix  yea rs , compared to  th e  whole o f  th e  House be ing  e le c te d  every  
two ye a rs . Senators a re  in c re a s in g ly  v u ln e ra b le  to  th e  prom ise o f  b e t te r  
c o n s titu e n c y  s e rv ic e  from  c h a lle n g e rs . For example. Senator D ick  C la rk ,
(Dem, la )  concen tra ted  on A fr ic a n  p o l i t i c s  as th e  chairman o f  th e  A fr ic a n  
A f fa i r s  Subcommittee o f  th e  Fore ign  R e la tio n s  Committee. He made r e la t iv e ly  
few  t r ip s  back home and lo s t  th e  f i g h t  f o r  re -e le c t io n  to  George McGovern,
(Dem.S.D.)who h im s e lf faced  a d i f f i c u l t  re -e le c t io n  f i g h t  in  1980 : h is  
opponent charged him w ith  be ing  more concerned w ith  in te rn a t io n a l issues .
Former R e p rese n ta tive , Frank â n ith ,  (Dem, M iss ), s ta te d , " A l l  members have a 
p rim a ry  in te r e s t  in  being re -e le c te d . Some members have no o th e r in te r e s t " .
The d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  s e rv in g  on a fo re ig n  p o l ic y  com m ittee were e v id e n t in  
th e  1980 Senate e le c t io n s :  Four o u t o f  f i v e  members o f  th e  Fore ign  R e la tio n s  
Committee who were seeking re -e le c t io n  were d e f e a t e d . ^  |
...i
139
R epresen ta tion  produces in d iv id u a lis m  and p a ro c h ia lis m  , fra g m e n ta tio n  and 
d is p e rs io n  o f  a u th o r ity .  I t  d e s tro ys  th e  c a p a b i l i t y  o f  Congress to  in te g ra te  
p o l ic y ,  to  lead and to  govern. P a ro ch ia lism  produces i r r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  and 
undermines th e  w i l l  t o  govern.®
P a roch ia lism .
Close a t te n t io n  to  c o n s titu e n c y  in te r e s t  c e r ta in ly  enhances th e  chance o f  
r e -e le c t io n ,  b u t i t  a ls o  re in fo rc e s  p a ro c h ia lis m  in  C ongressional d e c is io n  -  
m aking.7 The weak e le c to ra l system and weak p a r t ie s  re in fo rc e  lo c a lis m  in  
American p o l i t i c s .  I t  i s  v i r t u a l l y  im poss ib le  to  conduct a cohe ren t n a tio n a l 
fo re ig n  p o l ic y  i f  a l l  d e c is io n  makers do n o t see th e  s takes  in  th e  same way.
Di s t r a c t i  o n .
The volume and d iv e r s i t y  o f  c o n s t itu e n t  demands a re  so u rg e n t and
u n re le n tin g  as to  lead members to  focu s  on th e  ro le  o f  re p re s e n ta tio n , to
co nce n tra te  on lo c a l and p e r ip h e ra l issues  and avo id  broader r e s p o n s ib i l i t y .
A 1977 s tudy  found th a t  h a l f  o f  th e  members o f  th e  House f e l t  t h a t
c o n s titu e n c y  demands in te r fe re d  w ith  th e  p rope r e x e rc is e  o f  t h e i r  
le g is la t iv e  d u t ie s .  One Congressman no ted , "Too much o f  o u r tim e  and energy 
is  d iv e r te d  in  th a t  d ir e c t io n  w ith  th e  r e s u l t  t h a t  th e  o p p o r tu n ity  f o r
c re a t iv e  th in k in g  in  a le g is la t iv e  way is  g re a t ly  lessened. I t  is  to o  bad we 
don’ t  have two members o f  Congress f o r  each d i s t r i c t ,  w ith  one having  th e  
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  h a n d lin g  c o n s titu e n c y  requests".®  Members must remain 
lo c a l ly  o r ie n te d  th rou g ho u t t h e i r  ca re e rs  in  th e  p u rs u it  o f  re -e le c t io n .  
However, t h i s  is  la rg e ly  where t h e i r  in te r e s ts  l i e .  A 1971 s tud y  o f  se ve n ty - 
seven House members found th a t  th e  m a jo r ity  d e rive d  g re a te s t s a t is fa c t io n  
from  t h e i r  re p re s e n ta tiv e  ro le .®
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" In  s h o r t" ,  contends S undqu is t, “w hether a member f in d s  c o n s t itu e n t  
s e rv ic e  th e  most o r  le a s t  s a t is fy in g  e lem ent o f  th e  jo b ,  none can escape i t s  
demands. I f  th e y  l e t  them selves, members can become w h o lly  absorbed in  th e  
e rrand  ru n n in g , in  lo b by in g  and case work, in  g a rne rin g  fe d e ra l p ro je c ts  f o r  
t h e i r  s ta te s  o r  d i s t r i c t s ,  and in  re tu rn in g  home a t  fre q u e n t in te r v a ls  t o  
speak, l is t e n  and be seen. Y e t i f  th e y  pay to o  l i t t l e  a t te n t io n  to  th a t  
aspect o f  t h e i r  jo b s , th a t  can b r in g  a q u ick  end to  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  c a re e rs . 
N eg lec t is  an issue  p o l i t i c a l  opponents a re  q u ick  to  se iz e  on, and one 
c o n s t itu e n ts  can unde rs tand ".
Ir re s p o n s i b i l i t y .
C r i t i c s  o fte n  charge th a t  th e  m a jo r ity  o f  Congress is  u n w il l in g  to  run th e  
r is k  o f  s e r io u s  commitment to  p o l ic y  -  making; th a t  th e y  p re fe r  to  concern 
thenreelves w ith  lo c a l m a tte rs . They a re  dependent upon th e  P re s id e n t f o r  th e  
i n i t i a t i v e  to  s e t th e  le g is la t iv e  w ork load , p re fe r r in g  to  respond ra th e r  
than  propose. The tendency is  t o  avo id  r is k ,  t o  d e fe r  t o  th e  e x e cu tive  
branch ra th e r  than  stand  up f o r  t h e i r  own p re fe re n ces . As such, th e y  have 
p laced  them selves in  a p o s it io n  o f  s e l f  ~ p ro te c t io n ,  where the y  can ta ke  
c r e d i t  f o r  successes and avo id  blame f o r  any f a i lu r e .  When th in g s  go wrong, 
i t  i s  th e  e x e c u tiv e  who is  h e ld  re s p o n s ib le ; Congress can e a s i ly  escape 
blame.^ i As th e  in flu e n c e s  which go to  make le g is la t io n  a re  so d iv e rs e , 
th e re  can be no c le a r  a l lo c a t io n  o f  blame. Mayhew w r i te s ,  "on m a tte rs  where 
c r e d i t  -  c la im in g  p o s s ib i l i t ie s  wear t h in ,  members d is p la y  o n ly  a modest 
in te r e s t  in  what goes in to  b i l l s  o r  what t h e i r  passage accom plish es ".'*2
R e -e le c tio n , however, i s  n o t th e  s o le  concern o f  Congressmen. A lso  o f  
im p o rt a re : seek ing  in f lu e n c e  w ith in  th e  House o r  Senate, making good p u b lic  
p o l ic y ,  and a ca re e r in  p o l i t i c s  beyond th e  House o r  Senate. S undqu ist




no tes , "a  body made up o f  in d iv id u a ls  lo o k in g  o u t f o r  them selves canno t, as ^
1a c o l le c t i v i t y ,  a c t re s p o n s ib ly . I t  cannot govern . In d iv id u a ls  do n o t ;■Iconce ive , adop t, and enac t cohe ren t p r o g r a m m e s " I iICommittees: Ce n tre s  o f  Congre s s io nal Power .  #
Congressional government is  subcommittee government. Subcommittee 
government l ie s  c lo s e  to  th e  h e a rt o f  th e  contem porary Congress. To a la rg e  
e x te n t,  any le g is la t iv e  p o l ic ie s  o r ig in a te  in  commi ttee/subcam m i t te e  
government. However, th e  d e c e n tra l is a t io n ,  which is  a s tre n g th  when 
government p o l ic y  makers want new ideas and responsiveness, a ls o  makes 
c o o rd in a tio n  and, th e re fo re ,  i n i t i a t i o n ,  o f  p o l ic y  d i f f i c u l t .  Congress is  a 
c o l le c t io n  o f  power c e n tre s , many o f  which a re  r iv a ls .
C ongressional government by subconm ittee  is  a ls o  p a ro c h ia l government. In  
Congress, com m ittees a re  o rgan ised  la rg e ly  on th e  b as is  o f  c o n s titu e n c y  
in te r e s ts .  These com m ittees a t t r a c t  members from  th e  d i s t r i c t s  most d i r e c t ly  
a ffe c te d  by t h e i r  main s u b je c ts . Membership on a committee which appears 
most re le v a n t to  one’ s d i s t r i c t  can be most advantageous in  re -e le c t io n  
d r iv e s .  Thus, many C ongressional workgroups a re  n o t microcosms o f  th e  p a ren t 
houses, b u t a re  b iased one way o r  a no the r.
J u r is d ic t io n s  a re  n o t always c le a r  -  c u t,  and th e  p o te n t ia l f o r  
o b s tru c t in g  th e  p rogress o f  a m ajor b i l l  is  g re a t. B i l l s  ta ke  long and 
conrplex pa ths , in v o lv in g  a t  le a s t  one com m ittee and one subcorirmittee in  both  
th e  House and Senate.
In  1974, th e  House changed i t s  procedures to  a llo w  f o r  g re a te r  
p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  i t s  d e c is io n  -  making by ju n io r  members. The ra t io n a le  
behind t h is  was to  in c re ase  p a r t ic ip a t io n  by a l l  House members in  
le g is la t io n  and th e  change in  th e  r e fe r r a l  procedure enabled more a c to rs  to  
g e t in vo lve d  in  th e  passage o f  each b i l l .  P r io r  to  1974, a b i l l  was f i l e d  by 
a member and then  th e  c le r k  o f  th e  House, a c tin g  th rough  th e  Speaker would
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a ss ign  i t  to  a connmittee. However, th e  re fo rm  o f  19741® now a llow ed  f o r  
seve ra l d i f f e r e n t  type s  o f  b i l l  r e f e r r a l :  a) a j o i n t  r e fe r r a l  p e rm itte d  
se ve ra l com m ittees to  co n s id e r a b i l l  s im u lta n e o u s ly , b) a se q u e n tia l 
r e fe r r a l  a llow ed  severa l com m ittees to  co n s id e r a b i l l  in  sequence, c ) a 
s p l i t  r e fe r r a l  was when th e  Speaker s p l i t  a b i l l  in to  d i f f e r e n t  components 
and assigned them to  d i f f e r e n t  com m ittees. Post 1974, as long as th e  
ju r is d ic t io n  determ ined by House ru le s  g ive s  th e  committee a le g it im a te  
c la im  on th e  s u b je c t m a tte r o f  th e  b i l l ,  th e  Speaker can h a rd ly  d ism iss  a 
c a l l  f o r  c o n s id e ra tio n . J u r is d ic t io n a l p o l i t i c s  is  an in h e re n t fe a tu re  o f  
contem porary C ongressional p o l ic y  making; to  ho ld  ju r is d ic t io n  means to  
h o ld  a p ie ce  o f  th e  a c t io n . i?
The g re a te r  use o f  m u lt ip le  r e fe r r a l  procedures in  th e  House and Senate, 
and th e  increased emphasis on re -e le c t io n  have served to  weaken 
Congressional i n i t i a t i v e s  in  p o l ic y  -  making. The 1885 measures which were 
th e  s u b je c t o f  m u lt ip le  r e fe r r a ls  in  th e  House in  th e  95th  Congress, (1977 
-  ’ 7 8 ), accounted f o r  tw en ty  pe r c e n t o f  a l l  committee business in  th e  
House. Such le g is la t io n  is  o n ly  h a l f  as l i k e ly  to  be re p o rte d  from  com m ittee 
in  c o n tra s t  to  b i l l s  s in g ly  r e fe r  red . i® They a ls o  take  up more tim e  and 
th e re  is  a g re a te r  l ik e l ih o o d  o f  amendment on th e  f lo o r .
R e fe rra l procedures add y e t fu r t h e r  de lays  to  th e  Congressional p rocess, 
and i t  i s  e s p e c ia lly  p ro b le m a tic  as th e  more a c to rs  who become in v o lv e d  in  
fo re ig n  p o l ic y ,  th e  le s s  d e c is iv e ly  and q u ic k ly  th e  n a tio n  can a c t.  In  th e  
in te rn a t io n a l system, th e  im p e ra tiv e  is  speed o f  a c t io n .
A fu r th e r  de lay  t o  C ongressional dec is ion -m ak ing  is  th e  absence o f  any 
com m ittee s im i la r  to  th e  House Rules Committee in  th e  Senate. In  th e  Senate 
debate may co n tin u e  a t  le n g th  on v i r t u a l l y  any s u b je c t.  The la ck  o f  s t r i c t  
procedure l im i t in g  amendments in  th e  Senate means th a t  a fo re ig n  p o l ic y  
issue  may be a ttached  as a " r id e r " i®  to  any p iece  o f  le g is la t io n .  A lso , as 
a lm ost any proposal e n ta i ls  th e  e xpe n d itu re  o f  money, ju r is d ic t io n a l  
boundaries a re  y e t f u r th e r  obscured and th u s  prone to  co n s ta n t d e la y . The
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problem  is  compounded when in  1971, re fo rm  g re a t ly  eased th e  requ irem ents 
f o r  r o l l  c a l l  v o te s . Now th e  concern is  f o r  maximum p o s s ib le  p a r t ic ip a t io n ;  
members o fte n  ig n o ra n t o f  th e  d e ta i ls  o f  th e  b i l l s  on which the y  a re  v o t in g .
C o n g re s s , In forma t io n a n d F o re ig n  P o lic y .
The A b s e n c e o fa n In te g r a te d In f o rm a tion  System.
Congress does n o t have a s in g le  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  in fo rm a tio n  system , b u t 
ra th e r  each member’ s  o f f i c e  and re le v a n t com m ittee s t a f f  develop and 
m a in ta in  i t s  own system . Power in  Congress d e r iv e s  from  in d iv id u a l members 
ra th e r  than  f r o n  th e  body as a w hole. The in d iv id u a l member, as a source o f  
power in  th e  system, o rg an ize s  and shapes th e  f lo w  o f  in fo rm a tio n  th rough  
h is /h e r  own o f f ic e .  The e x te n t o f  th e  f lo w  o f  in fo rm a tio n  on fo re ig n  p o l ic y  
can be e x te n s iv e  o r  n e g l ig ib le ,  depending on th e  member’ s com m ittee 
r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s ,  c o n s titu e n c y  concerns and persona l in te r e s ts .  The sources, 
fo cu s , p e rs p e c tiv e  and p o l ic y  p re fe rences  re f le c te d  in  th a t  f lo w  va ry  
d ra m a tic a lly  f r a n  o f f ic e  to  o f f i c e . 2 0
Common In fo rm a tio n  Resource^^^.......................................................... ...............................................
There a re  fo u r  su p p o rt agencies th a t  se rve  th e  in fo rm a tio n a l and 
a n a ly t ic a l needs o f  Congress:
(a ) General A ccounting  O f f ic e  (G .A .O .) has an annual budget o f  $300 m i l l io n  
p lu s , and a s t a f f  in  excess o f  5000. I t  i s  th e  in v e s t ig a t iv e  arm o f  Congress 
and w i l l  respond to  requests  f o r  in fo rm a tio n  and a n a ly s is  on how th e  
e x e c u tiv e  branch is  im plem enting i t s  le g is la t iv e  mandates, e s p e c ia lly  
w hether i t  i s  spending th e  money a p p ro p ria te d  by Congress.
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Most o f  i t s  s t a f f  a re  in  W ashington, a lthough  th e  G.A.O. a ls o  m a in ta in s  
o f f ic e s  in  fo u rte e n  c i t i e s ,  and s u b lo c a tio n s  in  a fu r th e r  tw e n ty - f iv e  
c i t i e s ,  and branches re s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  o v e rs ig h t o f  European a c t i v i t ie s .  
I t  i s  e s p e c ia lly  v a lu a b le  when an o f f ic e  has a c o n tin u a l and s u b s ta n t ia l 
in te r e s t  in  a c e r ta in  is su e , and in  re c e n t years th e  G.A.O. has d iv e r s i f ie d  
and become p a r t ic u la r ly  in v o lv e d  in  defence spending. I t s  re p o r ts  a re  
thorough and d e ta ile d .
However, th e  G .A .O .’ s fo re ig n  p o l ic y  re la te d  a c t i v i t i e s  a re  in  p ra c t ic e  
l im ite d  by th e  r e la t iv e ly  sm a ll amount o f  fe d e ra l budget a llo c a te d  to  
fo re ig n  p o l ic y  m a tte rs .
(b ) C ongressional Research S e rv ice  (C .R .S .) has an annual budget o f  around
$40 m i l l io n  and a s t a f f  o f  840. I t s  ta s k  is  th a t  o f  p ro v id in g  genera l
research and in fo rm a tio n  s u p p o rt t o  Congress. In  th e  realm  o f  fo re ig n  
p o l ic y ,  th e  C.R.S. draws on a seven person re fe ren ce  team which answers 
b a s ic  reques ts . In  a d d it io n ,  app ro x im a te ly  t h i r t y  fo re ig n  a f f a i r s  s u b je c t 
a rea  s p e c ia l is ts  respond to  in d iv id u a l requests  f o r  research and a n a ly s is .  
The C.R.S. is  p robab ly  b es t known f o r  i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  d e l iv e r  b as ic
in fo rm a tio n  and a n a ly s is  o f  immediate le g is la t iv e  a c t i v i t i e s  v e ry  q u ic k ly .
(c )  C ongressional Budget O f f ic e  (C .B .O .) has a budget o f  around $17.25
m i l l io n  and a s t a f f  o f  about two hundred. I t  was crea ted  p r im a r i ly  to  serve  
th e  budget com m ittees which were a p ro du c t o f  th e  C ongressional Budget and 
Impoundment A c t o f  1974.
(d ) O f f ic e  o f  Technology Assessment (O .T .A .) , w ith  a budget o f  $15.5 m i l l io n  
per annum and a s t a f f  o f  about 140, assesses p o l ic y  im p lic a t io n s  o f  
s c ie n t i f i c ,  te c h n ic a l and g lo b a l tre n d s . R e ly ing  la rg e ly  on e x te rn a l 
c o n tra c to rs , th e  O .T.A . deve lops lo n g e r term  s tu d ie s  th a t  are e x te n s iv e ly
145
researched and review ed. Recent e f f o r t s  in  th e  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  f i e l d  have J
focused on tra d e  and techno logy  t r a n s fe r . 2 1
However, Heginbotham suggests th a t  i t  i s  a m is take  to  expect a s in g le
in te g ra te d  in fo rm a tio n  system to  p ro v id e  Congress w ith  th e  k in d  o f  |
in fo rm a tio n  th a t  th e  e x e c u tiv e  branch needs to  manage fo re ig n  p o l ic y .  
Congress is  an aggregate o f  la rg e  numbers o f  independent power c e n tre s , each 
o f  which deve lops i t s  own d is t in c t i v e  in fo rm a tio n  system s. The in fo rm a tio n  
needs in  Congress a re  ta rg e te d  on th e  s p e c i f ic  ch a llen g es  to  e x e cu tive  
branch p o l ic ie s ,  programmes and budgets th a t  in d iv id u a ls  and c o a l i t io n s  o f  
members choose to  mount. 2 2
Menrtbers’ Roles in  Subcommittee Government.
Congressional workgroups a re  seen by le g is la to r s  as h e lp in g  in  a t ta in in g  
personal and ca re e r g o a ls . They in c re ase  a le g is la t o r ’ s  re -e le c t io n  chances, 
enab le  him to  shape p u b lic  p o l ic y ,  and enab le  him to  e x e r t  some in f lu e n c e . 2 3
M y ].tlR l.jc ,ity  o f  A ss ignments.
In  th e  96th Congress, 1979 - ’ 80, th e re  were 113 s ta n d in g  com m ittees and 
subconm ittees in  th e  Senate and 170 in  th e  House. The average Senator h e ld  
about te n  sea ts  on s ta n d in g  workgroups; th e  average R e p rese n ta tive  5 .5 . 
Leadership  posts  a re  a ls o  numerous: in  th e  96th  Congress a l l  b u t two
Dem ocratic R ep resen ta tives  c h a ire d  a com m ittee o r  subcomm ittee. W ith  so many 
assignm ents, members a re  overextended and hard pressed to  manage t h e i r  
crowded schedu les. S cheduling  problems a re  endemic, w ith  committee quorums 
d i f f i c u l t  t o  ach ieve  and members’ a t te n t io n  focused e lsew here. S undqu ist 
contends th a t  a body made up o f  in d iv id u a ls  lo o k in g  o u t f o r  them selves 
canno t, as a c o l le c t i v i t y ,  a c t  re s p o n s ib ly . I t  cannot govern. In d iv id u a ls  do
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n o t conce ive , adopt, and enac t cohe ren t p r o g r a m m e s . 2 4  But what o f  th e  
increased s t a f f  f a c i l i t i e s ?
The Role o f  Congress io n a l S t a f f : H a s t h e S t a f f E x p lo s io n H e lp e d o rH in d e re d .............
Congre ss?...
"To a la rg e  degree, subcommittee government is  s t a f f  government. The 
modern C a p ito l H i l l  bureaucracy b e tra ys  th e  c h a ra c te r o f  Congress as a 
d e c e n tra lis e d , n o n h ie ra rc h ic a l in s t i t u t io n .  I t  is  n o t one bureaucracy b u t 
many, c lu s te re d  about ce n tre s  o f  power and in  some sense d e f in in g  those  
c e n tre s " .2 ®
Members a re  a b le  to  fo l lo w  more issues than th e y  co u ld  i f  the y  had to  
a tte n d  a l l  th e  m eetings p e rs o n a lly . As a r e s u lt ,  both  members as in d iv id u a ls  
and Congress as a whole a re  b e t te r  a b le  to  manage a h e a v ie r w orkload than 
would be p o s s ib le  w ith o u t these  s t a f f s . 2 6
S ta f fs  a re  a ls o  expected to  go o u t and drum up new bus iness. The increased 
use o f  p e rso n a lise d , e n tre p re n e u r ia l s t a f f s  has helped Congress re ta in  i t s  
p o s it io n  as th e  key i n i t i a t o r  o f  fe d e ra l p o l ic y .  Congress is  le ss  pass ive  
today , thanks la rg e ly  t o  i t s  increased  s t a f f .  The system o f  in d iv id u a lis e d  
s t a f f  c o n tro l seems a ls o  to  be re s p o n s ib le  f o r  much o f  th e  o v e rs ig h t.
However, th e re  a re  n e g a tive  aspects , in c lu d in g  th e  e f f e c t  o f  s t a f f s  on 
Congress’ a b i l i t y  to  a c t as a d e l ib e ra t iv e  body. Congress, as is  made 
e v id e n t in  F e d e ra lis t  52, was in tended  to  serve  as a s u b s t itu te  f o r  d i r e c t  
m eetings o f  c i t iz e n s .  R e p resen ta tion , i t  was envisaged, was l i k e ly  to  
produce a more manageable process than  d i r e c t  democracy, and b e t te r  r e s u lts .  
I n d ir e c t  com m unication, such as th e  American Congress has today was n o t what 
was envisaged, f o r  d i r e c t  canm un ica tion  among e le c te d  members was cons idered  
e s s e n t ia l t o  in form ed d e l ib e ra t io n .  W h ile  in d ir e c t  communication can convey 
a g re a t deal o f  in fo rm a tio n , i t  cannot h e lp  a Congressman fe e l o r  sense h is  
c o lle a g u e s ’ re a c tio n s  to  h is  own o r  each o th e r ’ s  argum ents. Debate and
:
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d is c u s s io n  have lo s t  t h e i r  c e n tra l p la ce  in  th e  le g is la t iv e  p rocess. The 
number o f  Congressional s ta f f e r s  may have increased fo u r  f o ld  b u t th e  
s ta f f e r s  a c tu a l ly  in c re ase  th e  le g is la t iv e  w orkload because members o f  
Congress must su p e rv ise  th e  s t a f f s  and pay a t te n t io n  to  s t a f f  business and 
in i t i a t i v e s .  G ra d u a lly  th e  s t a f f s  ta ke  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  much o f  th e
com m ittee bus iness, e s p e c ia lly  o v e rs ig h t,  and th u s  le g is la to r s  f in d  
them selves le s s  prepared.
For a process o f  le g is la t iv e  d e l ib e ra t io n  to  fu n c t io n  w e ll ,  th e re  a re  
th re e  d is t in c t  requ irem ents : a ccu ra te  in fo rm a tio n , t im e , and com m unication. 
The re lia n c e  on s t a f f  undercu ts  each o f  these  requ irem en ts . In  th e  f i r s t  
in s ta n ce , th e  m a jo r ity  o f  in fo rm a tio n  reach ing  members may w e ll be r e l ia b le ,  
b u t i t  would ta ke  an e x p e rt to  s o r t  o u t th e  r e l ia b le  from  th e  u n re lia b le ,  
and even an e x p e rt cannot know what m a te r ia l has been w ith h e ld  to  se rve  a 
s t a f f ’ s  o r  cha irm an ’ s own in te r e s ts .  Secondly, th e  use o f  s t a f f  has n o t l e f t  
members more tim e  to  co n ce n tra te  on t h e i r  le g is la t iv e  work. I f  a n y th in g , th e  
use o f  e n tre p re n e u r ia l s t a f f s  has meant an inc rease  f o r  members o f  hea rings  
and amendments cons ide red  every ye a r. T h ir d ly ,  th e  use o f  s t a f f  n e g o tia t io n s  
as a s u b s t i tu te  f o r  d i r e c t  co nve rsa tio n  and d e l ib e ra t io n  among members has 
led  to  an inc rease  in  in d ir e c t  n e g o tia t io n  and a d e c lin e  in  d i r e c t  
d e l ib e ra t io n .  S ta f fe r s  tend  to  in te r a c t  w ith  each o th e r in  an e f f o r t  to  
produce consensus.
The im petus o f  s t a f f  is  to  b u i ld  c o a l i t io n s  by having  programmes to  
respond to  more demands, ra th e r  than  l e t  them d ie  a n a tu ra l dea th . The 
r e s u l t  is  an in c re a s in g ly  in c lu s iv e  and complex le g is la tu r e  th a t  can o n ly  be 
understood by an e x p e rt.  In  tu r n ,  t h i s  inc reases  th e  power o f  permanent 




The New Congress: The Im pact o f  Ref o r m: A B r ie f  Synop s is . ........................
In  th e  1970’ s com m ittee government gave way to  subcommittee dominance. A 
s e r ie s  o f  re fo rir©  in  th e  1971 - ’ 75 p e r io d  r a d ic a l ly  a lte re d  th e  way in  which 
th e  House conducted i t s  bus iness. The p rim a ry  th r u s t  o f  th e  re form s was 
o rg a n is a tio n a l and p rocedura l [w ith  p o l ic y  change as th e  u lt im a te  g o a l] .  
However, a second fo cu s  was to  s h i f t  p o l ic y  n o t in d i r e c t ly  th rough  
s t r u c tu ra l re fo rm , b u t d i r e c t ly  th rough  le g is la t iv e  changes in  th e  
programmes and e x e cu tive  branch a c t i v i t y ,  such as th e  s e r ie s  o f  le g is la t iv e  
p ro h ib it io n s  which in c lu de d  th e  War Powers R e so lu tio n . T h is  s h i f t  occurred  
p r im a r i ly  in  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  m a tte rs . I t  c o n s t itu te d  a re v o lu t io n  and in  
c o n ju n c tio n  w ith  in te rn a l re form s o f  th e  in s t i t u t io n  b rough t about pro found 
and permanent change in  Congress’ p o s it io n  in  th e  fo rm u la tio n  o f  fo re ig n  
p o l ic y .
Committee chairmen were no lo n g e r a u to m a tic a lly  s e le c te d  by th e  s e n io r i ty  
p r in c ip le ,  th e  le n g th  o f  c o n tin u a l s e rv ic e  on a com m ittee .2 Q Dem ocratic 
p a r ty  members were no lo n g e r t o  be assigned to  p o s it io n s  by th e  Ways and 
Means Committee. In s te a d , a p a r ty  o rg a n is a tio n , th e  S te e rin g  and P o lic y  
Committee, one t h i r d  o f  whose members were appo in ted  by th e  Speaker, 
c o n tro lle d  appointm ents to  th e  com m ittee and th e  naming o f  chairm en. The 
Dem ocratic caucus, composed o f  a l l  p a r ty  members o f  th e  House, then  vo te  
upon th e  recommendations o f  th e  S te e rin g  and P o lic y , w ith  agreement n o t 
assu red .
In  1974 a p p ro p r ia t io n s  a ls o  f e l l  p rey to  p a r ty  le a d e rsh ip  when 
a p p ro p r ia t io n s  subcommittee chairmen were to  be appo in ted  by S te e rin g  and 
P o lic y ,  s u b je c t to  caucus a p p ro va l. A fu r th e r  re fo rm  o f  even g re a te r  
im portance was th e  c re a tio n  in  both  th e  House and Senate o f  Budget 
com m ittees which were designed to  ra t io n a l is e  th e  re la t io n s h ip  between 
spending and revenue ra is in g .
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The b ig g e s t b lo ck  o f  re form s occurred  in  1973 when th e  s e le c t io n  o f  
subcommittee members was made th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  o f  th e  f u l l  conm ittee  
caucus and cou ld  n o t be dom inated by com m ittee chairm en; subcommittees were 
a ls o  g ran ted  f ix e d  ju r is d ic t io n s ,  so th a t  f u l l  com m ittee chairmen cou ld  n o t 
c re a te  new subcomm ittees a t  w i l l  to  reward f r ie n d s  and punish enemies. 
Committee members were a ls o  guaranteed t h e i r  ch o ice , based upon s e n io r i ty ,  
o f  subcoTim ittee assignm ents, and subcanm ittees were fo rc e d  to  have r a t io s  o f  
p a r ty  members which re f le c te d  f u l l  committee p a r ty  ba lances, so th a t  
c o n s e rv a tiv e  chairmen cou ld  n o t s ta c k  c e r ta in  subcomm ittees w ith  R epublicans 
and overba lance  o th e r  le s s  pow erfu l ones w ith  l ib e r a l  Democrats.
In  1974 i t  was a ls o  mandated th a t  com m ittees w ith  more than  tw enty  members 
b u t no subcommittees would have to  e s ta b lis h  a t  le a s t  fo u r  such bod ies to  
ensure co trp le te  in v e s t ig a t io n .  Committees were a ls o  re q u ire d  to  e s ta b lis h  an 
o v e rs ig h t subcommittee to  examine th e  o v e ra ll a f f a i r s  o f  th e  com m ittee. 
Members would be r e s t r ic te d  to  membership on two subcomm ittees in  each f u l l  
com m ittee on which th e y  se rve .
W hile  th e  re form s o f  th e  1970s cou ld  have produced e ith e r  a more 
c e n tra lis e d  o r  a more d e c e n tra lis e d  Congress, th e  weakness o f  th e  p a r ty  
system and th e  re lu c ta n c e  o f  members t o  su bo rd in a te  t h e i r  newly -  l ib e ra te d  
subcommittees to  p a r ty  le a d e rs h ip  t i l t e d  th e  balance s tro n g ly  in  fa v o u r o f  
fa c t io n a l is e d  a lle g ia n c e s . The upshot o f  th e  g re a te r p a r t ic ip a t io n  re s u lt in g  
from  th e  re form s has le d  to  a s i tu a t io n  in  which th e  o n ly  re a l power is  th e  
a b i l i t y  to  b lo ck  le g is la t io n .
The re form s energ ised  Congress and a ls o  transfo rm ed  th e  body from  a c losed  
to  a v e ry  open system. Power and resources were expanded and spread o u t so 
th a t  i t  was no lo n ge r necessary to  "go a long to  g e t a lo n g ". An incom ing 
freshman now has th e  au tom a tic  a b i l i t y  t o  h ir e  up to  tw e n ty -tw o  s t a f f ,  w ith  
a s t a f f  budget o f  a t h i r d  o f  a m i l l io n  d o l la r s .  However, i t  i s  now more 
d i f f i c u l t  to  o b ta in  consensus w ith in  com m ittees, and th e re  is  g re a te r  
o p p o r tu n ity  f o r  in d iv id u a ls  to  o v e r ru le  committee p o s it io n s  on th e  f lo o r .
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Thus, th e  a b i l i t y  o f  p a r ty  le a de rs  and t h e i r  s e n io r co lle ag u es  to  in flu e n c e  
rank and f i l e  membership has d im in ish e d  enorm ously. Open v o t in g ,  open mark­
ups, open conference com m ittees and th e  d ram a tic  in c re ase  in  th e  media 
presence^® have a l l  widened th e  scope f o r  invo lvem ent f o r  members . However, 
th e  m ajor reason as to  why p a r ty  le a d e rsh ip  has f a i le d  to  impose i t s e l f  
a f t e r  re form s is  "dem ocracy". In  th e  t h i r d  volume o f  The American 
Commonwealth, Lord Bryce w ro te , "perhaps no form  o f  government needs g re a t 
leade rs  as much as democracy"
The In c re ased Muscl e o f  ....Pressure Groups
The Vietnam War b rough t w ith  i t  th e  development o f  a la rg e  a n t i-w a r  
p o l i t i c a l  movement th a t  developed f r a n  th e  mid 1960s to  th e  1970s. T h is  
movement t ra in e d  a la rg e  number o f  people in  th e  techn iques  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
o rg a n is a tio n  and p ressu re . Frcxn th e  la te  1960s to  th e  mid 1970s, th e re  was 
an e x p lo s io n  o f  "p u b lic  in te r e s t "  groups in  Washington, made p o s s ib le  by th e  
d e c e n tra l is a t io n ,  dem ocra tis in g  and opening re form s o f  Congress. There a re  
many p o in ts  o f  access in  th e  system f o r  in te r e s t  groups, and i t  is  p o s s ib le  
f o r  groups to  fo rm  and p e r s is t  w ith  l im ite d  resources. W ell fin an ce d  and 
o rgan ised  lo b by in g  has expanded.®i As these  groups formed and dem onstrated 
t h e i r  im pact on th e  p o l ic y  process and p o l ic y  outcomes, th e y  bred co u n te r 
lo b b y is ts  in  re a c tio n , and a ls o  b rough t about g re a te r s e n s i t i v i t y  amongst 
a l l  in te r e s t  groups to  th e  power o f  Congress, th e  new a c c e s s ib i l i t y  and th e  
need to  p ro te c t  o r  advance t h e i r  group in te re s ts  on C a p ito l H i l l .
The expansion o f  in te r e s t  groups is  n o t co n fin e d  to  dom estic p o l ic y .  In  
fo re ig n  p o l ic y ,  th e re  was good reason to  inc rease  e f f o r t s  to  in f lu e n c e  
Congress as a whole because both Houses were g e t t in g  much more in vo lve d  in  
th e  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  process. Increased fo re ig n  lobby in g  by fo re ig n  s ta te s ,  
e th n ic  groups and id e o lo g ic a l and commercial o rg a n is a tio n s , promoted th e  
d e s ire  by Congress to  g e t in vo lve d  in  fo re ig n  p o lic y  q ue s tio n s  and p rov ided
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th e  P re s id e n t.
A l l  these  changes occurred  w ith in  a c o n te x t o f  a ra p id ly  changing 
membership in s id e  both  th e  House and Senate The 1970s w itnessed ra p id  
tu rn o v e r in  Congress. Around th re e  q u a rte rs  o f  members had been newly 
e le c te d  to  th e  in s t i t u t io n  s in c e  N ixon ’ s ascendancy to  th e  W hite H o u s e .® 2
The In h e re n t Weakness o f  Congress in  Fo re ign  Pol i cy .
One o f  th e  m ajor C ongressional problems in  d e a lin g  w ith  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  
m a tte rs  stems frcxn th e  a t t i tu d e s  th a t  many Congressmen have developed. 
Deference to ,  and d is re s p e c t f o r  th e  e x e cu tive  branch, p e r io d ic  d is in te r e s t  
in  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  m a tte rs , la c k  o f  su s ta in e d  in te r e s t  in  any p a r t ic u la r  
issu e , p a ro ch ia l m o tiv a tio n s  due to  th e  pressure  from  c o n s t itu e n t in te r e s t  
groups, and a re lu c ta n c e  to  ta ke  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  a re  a l l  m a jo r problems which 1
no amount o f  s t r u c tu ra l re fo rm  can remedy.
Congress tends to  handle fo re ig n  p o l ic y  as i t  handles dcx tes tic  p o l ic y .  Too 
o fte n  i t  asks what th e  p o l i t i c s  a re , n o t what th e  n a tio n a l in te r e s t  is .  I t s  
members tend  to  focu s  on one aspect o f  a problem and to  l e t  judgment on th a t  
aspect dete rm ine  broad p o l ic y  on a complex issue . Congress is  n o t good a t  
keeping s e c re ts ; o fte n  c o n f id e n t ia l i t y  i s  viewed as d ece p tion .
TheP rob lem  o fL e a d e rs h ip .
S pan ie r and Nogee contend, "never in  American h is to r y  has th e  problem  o f  
le a d e rsh ip  been so lin k e d  w ith  th e  s e c u r ity  and w e ll -  be ing  o f  th e  n a tio n ; 
and ra re ly  have th e  c ircum stances o f  dom estic l i f e  made th e  c re a tio n  o f  th a t  
le a d e rs h ip  more d i f f i c u l t  t o  ob ta in ".® ®  Congress r e f le c ts  th e  fra g m e n ta tio n  




th a t  th e re  is  no one p lace  in  th e  in s t i t u t io n  where fo re ig n  p o l ic ie s  a re  
aggregated and fo rm u la te d . Every p iece  o f  le g is la t io n  is  examined 
independen tly  in  connmittee and acted  upon in  r e la t iv e  is o la t io n  from  o th e r 
re la te d  b i l l s .
Inca p a c i ty T o  Act  Qui c k l y . ...........
In  th e  le g is la t iv e  p rocess, speed is  a lways a t  odds w ith  d e l ib e ra t io n .  The 
C o n s t i tu t io n  s e ts  th e  le g is la tu r e  f re e  to  develop i t s  c a p a c ity  f o r  
d e l ib e ra t io n  by lo c a t in g  th e  c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  s w i f t  a c t io n  elsewhere -  namely 
in  a pow erfu l e x e c u tiv e  o u ts id e  th e  le g is la t iv e  branch. H am ilton  w ro te  in  
F e d e ra lis t  70, "d e c is io n , a c t i v i t y ,  secrecy and d is p a tc h  w i l l  c h a ra c te r is e  
th e  proceed ings o f  one man in  a much more em inent degree than  th e  
p roceed ings o f  any g re a te r  number"®*. Thus, w ith  th e  P re s id e n t a t  hand to  
a c t  when speed was re q u ire d , Congress developed th e  a l te r n a t iv e  v i r t u e  o f  
d e l ib e ra t io n .  I t  became a forum  f o r  re c o n c il in g  th e  d iv e rg e n t o p in io n s  o f  
th e  n a t io n ’ s d iv e rs e  and d is ta n t  re g io n s . S undqu ist argues, "from  th e  
b eg inn ing . Congress has shown th a t  i t s  most deep -  seated fe a r  is  n o t o f  
o b s tru c t io n  b u t o f  q u ic k  m a jo r ita r ia n  d e c is io n s , and i t s  s tru c tu re s  and 
procedures have evo lved  accord ing ly".® ®  Committees and la t e r  subca rm itte e s  
were c rea ted  f o r  th e  thorough c o n s id e ra tio n  o f  le g is la t io n ,  each w ith  th e  
r ig h t  to  proceed w ith  v i r t u a l  autonomy a t  i t s  own pace. The Senate adopted 
th e  ru le  o f  u n lim ite d  debate.®® Thus, th e  in a b i l i t y  o f  Congress to  a c t 
q u ic k ly  v i r t u a l l y  c a rp e ls  Congress to  d e lega te  i t s  powers. Fore ign  a f f a i r s  
is  th e  p re -em inen t a rea in  which th e  government must be capable o f  in s ta n t  
and re s o lu te  responses.
Between th e  wars Congress experim ented w ith  th e  N e u tr a l i ty  A c ts , w ith  th e  
n o tio n  th a t  i t  cou ld  p re s c r ib e  in  advance th e  course o f  a c t io n  to  be pursued 
by th e  government in  any c r i s i s  t h a t  m igh t a r is e .  The experim en t was doomed
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t o  f a i lu r e .  The tra ge d y  o f  th e  Second W orld War dem onstrated th a t  a f le x ib le  
s tance  was v i t a l  to  fo re ig n  p o l ic y .
The Formosa, M idd le  E ast, Cuba and Tonkin G u lf R e so lu tio n s  were a l l  
concessions, which recogn ised th a t  in  th e  modern e ra  Congress cannot debate 
how to  respond to  u ltim a tum s, o r  when to  issue  them.®7 As a r e s u l t  S undqu ist 
w r i te s ,  "Congress has a dm itted  th e  endemic weakness o f  i t s  own c a p a c ity . 
Whenever i t  has recogn ised th e  n e c e s s ity  f o r  speed o f  a c t io n ,  i t  has 
responded by b u ild in g  up th e  Presidency".®®
P a ra ly s is .
In  re ce n t yea rs , f re e -s ta n d in g  fo re ig n  a f f a i r s  b i l l s  have n o t been 
enacted. In s te a d , th e y  have faced  a lm ost insurm ountab le  o b s ta c le s , in c lu d in g  
those  general o b s ta c le s  faced  by a l l  le g is la t io n ,  and by those  more s p e c i f ic  
b a r r ie rs  r e la t in g  d i r e c t ly  to  th e  f a c t  th a t  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  q ue s tio ns  a re  now 
among th e  most c o n tro v e rs ia l fa c in g  Congress. In  g e n e ra l,C ongressional 
c i r c u i t s  a re  overloaded and th e  d i f fu s io n  o f  power and th e  d e c e n tra l is a t io n  
o f  th e  committee s t ru c tu re  a re  to o  p e rva s ive . D r is h le r  w r i te s ,  " i t  i s  now 
f a i r  t o  say th a t  Congress o n ly  g e ts  done what i t  cannot o th e rw ise  avoid".®® 
P a ra ly s is  has th e  e f f e c t  o f  s h a rp ly  c u r t a i l in g  th e  a b i l i t y  o f  fo re ig n  
a f f a i r s  and a p p ro p r ia t io n s  com m ittees to  produce fre e -s ta n d in g  le g is la t io n ,  
and i t  has v i r t u a l l y  made c o n tin u a l re s o lu t io n s  and supplem ental 
a p p ro p r ia t io n s  th e  o n ly  v ia b le  means f o r  a f fe c t in g  fo re ig n  p o lic y .*®
In a b i l i t y  To P la n .........
The d e c e n tra l is a t io n  and fra g m e n ta tio n  o f  power w ith in  th e  le g is la t iv e  
body th w a r t Congress’ a b i l i t y  t o  p la n . The in c a p a c ity  to  p la n  is  a synrptom 
o f  th e  two -  chamber system , and e s p e c ia lly  th e  commi t te e  system. The
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s p e c ia lis e d  com m ittees by t h e i r  ve ry  n a tu re  a re  designed to  have a narrow 
fo cu s . The problem  is  compounded by th e  com m ittees’ d iv is io n  o f  t h e i r  
concerns in to  th e  s t i l l  narrow er c o n fin e s  o f  th e  subcom m ittees. These 
s p e c ia lis e d  bod ies cannot be th e  source o f  one grand s tra te g y .  The problem  
is  exacerbated by th e  la c k  o f  one c e n t r a l is in g  in s t i t u t io n .
The S top and ^  Natu r e  o f  Congress . R e le n tle s s  Debate I n s t e p  o f  S w if t  
A c tio n a n d S u d e te n L u rches In s te a d  o fS te a d y P o l i c ie s
The Boland Amendment
In  1985 Congress repea led th e  te n  year o ld  C la rk  Amendment p ro h ib i t in g  a id  
to  th e  Angolan re s is ta n c e . Y e t i t  to o k  t h i s  s te p  a t  e x a c t ly  th e  same tim e  i t  
was denying a id  to  a n t i communist re s is ta n c e  in  N icaragua. F ive  d i f f e r e n t  
Boland Amendments on a id  t o  th e  Nicaraguan re s is te n c e  passed Congress 
between 1982 -  1986. What each o f  those  Amendments in tended was never 
c o n p le te ly  c le a r .  I n i t i a l l y ,  th e re  was s ig n i f ic a n t  su p p o rt f o r  a id in g  
N icaraguan re s is ta n c e ; in  f a c t ,  b e fo re  v o tin g  on th e  Boland /Vnendment, th e  
House a c tu a l ly  vo ted  down an Amendment th a t  c a te g o r ic a l ly  c u t  o f f  a id  to  th e  
C on tras. The Boland Amendment then  passed unanimously 411 -0 ,  making i t  a t  
le a s t,  f a r  more d i f f i c u l t  t o  a id  th e  C ontras.*?
The Oc to b e r D e b a te o n th e P r e s id e n t ’ s P e r s ia n G u l fP o l ic y .
In  a day long d is c u s s io n  th a t  fe a tu re d  f i r s t  th e  d e fe a t and then  th e  
passage o f  a re s o lu t io n  on th e  G u lf,  th e  Senate proved how d i f f i c u l t  i t  can 
be t o  fo rg e  coheren t p o l ic y  from  d iv e rg e n t Congressional p o in ts  o f  v iew . In  
th e  f i r s t  two v o te s , th e  re s o lu t io n  was de fea ted , 47 :51 ; w ith in  hours, th e  
Senate reversed t h is  v o te , 54 :44. Senator P ryo r no ted , ’ In  th e  f in a l  
a n a ly s is ,  I  don’ t  know what we’ re  d o in g ’ . The re s o lu t io n  th a t  f i n a l l y  passed
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d id  n o th in g  more than  schedule th e  Senate to  vo te  aga in  severa l months
la t e r . *2
House as d is t in c t  from  Senate.
I n s t i t u t io n a l  f r i c t i o n  and r iv a l r y  is  n o t l im ite d  to  th e  P re s id e n t and 
Congress, b u t a ls o  extends to  th e  two Houses o f  Congress: th e  House o f  
R ep resen ta tives  and th e  Senate. To f in d  evidence o f  a b icam eral p o l ic y  
making body one must go back to  th e  e ig h te e n th  c e n tu ry , to  th e  J o in t  
Committee o f  F if te e n  on R e co n s tru c tio n . T h is  ce n tu ry  th e  tre n d  has been 
tow ard d e c e n tra l is a t io n  o f  power even w ith in  th e  in d iv id u a l Houses, f i r s t l y  
as C ongressional acceptance o f  P re s id e n t ia l le a d e rsh ip  made c e n t r a l is a t io n  
seem unnecessary, and in  th e  1970s as th e  commi t te e  system promoted 
d iffu s e n e s s  to  guard ove r an Im p e ria l P residency.
The House because o f  i t s  h is t o r ic  and C o n s titu t io n a l le s s e r ro le  in  th e  
conduct o f  fo re ig n  a f f a i r s  has on occas ion  t r ie d  to  upse t what th e  Senate 
has ach ieved , f o r  example, re g a rd in g  th e  Panama Canal T re a tie s ; o r  as in  th e  
case o f  th e  Zimbabwe -  Rhodesia n e g o tia t io n s , th e  House and e s p e c ia lly  i t s  
Fore ign  A f fa i r s  Committee*® came to  th e  rescue o f  th e  P re s id e n t and saved 
him from  th e  Senate ’ s  a tte m p t to  undermine P re s id e n t ia l p o l ic y .  S im ila r  
f r i c t i o n  arose d u r in g  th e  Vietnam War when repeated Senate re s o lu t io n s  
opposing th e  war d ie d  in  th e  House. Thus, Congress is  by no means a u n i f ie d  
body, and th e re  a re  y e t fu r th e r  d ive rgences between th e  two Houses.
D uring  th e  Eisenhower, N ixon and Ford P re s id en c ie s , P re s id e n t ia l m eetings 
w ith  C ongressional m a jo r ity  le a de rs  were l im ite d  in  scope i f  th e y  ever too k  
p la ce  a t  a l l .  P o lic y  d if fe re n c e s  between th e  two Houses were n eg o tia te d  in  
an ad hoc manner, by confe rence  com m ittees appo in ted  s e p a ra te ly  f o r  each 
p ie ce  o f  le g is la t io n .  Congress d id  n o t devolop any j o i n t  means f o r  
in te g ra t in g  p o l ic y .  R iv a lr y  i s  in h e re n t between th e  two Houses o f  Congress.
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Whereas th e  Senate is  w id e ly  exposed to  p u b lic  a cc la im  and a t te n t io n ,  th e  
House, because o f  i t s  s iz e  and co n rp le x ity  confuses th e  casual o n lo o ke r, and 
hence i t s  members a re  r e la t iv e ly  enclosed and in s u la te d . Senate debate is  
long and vo lum inous. I t  draws and ho lds  th e  a t te n t io n  o f  th e  media and 
p u b lic  o p in io n  makers. In  c o n tra s t ,  House debate is  co m p a ra tive ly  s h o r t ,  
p o in te d  and o fte n  te c h n ic a l.  Senators a re  famous, recogn ised men, some o f  
whan use t h e i r  o f f ic e  as a sp ringboa rd  f o r  t h e i r  P re s id e n t ia l a m b itio n s .
House members, o th e r than  th e  Speaker, a re  la rg e ly  anonymous -  th e re  a re
ju s t  to o  many o f  them. And th e  sheer numter o f  R ep resen ta tives  has com pelled i j
■1
th e  r is e  o f  customary ways o f  do ing  bus iness** , which a re  o fte n  m eaningless I
t o  th e  o u ts id e rs , y e t a b s o lu te ly  v i t a l  f o r  th e  e f f i c i e n t  conduct o f  3
business.*®
Thus, th e  problem  o f  p o l ic y  in te g ra t io n  in  Congress appears a t  th re e  
le v e ls :  1) in  each com m ittee and sub -  com m ittee, 2) in  each House as a 
whole, 3) between th e  two Houses.
C o n g r e s s in F o r e ign P o l ic y : W h o N e e d s I t ? T h e B e n e f i t s o f Congres s io n a l 
In v o lveme n t in  Fore ign  Pol ic y .
A c tiv is m , a s s e rtiv e n e s s , re p re s e n ta tio n  and a c c e s s ib i l i t y  a re  a l l  g re a t 
s tre n g th s  o f  Congress. Congress is  o fte n  b e t te r  ab le  and more w i l l i n g  than  
th e  e x e c u tiv e  branch to  o b ta in  a p o l ic y  o u tp u t from  o u ts id e , from  academia 
and from  th e  p r iv a te  s e c to r .  C ongressional invo lvem ent in  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  
makes a d e c is io n  to  commit American tro o p s  abroad le s s  l i k e ly ,  in h ib i t s  
e x tra le g a l and c o v e r t a c t i v i t i e s ,  and makes bo ld  d ep a rtu res  le ss  l i k e ly .  
Congress can he lp  fo rm u la te  p o l ic ie s ,  i t  can a c t to  check th e  grow ing power 
o f  th e  P res idency, i t  can su p p o rt th e  P residency, and i t  can m o n ito r th e  
a t t i tu d e s  o f  th e  American peop le . Congress can in fo rm  and educate , and can 
convey th e  view s o f  th e  people  to  th e  P res iden t.*®
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P u b lic  s c ru t in y  o f  th e  o p tio n s  is  l i k e ly  to  y ie ld  b e t te r  p o l ic y .  P o lic y  is  
su b jec te d  to  a d iv e r s i t y  o f  in s ig h ts  and p o l i t i c a l  e xpe rience . Congressional 
re p re s e n ta tiv e s  a re  more l i k e ly  to  r e f le c t  " r e a l" in te r e s ts .  C ongressional 
a t te n t io n  to  in te rn a t io n a l issues o f fe r s  some hope o f  deve lop ing  a p u b lic  
consensus which w i l l  su pp o rt a p o s i t iv e  American ro le  in  th e  w o rld . Not o n ly  
a re  p o l ic ie s  s c ru t in is e d  by Congress more l i k e ly  to  r e f le c t  p u b lic  w i l l ,  b u t 
members, once engaged in  th e  p o l ic y  making process shou ld  be b e t te r  a b le  to  
lead and teach t h e i r  c o n s t itu e n ts  th rough  th e  c o m p le x itie s  o f  in te rn a t io n a l 
issues . And la s t ly ,  i f  Congress r e a l ly  does c o n tr ib u te  a c t iv e ly  to  p o l ic y  
fo rm u la tio n , and i f  i t  r e a l ly  does h e lp  educate th e  p u b lic ,  th e  r e s u l t  
shou ld  be g re a te r  s t a b i l i t y  and p r e d ic t a b i l i t y  in  American p o l i t i c s . *?
To Concl ude.....
However, Congress is  in e v ita b ly  a re a c tiv e  in s t i t u t io n .  I t  m ir ro rs  th e  
n a t io n ’ s p o l i t i c a l  l i f e .  Today’ s Congress is  open, d i f fu s e  and fragm ented. 
I t  la cks  le a d e rs h ip  and consensus, and i t s  id e o lo g ic a l o r  p a r t is a n  
commitments a re  u n c e rta in . R ather than  in d iv id u a ls  a f f i l i a t e d  to  p a r t ie s ,  
th e re  a re  in d iv id u a l p o l i t ic ia n s  in  business f o r  them selves, and a s e r ie s  o f
s h i f t in g  c o a l i t io n s  around s p e c i f ic  issu e s . R ather than  a few leade rs  o r
checkpo in ts  o f  le g is la t io n ,  th e re  a re  many.*®
L e g is la to rs  them selves adm it t o  be ing  d is s a t is f ie d  w ith  committee
government. In  1977, a survey o f  153 House members id e n t i f ie d  th e  com m ittee 
s t ru c tu re  as th e  most f re q u e n t ly  m entioned "o b s ta c le " p re ve n tin g  th e  House 
from  doing i t s  jo b .  Reform ing th e  com m ittee s t ru c tu re  is  th e  most commonly 
m entioned suggestion  f o r  in rproving  Congress: fo r ty -o n e  pe r ce n t o f  those  
in te rv ie w e d  mentioned it . * ®
S ince 1970 th e  House has a u th o r is e d  two in te n s iv e  s tu d ie s  o f  th e  committee 
system : th e  B o l l in g  Committee, 1973 -  ’ 74 and th e  P a tte rson  Committee, 1979
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- ’ 80.5® A ccord ing  to  th e  1979 s tud y  by th e  P a tte rson  Committee, over seven ty 
pe r ce n t o f  th e  184 responding members agreed th a t  th e  committee system 
d e sp e ra te ly  needed m a jo r re p a ir .  The problem  is  how to  re c o n c ile  democracy 
w ith  h ie ra rc h y .
However, m ajor change is  re s is te d  because i t  th re a te n s  to  upse t Congress’ 
in te rn a l balance, je o p a rd is in g  n o t o n ly  le g is la to r s ’ workgroup ca re e rs , b u t 
a ls o  t h e i r  m u tu a lly  advantageous lin k a g e s  w ith  o u ts id e  c l ie n te le  groups. 
Mann and O rn s te in  n o te , "subcom m ittee government m ir ro rs  th e  a to m is a tio n  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  in  th e  co u n try  a t  la rg e ".s ?
U lt im a te ly ,  in  th e  arena o f  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  Congress is  s im p ly  n o t a b le  to  
a c t to  th e  b e n e f it  o f  fo re ig n  p o l ic y .  Congress p la ys  an im p o rta n t ro le  b u t 
th e  d isadvantages o f  le g is la t iv e  in te r fe re n c e  in  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  more than  
outw eigh th e  advantages.
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Chapter 6: Oonçlu^  ^ No Prospec t o f Reform. Why Americ a  D^st S tre n g th  
 Presic^n^ .......
Iranga t e : A  Symptom o f th e D y s fu n c t io n  o f  th e  American System o f  Gove rnment.......
"N in e ty , i f  n o t one hundred per ce n t o f  th e  m o tiv a tio n  f o r  th e  
c la n d e s tin e  co n ta c ts  was th e  hope th a t  th e y  would lead to  th e  re tu rn  o f  th e  
American hostages kidnapped in  B e iru t . . .T h e  m o tive , in  o th e r words, was 
n o th in g  to  do w ith  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  in  th e  u s u a lly  accepted sense o f  th e  word.
I t  was to  do w ith  a hostages -  f o r  -  arms deal whose m o tiv a tio n  was 
e s s e n t ia l ly  roo ted  in  dom estic p o l i t ic s " . ?
I t  to o k  th e  shock o f  th e  I ra n  -  C ontra  a f f a i r ,  th e  Admin is t a t io n ’ s t ra d in g  
o f  arms f o r  hostages and th e  d iv e rs io n  o f  th e  p r o f i t s  to  fund  th e  Contras^ 
f o r  Congress to  recogn ise  th e  f a i lu r e  o f  th e  p os t -  Vietnam fo rm u la , th e  
fo rm u la  which in  th e  wake o f  th e  Vietnam War and W atergate had been in tended 
to  p re ve n t such e x e c u tiv e  abuses e ve r aga in .
However, Ira n g a te  is  n o t an is o la te d  episode in  th e  h is to r y  o f  th e  
P res idency. Every modern P re s id e n t s in c e  Eisenhower has been lu re d  by th e  
p rospec t o f  d ram a tic  a c tio n s  abroad in  compensation f o r  th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  
im plem enting dom estic p o l i t i c s .  P re s id e n t Eisenhower’ s d e c is io n  to  invade 
Lebanon in  1958, Kennedy: Bay o f  P igs  in  1961, Johnson’ s in c u rs io n  in to  th e  
Dominican R epub lic  in  1965 and C a r te r ’ s  d ip lo m a tic  manoeuvers d u r in g  Camp 
David a re  c la s s ic  i l l u s t r a t io n s  o f  P re s id e n ts  tempted by a fo re ig n  p o l ic y  
coup to  b o ls te r  p o l i t i c a l  e ffe c t iv e n e s s  a t  home. [ I t  cou ld  be argued the  
P re s id e n t Reagan d id  n o t need to  b o ls te r  h is  p o p u la r ity  in  such a manner. 
However, one tends to  fo r g e t  th e  f a c t  th e  he encountered a lm ost as much 
d i f f i c u l t y  g e t t in g  h is  p o l ic ie s  th rough  Congress as C a rte r d id ,  lo s in g  
c o n tro l o f  th e  Senate in  1986].
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The P re s id e n t is  in h ib i te d  by Congress, e s p e c ia lly  as a r e s u lt  o f  th e  pos t 
Vietnam War and W atergate le g is la t iv e  r e s t r ic t io n s .  H is  o n ly  o p tio n  is  to  
tu rn  to  fo re ig n  adven tu res. The s e p a ra tio n  o f  powers i t s e l f  which by 
th w a r tin g  th e  P re s id e n t’ s  e f f o r t s  to  b u i ld  su p p o rt f o r  h is  programmes, 
is o la te s  him and tem pts him and h is  s t a f f  t o  dangerous p o l i t i c a l  gambles to  
m a in ta in  h is  p o s it io n .^
The Prospect o f Refo rm .........
"Under a l l  c ircum stances, i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  n o t t o  fe e l th a t  th e  P re s id e n t 
o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  must envy th e  le g is la t iv e  p o s it io n  o f  th e  B r i t is h  Prime 
M in is te r " .4
The Issue  o f  C o n s titu t io n a l Reform.
America has amended th e  C o n s t i tu t io n  o n ly  s ix te e n  tim es  s in c e  1789. 
Several o f  these  amendments have been s t r u c t u r a l , f o r  example, th e  d i r e c t  
e le c t io n  o f  S enators; b u t none have addressed th e  b a s ic  se p a ra tio n  o f  powers 
d o c tr in e .  However, th e  q ue s tio n  remains o f  how th e  p a rtn e rs  o f  a fo rc e d  
lo v e le s s  m arriage  between Congress and th e  P re s id e n t can come to  l iv e  
to g e th e r w ith  a reasonable degree o f  harmony and w ith  enough u n i ty  o f  
purpose to  make government work.®
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The Gamut o f Reform Proposals:
S tru c tu ra l
System ic
Focus
1. P a r i i  amentary system
2. P a rlia m e n ta ry  v a r ia n ts
3 . I n i t i a t i v e  and R eca ll
4 . C ouncil o f  S ta te
5. C ab ine t upgrad ing
6. N a tio n a l P lann ing  Agency
7. A lte re d  P re s id e n t ia l
S e le c tio n
8. S ix -y e a r P re s id e n t ia l 
term s
9. C ongressional Reform
10.P a rty  -  system o ve rh a u l.
Procedural
1. War Powers R e so lu tio n
2. Budget and Impoundment 
C o n tro l A c t (1974)
3. Campaign Finance A c t
(1974)
4 . N a tio na l p la n n in g  b i l l
(proposed 1975 and 1976)
5. R e s t r ic t io n  o f  E xecu tive
p r iv i le g e  c la im s
Level
I n s t i t ­
u t io n a l
1. C o lle g ia l E xecu tive
2 . L im ite d  s iz e  and fu n c t io n  2. 
o f  P re s id e n t ia l s t a f f
3. S trengthened P re s id e n t ia l 
p la nn in g  and e v a lu a tio n  
s t a f f s
3.
E x p l ic i t  d e le g a tio n s  o f  
P re s id e n t ia l fu n c t io n s  
to  s t a f f  
Requirement o f
P re s id e n t ia l powers 
im pact -  s ta tem en ts , 
s p e c i f ic  re p o r ts  w ith  
S ta te  o f  th e  Union 
message, and annual 
n a tio n a l -  p os tu re  
s ta te m e n t.
M u lt ip le  advocacy.
Source: Norman C. Thomas, "R eform ing th e  P res idency: Problems and P rospects"
in  Thomas E. C ron in  and R exford G. Tugwell (E d), The P res idency Reappraised,
(New York, P raeger, 1977), p .328.
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StructuralReform:theayesandnayes........
Many who have despa ired  o f  th e  American system o f  Government have looked 
tow ard th e  example o f  those  Western European and B r i t is h  Commonwealth 
c o u n tr ie s , where th e  P a rlia m e n t is  sove re ign , and th e  le g is la t iv e  and 
e x e c u tiv e  branches u n ite d  a t  th e  apex in  a C ab ine t th a t  dom inates th e  
le g is la tu r e  and d ir e c ts  th e  E xecu tive .^
In  th e  tw e n t ie th  C en tu ry , C ongressional subm ission to  R ooseve ltian  
le a d e rsh ip  aroused renewed debate on th e  issue  o f  C o n s t i tu t io n a l re fo rm . 
W illia m  Y. E l l i o t  suggested th a t  th e  term s o f  House members be extended to  
fo u r  yea rs , co n cu rre n t w ith  th e  P re s id e n t 's ,  and th a t  th e  e x e c u tiv e  be 
g ran ted  power to  d is s o lv e  th e  House o f  R ep resen ta tives  once d u r in g  h is  
term.®
Henry H a z l i t t  proposed a P a riia m e n ta ry  system in  which th e  e x e cu tive  would 
be chosen by th e  Congress. A t any tim e  th e  le g is la tu r e  co u ld  vo te  a la ck  o f  
con fidence  in  th e  e x e c u tiv e , and th e  e x e cu tive  would have th e  ch o ice  o f  
d is s o lv in g  th e  House and c a l l in g  new e le c t io n s  o r  s im p ly  re s ig n in g . In  th e  
new e le c t io n ,  th e  e xe c u tiv e  and th e  le g is la tu re  would have to  run , and i f  
th e  e x e c u tiv e  was d e fea ted , th e  Congress cou ld  chose h is  successor.®
In  1945 F in le t te r  proposed th a t  th e  term s o f  S enators, R ep resen ta tives  and 
th e  P re s id e n t a l l  be s ix  yea rs , w ith  s im u ltaneous e le c t io n ,  th a t  d is s o lu t io n  
power be vested  in  th e  P re s id e n t, and in  th e  even t o f  d is s o lu t io n ,  e le c t io n s  
be h e ld  f o r  th e  P re s id e n t and e n t i r e  Congress.?®
In  1966 P re s id e n t Johnson proposed th e  e le c t io n  o f  House members f o r  fo u r  
year te rm s, co n cu rre n t w ith  th a t  o f  th e  P re s id e n t. However, members argued 
th a t  t h i s  would b ind  them to o  c lo s e ly  w ith  th e  P res iden t.??
The proposa l f o r  a C ongressional no -  con fidence  v o te  a tte rrp ts  to  in c rease  
P re s id e n t ia l responsiveness and a c c o u n ta b il i ty ,  and s h i f t  th e  balance away 
frcHTi th e  P re s id e n t to  th e  Congress. I t  would p ro v id e  one means o f  end ing any 
deadlock between th e  P re s id e n t and th e  Congress. However, in  th e  wake o f
167
W atergate and N ixon ’ s demise, i t  was pe rce ived  th a t  th e  impeachment process 
and th e  system o f  checks and balances w orked.?%
C ab ine t Government in  Am erica.
In  th e  1870s and th e  1890s, th e  n o tio n  o f  C ab ine t Government gained
prom inence. The f u l l  development o f  C ab ine t Government was analysed by 
W a lte r Bagehot in  The E ng lis h C o n s t i t u t io n . ? ® I t  had a m a jo r in f lu e n c e  on 
American p o l i t i c a l  obse rve rs  who compared th e  d is c ip l in e  and p r in c ip le s  o f  
B r i t is h  p a r ty  leade rs  w ith  th e  d is u n ity  and d is lo y a l ty  o f  th e  American 
Congress. In  normal tim e s , Bagehot argued, c a b in e t government was more
respons ive , e f f i c i e n t  and accoun tab le  t o  th e  p a r ty  and th e  e le c to ra te .  In  
c r i s i s  tim e s , i t  was more f le x ib le ,  f o r  th e  P a rlia m e n t, u n l ik e  th e  Congress, 
cou ld  re p lace  one Prime M in is te r  w ith  ano the r more a b le  to  deal w ith  th e  
s i tu a t io n .
Gam aliel B ra d fo rd , a member o f  th e  House, proposed a ’ q ue s tio n  p e r io d ’ to  
b r in g  th e  C ab ine t s e c re ta r ie s  b e fo re  Congress f o r  in te r ro g a t io n .? ^  in  1879, 
George Pendleton recommended th a t  th e  main o f f ic e r s  o f  each o f  th e  e x e c u tiv e  
departm ents occupy se a ts  on th e  f lo o r  o f  both  th e  House and th e  Senate. 
Pendleton was in f lu e n t ia l  enough to  ga in  th e  c re a tio n  o f  a b ip a r t is a n  s e le c t  
committee o f  te n  to  examine th e  p ro p o sa l, and in  1881, h is  com m ittee
re p o rte d  fa v o u ra b ly  on th e  measure. A lthough P end le ton ’ s b i l l  was n o t vo ted  
on th a t  yea r, i t  was re in tro d u c e d  a t  th e  s t a r t  o f  th e  n e x t Congress.
However, by th a t  tim e  Pendleton had lo s t  in te r e s t ,  c o n c e n tra tin g  ra th e r  on 
th e  C iv i l  S e rv ice  Reform A c t o f  1883, B rad fo rd  concluded th a t  th e  q u e s tio n  
p e r io d  re fo rm  never rece ived  th e  s l ig h te s t  a t te n t io n  from  e i th e r  house o f  
Congress.? ®
A lthough a q ue s tio n  p e r io d  cou ld  r e s u l t  in  increased a c c o u n ta b il i ty ,  i t  i s  
a ls o  p o s s ib le  th a t  i t  m igh t lead to  to  renewed e x e cu tive  e f f o r t s  a t  secrecy, 
o r  th e  danger o f  to o  much exposure a t  th e  expense o f  le g it im a c y .
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Recal1 Procedures.
The n o tio n  o f  mass re fe ren d a  as suggested by th e  P eop le ’ s  Lobby?® is  n o t 
new and th e  techno logy e x is ts  to  accommodate such a p ro p o sa l. But who would 
dec ide  th e  q u e s tio n s ; what would happen i f  th e  v o te rs  adopted c o n tra d ic to ry  
laws? ?7
A C ouncil o f  S ta te .
The C o n s t i tu t io n a l Convention o f  1787 cons ide red  th e  c re a tio n  o f  a C ouncil 
o f  S ta te  com pris ing  th e  P re s id e n t, th e  C h ie f J u s tic e , th e  P re s id e n t o f  th e  
Senate, th e  Speaker o f  th e  House, and th e  heads o f  th e  e x e cu tive  
departm ents. However, th e  p roposa l was re je c te d  because th e  Convention 
b e lie ve d  th a t  th e  P re s id e n t shou ld  be f re e  to  chose h is  own a d v is e rs .
In  1940 C orw in ’ s , The President^^ O ff.l99  and Powers proposed th e  
c o n s tru c t io n  o f  a c a b in e t from  a j o i n t  L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil t o  be c re a te d  by 
th e  two Houses o f  Congress.?® However, a C ouncil o f  S ta te  would m ere ly 
in c rease  th e  problem  o f  f i x in g  a c c o u n ta b il i ty .
C ab ine t U pgrad ing ........
In  1972 Thomas E. C ron in  recommended th e  re o rg a n is a tio n  o f  th e  e x e c u tiv e  
branch w ith  new departm ents o f  Community Development, N a tu ra l Resources, 
Human Resources and Economic A f fa i r s ,  a lo ng s id e  e x is t in g  departm ents o f  
S ta te , th e  T reasury , Defence, J u s tic e  and A g r ic u ltu re .  However, th e  problems 
o f  managing th e  e x is t in g  super departm ents a re  a lre a d y  immense.?®
N a t io n a lP la n n ing A gency ..........
The in te n t io n  would be t o  c o o rd in a te  P re s id e n t ia l,  Congressional and 
E xecu tive  branch r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s .  L ib e ra ls  argued th a t  n a tio n a l economic 
p la nn in g  would r e s u l t  in  increased  responsiveness and a c c o u n ta b il i ty .  The 
C o nse rva tives , however, regard  t h i s  as a th r e a t  to  economic freedom .2®
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A lte re d  P re s id e n t ia l S e le c t io n ..............
One o f  th e  most im p o rta n t re fo rm  p roposa ls  is  th a t  o f  a n a tio n a l d i r e c t  
p rim a ry  f o r  nom ina ting  P re s id e n t ia l cand ida tes . Such a system would be f a r  
more open and p u b lic ;  would e lim in a te  th e  r is k  o f  choosing a "da rk  h o rs e "(a  
P re s id e n t ia l cand ida te  unknown t o  a la rg e  p a r t  o f  th e  p u b lic ,  i n i t i a l l y  
supported  by o n ly  a m in o r ity  o f  a c t i v is t s . )  O ther advantages would be 
re d u c tio n  in  th e  in o rd in a te  le n g th  o f  th e  s e le c t io n  process and th e  
tremendous c o s t o f  campaigning in  s ta te  a f t e r  s ta te .  I t  would p robab ly  c u t  
down th e  'bandwagon' e f f e c t  whereby a few unexpected successes in  e a r ly  
p r im a r ie s  can produce a surge o f  momentum.
However, th e re  a re  m ajor drawbacks. I t  is  l i k e ly  th a t  th e  d i r e c t  n a tio n a l 
p rim a ry  would sound th e  death k n e ll f o r  a n a tio n a l p a r ty  system. N a tio n a l 
p r im a r ie s  would a ls o  be h e a v ily  b iased in  fa v o u r o f  cand ida tes  a lre a d y  w e ll 
e s ta b lis h e d  and f a m i l ia r  to  th e  p u b lic .  There would be no o p p o r tu n ity  f o r  
o th e rs  to  ga in  p u b lic  re c o g n it io n  th rough  t h e i r  perform ances in  a s e r ie s  o f  
s ta te  p r im a r ie s . I t  is  a ls o  u n l ik e ly  th a t  th e  in d iv id u a l is t ic  and p a ro c h ia l 
in te r e s ts  o f  s ta te s  w i l l  be e a s i ly  o ve rcaæ . Norman C. Thomas w r i te s ,  
"U n fo r tu n a te ly , none o f  th e  re form s r e la t in g  to  th e  s e le c t io n  o f  th e  
P re s id e n t appears d ire c te d  tow ard broadening th e  n a tio n a l c a s t f o r  p o te n t ia l 
nominees o r  im prov ing  th e  q u a l i t y  o f  th e  people u l t im a te ly  chosen to  se rve  
as P re s id e n t and V ice  -  P res iden t".® ?
One S ix  Year Term.
There a re  seve ra l advantages to  t h i s  p roposa l: F i r s t l y ,  i t  would enab le  
th e  P re s id e n t to  devote a l l  h is  t im e  to  h is  ta s k . A P re s id e n t begins h is  r e -  
e le c t io n  carrpaign e a r l ie r  and e a r l ie r .  For example, on J u ly ,  3 1 s t, 1979, th e  
Washington Post announced th a t  P re s id e n t C a rte r had begun h is  campaign f o r  
re -e le c t io n  -  a f t e r  t h i r t y  months in  th e  W hite House. W ith  one s ix  year term  
th e  P re s id e n t would be a b le  t o  devo te  h is  f u l l  a t te n t io n  to  th e  jo b .  Lowi
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s ta te s ,  "e v e ry th in g  th a t  can be s a id  in  fa v o u r o f  th e  s in g le  s ix  year term  
b o i ls  down to  th e  s in g le  argument th a t  p o l i t i c s  shou ld  be taken  o u t o f  th e  
o ff ic e " .® ®
However, th e  P re s id e n t would be a lame duck f r o n  th e  moment o f  h is  
e le c t io n .  He would s t i l l  be com pelled to  engage in  p o l i t i c a l  b a rg a in in g  in  
o rd e r to  e s ta b lis h  w inn ing  c o a l i t io n s .  I t  would a ls o  reduce P re s id e n t ia l 
a c c o u n ta b il i ty ;  and i f  fo u r  years i s  supposedly in s u f f ic ie n t  tim e  f o r  th e  
im p lem enta tion  o f  th e  P re s id e n t 's  p la n s , th e re  is  no guarantee th a t  s ix  
years w i l l  be s u f f ic ie n t .  The m ajor argument a g a in s t s in g le  s ix  year te rm , 
however, is  th e  f a c t  th a t  s in g le  term  l im ita t io n s  a re  s t ro n g ly  assoc ia ted  
w ith  c o r ru p tio n .  In  Am erica i t  would be an e s p e c ia lly  c o r ru p tin g  s i tu a t io n  
due to  th e  la ck  o f  a p a r ty  t i c k e t  and exacerbated by th e  absence o f  th e  tim e  J
p e rs p e c tiv e  produced by th e  p ro spe c t o f  re -e la c tion .® ®
Congres s io n a lReform.
As has been seen in  Chapter 3 th e  1970s w itnessed  a resurgence o f  
Congress. U n fo r tu n a te ly , o fte n  th e  outcome and consequences were th e
o p p o s ite  o f  what was in tended .
Two d i f f e r in g ,  and to  a la rg e  degree in co m p a tib le , p e rsp e c tive s
c h a ra c te r is e  those  who seek to  re fo rm  Congress. On th e  one hand, those  who 
va lu e  prom pt, e f f i c i e n t  s o lu t io n s  to  p o l ic y  problems seek to  advance tow ard 
a more c e n tra lis e d  le g is la tu r e .  They a re  prepared to  fo re g o  openness and 
m u lt ip le  channels o f  com m unication; th e y  a re  prepared to  r e ly  upon c i t iz e n  -  
en fo rced  a c c o u n ta b il i ty  to  keep a pow erfu l e xe cu tive  in  l in e .
On th e  o th e r hand, th e re  a re  tho se , ju s t  as committed to  re fo rm , who p lace  
u lt im a te  va lu e  on a f re e ,  open and d e l ib e ra t iv e  process, and a re  prepared to  
endure d e c e n tra l is a t io n ,  i r r e s p o n s ib i l i t y ,  s low  d e c is io n  -  making and
compromise as th e  p r ic e  re q u ire d  to  guarantee responsiveness. They r e ly  on 
th e  a b i l i t y  o f  th e  c i t iz e n ,  in d iv id u a l ly  o r  in  o rgan ised  groups, t o  p re sen t 
h is  view s p r io r  t o  p o l ic y  fo rm u la tio n . ®4
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PartyReform,.
The r e v i t a l is a t io n  o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  would be an enormous 
u n d e rta k in g . The long -  te rm  tre n d  d u r in g  th e  T w en tie th  C entury has been th e  
d e c lin e  o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r ty .  S ince 1952 th e  P re s id e n t ia l nominees o f  th e  
two m a jo r p a r t ie s  have d ivo rce d  th e  management o f  t h e i r  campaigns from  th e  
o p e ra tio n s  o f  th e  n a tio n a l com m ittees o f  t h e i r  p a r t ie s .  The p a r ty  
o rg a n is a tio n  remains fragm ented and d e c e n tra lis e d .
One o f  th e  re fo rm  p roposa ls  aimed a t  re s to r in g  th e  conven tion  system , 
p ro v id e s  th a t  up to  one t h i r d  o r  even one h a l f  o f  th e  de leg a te s  be chosen by 
s ta te  p a r ty  leade rs  w ith o u t go ing  th rough  a p u b lic  s e le c t io n  process a t  a l l  
as happened in  1988. The argument is  th a t  t h i s  would p e rm it some o f  th e  re a l 
c o a l i t io n  b u ild in g  th a t  was once a n a tu ra l and v i t a l  fe a tu re  o f  p a r ty  
government.
However, i t  is  d o u b tfu l w hether t h i s  cou ld  r e v i t a l is e  th e  two m ajor 
p a r t ie s  to  any g re a t degree; many c o n d it io n s  now e x is t ,  e s p e c ia lly  b ig  
government i t s e l f ,  which a re  in h o s p ita b le  to  p a r t ie s  and e s p e c ia lly  th e  
two -  p a r ty  system. Today, th e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r ty  is  le ss  o f  an o rg a n is a tio n  
w ith  a l i f e  o f  i t s  own, and more o f  an arena in  which o th e r  a c to rs  pursue 
t h e i r  in te r e s ts .  P a rty  id e n t i f ic a t io n  has dropped s h a rp ly , p a r ty  v o t in g  has 
d e c lin e d  and p a r t is a n  co n s is te n cy  in  v o t in g  is  decreasing.®®
Procedural System ic Reforms.
Most re form s adopted in  th e  p a s t two decades have d e a lt  w ith  government 
procedures ra th e r  than  s t r u c tu r a l arrangem ents, f o r  example, th e  War Pavers 
R e so lu tio n  and th e  Budget and Impoundment C o n tro l A c t. However, such re form s 
appear d es tin e d  to  f a i l .  As C hapter 4 dem onstrated th e  War Powers R e so lu tio n  
is  l i t t l e  more than  symbol.®®
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S tru c tu ral  I nst i t u tio n a l R efonrs.
C o lle g ia ] E xecu tive .
The ra t io n a le  behind t h is  proposa l is  th a t  th e  burdens o f  th e  o f f ic e  a re  
so g re a t th a t  the y  shou ld  be p laced  on more than  one head. However, th e re  is  
th e  p rospec t o f  c o n f l i c t  and c o m p e tit io n  w ith in  th e  e x e c u tiv e , la ck  o f  
a c c o u n ta b il i ty  and a d if fu s io n  o f  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y .  The n o tio n  o f  a c o l le g ia l  
e x e c u tiv e  has a t t ra c te d  l i t t l e  support.®7
L im ite d  S ize  and F unction  o f  P re s id e n t ia l  S ta f f . .....................
T h is  th e s is  argues th a t  th e  p r in c ip a l fu n c t io n s  o f  th e  W hite House s t a f f  
and th e  E.O.P. u n i ts  shou ld  be to  a s s is t  and adv ise  th e  P re s id e n t. However, 
t h i s  re q u ire s  P re s id e n t ia l com plience o f  th e  n o tio n  th a t  he reduce h is  
power.
Procédural I n s t i tu t im  Refo r m.
E x p ] ic i t  C t e P r e s i d ent i a l F u nct i o n s t o S t a f f s . ...............
S p e c if ic a l ly ,  proponents o f  t h i s  re fo rm  c a l l  f o r  th e  p u b lic a t io n  in  th e  
Federal R e g is te r o f :
(1 ) fu n c t io n s  assigned to  W hite  House u n i ts ,
(2 ) names and d u t ie s  o f  W hite House pe rsonne l,
(3 ) d e le g a tio n s  o f  a u th o r ity  w ith in  th e  E .O .P .,
(4 ) t i t l e s  o f  o f f i c i a l s  t o  whom th e  d e le g a tio n s  have been made.
A lso  suggested: A P re s id e n t ia l Powers Im pact S tatem ent A c t which would 
re q u ire  an a n a ly s is  by th e  e x e c u tiv e  branch and Congress o f  th e  im pact o f  
each im p o rta n t new le g is la t iv e  programmeon th e  powers o f  th e  P res idency, and 
a P re s id e n t ia l ly  prepared annual n a tio n a l pos tu re  s ta tem en t th a t  compares 
e x e c u tiv e  branch programme perform ance w ith  s ta te d  goals.®®
173
M u lt ip le  A d ^ ........
T h is  proposal c a l ls  f o r  d e c is io n a l processes th a t  guarantee th a t  th e  
P re s id e n t w i l l  re c e iv e  d iv e rs e  and v a r ie d  in fo rm a tio n  and c r i t i c a l  a n a ly s is  
o f  th e  main p o l ic y  a lte r n a t iv e s  b e fo re  ta k in g  im p o rta n t decisions.®®
Success, however, would depend on P re s id e n t ia l p e rs o n a lity  and le a d e rs h ip  
s ty le .
The In e v ita b ility  o fF a il u re .
The e te rn a l q ue s tio n  addressed by such p roposa ls  i s  how, i n s t i t u t i o n a l l l y ,  
th e  e x e c u tiv e  branch and th e  Congress m igh t re o rg an ise  them selves to  
f a c i l i t a t e  b e t te r  r e la t io n s  and co op e ra tion  and more cohe ren t and c o n s is te n t 
p o l ic y .  In  1973 th e  Commission on th e  O rg a n isa tio n  o f  th e  Government f o r  th e  
Conduct o f  Fore ign  P o lic y  was e s ta b lis h e d  to  address th e  problem .
The Commission supported th e  War Powers R e so lu tio n , encouraged th e  Senate 
t o  e x e rc is e  more a u th o r ity  in  th e  c o n firm a tio n  o f  e x e cu tive  branch 
appo in tees and o v e rs ig h t in  g e n e ra l. To inc rease  C ongressional p a r t ic ip a t io n  
in  th e  conduct o f  fo re ig n  a f f a i r s ,  th e  Commission m a jo r ity  recommended th e  
e s ta b lish m e n t o f  a J o in t  Committee on N a tio na l S e c u r ity  as a co un te rw e igh t 
to  th e  N.S.C. A bsh ire  s ta te s ,  "The Commission proposal im p lie d  th a t  i f  
Congress wanted t ru e  c o n s u lta t io n ,  i t  had b e t te r  o rg an ise  i t s e l f  f o r  such 
consu1t a t i  ons" . ® ®
Senator Mike M a n s fie ld , a member o f  th e  Commission contended th a t  such a 
com m ittee would in e v ita b ly  f a l l  under e x e cu tive  branch in f lu e n c e ; in  
c o n tra s t ,  fe l lo w  Commission member. R o c k e fe lle r  argued th a t  power had 
s h if te d  to o  much tow ard a d e c e n tra lis e d  Congress. In  th e  end, th e  
d isagreem ents overshadowed any agreement. The m a jo r ity  o f  th e  Commission 
stood  somewhere between M a n s fie ld  and R o c k e fe lle r , th e  both  o f  whom never 
a c tu a l ly  met fa ce  to  fa c e , o r  compremised t h e i r  p o s it io n s .  The essence o f
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th e  debate was P re s id e n t ia l ve rsus Congressional government -  th e  e te rn a l 
debate.®?
The in f lu e n t ia l  Committee on th e  C o n s titu t io n a l System, ch a ire d  by Nancy 
Landon Kassebaum, L loyd  N. C u t le r  and C. Douglas D i l lo n  undertook an 
assessment o f  th e  C o n s t itu t io n .  The Canm ittee concluded th a t  th e  Founding 
F a th e rs ’ system o f  checks and balances now impeded th e  s o lu t io n  o f  u rg e n t 
problem s. The system c e r ta in ly  p ro te c ts  a g a in s t th e  abuse o f  power, b u t i t  
a ls o  d if fu s e s  a c c o u n ta b il i ty .  As such, th e  Committee recommended:
(1 ) extend term s o f  House members t o  fo u r  years and Senators to  e i g h t years 
and p la ce  a l l  C ongressional e le c t io n s  in  P re s id e n t ia l e le c t io n  yea r,
(2 ) enab le  members o f  Congress to  serve  in  th e  C ab ine t and o th e r e x e cu tive  
p o s it io n s ,
(3 ) t o  make i t  e a s ie r  t o  r a t i f y  t r e a t ie s  by reduc ing  th e  p re sen t two -  
t h i r d s  vo te  in  th e  Senate to  s ix t y  pe r c e n t o r  re q u ire  a s im p le  m a jo r ity  in  
both  Houses,
(4 ) a u th o r is e  Congress to  s e t  l im i t s  on campaign spending. ®®
The Misgui^ N ature o f  Reform.
I t  is  na ive  to  im agine th a t  any b a s ic  re v is io n  o f  th e  e x e c u tiv e  o r  
le g is la t iv e  cou ld  be made a t  t h i s  advanced s tage  in  th e  n a t io n ’ s 
development. S undqu ist w r i te s ,  "However grave th e  s t ru c tu ra l weaknesses o f  
American government, those  th a t  a re  embedded in  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n  a re  q u ite  
beyond th e  reach o f  th e  reform ers".®® The amendment process is  so fo rm id a b le  
th a t  any fundam ental change th a t  arouses co n tro ve rsy  and determ ined 
o p p o s it io n  is  bound to  f a i l .  A proposa l can be b locked by one -  t h i r d  p lu s  
one o f  th e  membership o f  e i th e r  House, o r ,  by as l i t t l e  as one -  e ig h th  o f  
th e  n a t io n ’ s s ta te  le g is la t iv e  bod ies .
B asic change is  im p o ss ib le . For example, th e  fo rm a l merger o f  th e  
le g is la t iv e  and e x e c u tiv e  powers in  a j o i n t  C ab ine t o r  C ouncil i s  c o u n te r to
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th e  s e l f  -  in te r e s t  o f  members in  each branch in  m a in ta in in g  t h e i r  freedom 
o f  d e c is io n  and independence o f  a c t io n  w ith in  t h e i r  re s p e c tiv e  spheres.
The boundaries between th e  P re s id e n t and th e  Congress a re  c o n s ta n t ly  in  
f lu x .  No ru le s  can f i x  in  advance th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  game; Congress can o n ly  
p la y  w ith  ru le s .  The emphasis on th e  abuse o f  power tends to  d iv e r t  
a t te n t io n  away from  th e  le g it im a te  e x e rc is e  o f  power w ith in  th e  e x e c u tiv e  
branch. Congress must bow o u t o f  th e  arena o f  fo re ig n  a f f a i r s  and adm it 
d e fe a t in  th e  fa ce  o f  s u p e r io r  e x e c u tiv e  c a p a b i l i t ie s .
The in e v ita b le  f a i lu r e  o f  re fo rm  n e c e s s ita te s  one th in g :  America must 
s tre n g h te n  th e  P res idency. As has been dem onstrated e a r l ie r  in  t h is  ch a p te r, 
C o n s t itu t io n a l re fo rm  is  in c o n ce iva b le  w h ile  every  o th e r o p tio n  is  more 
d e tr im e n ta l than  b e n e fic ia l t o  th e  American system o f  government. Thus th e  
o n ly  s o lu t io n  is  f o r  s tro n g  P re s id e n t ia l le a d e rsh ip  w ith in  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n .
As was seen in  Chapter 1 (H ypo thes is  I I )  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  th a t  th e  P residency 
was in tended  to  be th e  p re -em inen t branch o f  government anyway. Congress 
must a llo w  th e  P re s id e n t to  e x e rc is e  th a t  le a d e rs h ip . By s u b m ittin g  to  
P re s id e n t ia l le a d e rsh ip  Congress is  m ere ly f u l f i l l i n g  th e  w ishes o f  th e  
Founding F a the rs . The P re s id e n t has g re a t resources and Congress must n o t 
c ircum ven t th a t  p o te n t ia l .
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The S traigh ts o f the Presidency
Leadersh ip .
"One o f  th e  most u n iv e rs a l c ra v in g s  o f  o u r tim e  is  a hunger f o r  com pe lling  
and c re a t iv e  leade rsh ip ".® 4
"The cu re  f o r  democracy is  leadersh ip".® ®
Congress la cks  th e  le a d e rs h ip  c a p a b i l i t y  in  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  m a tte rs . In  th e  
P re s id e n t ia l Leadership  model, i t  is  th e  P re s id e n t who m o b ilis e s  resources. 
Burns s ta te s ,  "Leadersh ip  in  th e  P residency means id e n t i f y in g  and 
e n u n c ia tin g  n a tio n a l va lues  o f  l ib e r t y  and e q u a li ty ,  c o n fro n tin g  
’ o v e r r id in g ’ moral and s o c ia l issues fa c in g  th e  country".® ®  In  th e  
P re s id e n t ia l le a d e rsh ip  model as d e ta ile d  in  Chapter 2 ("1960 S choo l), i t  is  
th e  P re s id e n t who s e ts  th e  d ir e c t io n  o f  th e  co u n try , who p ro c la im s  th e  
p o l ic ie s  and programmes he b e lie v e s  w i l l  move th e  n a tio n  tow ard i t s  g oa ls . 
The la c k  o f  le a d e rsh ip  becomes a campaign issue  and a P re s id e n t’ s 
c h a lle n g e rs  w i l l  seek to  d is p la c e  o r  succeed him by p rom is ing  th e  s tro n g  
a s s e r t iv e  le a d e rsh ip  th a t  th e  people  want. T h ir ty  years a f t e r  th e  emergence 
o f  th e  "1960 School" one pe rce ive s  th e  wisdom o f  i t s  w r i te r s .
The in s t i t u t io n a l  s t ru c tu re  o f  Congress and i t s  p a tte rn s  o f  behaviour have 
evo lved  to  enable i t  t o  fo l lo w  and respond, b u t n o t t o  lead . A t a l l  such 
tim e s , when th e  P re s id e n t ia l Leadersh ip  model has been re je c te d , th e re  has 
been no a lte r n a t iv e  model o f  C ongressional le a d e rsh ip . Even when v o te rs  g iv e  
th e  P re s id e n t an uncoope ra tive  Congress, th e  P re s id e n t remains th e  o n ly  
source o f  e f fe c t iv e  le a d e rs h ip . S tron g e r Congressional le a d e rsh ip  is  n o t th e  
answer e i th e r .  Even i f  th e  tre n d  o f  re ce n t decades co u ld  somehow be 
reve rsed , and the  c e n tra lis e d  power s tr ip p e d  frcm  Cannon and A ldrich® ? be
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re s to re d  to  t h e i r  successors, th e  new leade rs  cou ld  s t i l l  n o t speak f o r  a l l  
th e  peop le .
To g iv e  th e  c o u n try  a sense o f  p rogress toward any o f  i t s  accepted g o a ls , 
le a d e rs h ip  must m o b ilis e  in s t i t u t io n a l ,  p sych o lo g ica l and p o l i t i c a l  
resources, and th e  e x e cu tive  is  w e ll designed f o r  t h is  purpose. W ith  i t s  
h ie ra rc h ic a l s t ru c tu re ,  i t  can re p re se n t th e  d iv e rs e  view s o f  th e  mæy 
departm ents and agencies and re c o n c ile  them in  th e  E .O .P ., w ith  th e  p o in t  o f  
d e c is io n  in  th e  c h ie f  e x e c u tiv e  h im s e lf.  I f ,  on any g iven  p o l ic y  s i tu a t io n ,  
i t  f lo u n d e rs  in  in d e c is io n  f o r  months, i f  i t  is  deadlocked by in te rn a l 
p o l ic y  c o n f l ic t s ,  o r  i f  i t  succumbs f i n a l l y  to  th e  demands o f  narrow 
in te re s ts  and i t s  f in a l  d e c is io n  is  th e  outcome o f  compromise, a l l  these  
weaknesses a re  l i k e ly  to  remain concealed. The f i r s t  th e  p u b lic  a t  la rg e  
hears o f  a p o l ic y  d e c is io n  is  when th e  P re s id e n t announces i t .  Then he 
speaks w ith  d e c is io n  and a u th o r i ty ,  and h is  p re s e n ta tio n  is  w e ll o rgan ised  
and sys te m a tic .
In  c o n tra s t,  Congress does i t s  f lo u n d e r in g  in  th e  g la re  o f  p u b l ic i t y .  
Every c o n f l i c t ,  de lay  and deadlock is  a r r iv e d  a t  in  th e  open, as is  every  
concession to  th e  lo b b y is t .  A lso , Congress -  u n lik e  th e  e x e cu tive  branch -  
is  b ip a r t is a n  , which means th a t  on th e  in s id e  o f  i t s  de l i t e r a t io n s  a t  every  
s tage , is  a m in o r ity  in te n t  on d is c re d i t in g  th e  m a jo r ity ,  exposing d is p u te s  
and in d e c is io n .
The fa c t  remains th a t  th e  e x e c u tiv e  branch does have th e  c a p a b i l i t y  o f  
being more d e c is iv e  than  th e  le g is la t iv e  branch s im p ly  because i t  is  a 
h ie ra rc h y . C ongressional a c t io n  is  g e n e ra lly  le ss  f le x ib le  and tends toward 
a b la n k e t approach; i t  is  f a r  to o  responsive  to  p u b lic  o p in io n . Congress, 
overloaded w ith  th e  dom estic arena a lone , has d i f f i c u l t y  in  fo rm u la tin g  
o v e ra ll p o l ic y .
In  th e  n a tu re  and mandate o f  th e  o f f ic e  o f  th e  P re s id e n t, as Commander-in­
ch i e f  o f  th e  armed fo rc e s  and as th e  p r in c ip a l governmental o f f i c e r
-J
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re sp o n s ib le  f o r  p o l ic y  e x e c u tio n , th e  P re s id e n t is  a t  th e  c e n tre  o f  American 
p o l i t i c a l  l i f e .  The American people lo o k  to  th e  P re s id e n t f o r  le a d e rsh ip  and 
regard  him as t h e i r  re p re s e n ta tiv e  b e fo re  th e  w o rld . The people look t o  the  
P re s id e n t f i r s t  and fo rem ost to  a r t ic u la te  and su pp o rt th e  n a tio n a l 
in te r e s t .
The ve ry  o rg a n is a tio n  o f  th e  executive branch means th a t  a u th o r ity  is  
c e n tra lis e d  in  one man, r e s u lt in g  in  an a b i l i t y  to  v iew  th e  whole p ic tu re .  
Thus, dec is ion -m ak ing  can be ra p id  and th e  e xecu tio n  o f  p o l ic y  making 
imm ediate. The e xe cu tive  branch a ls o  has u n p a ra lle lle d  access to  in fo rm a tio n  
to  in fo rm a tio n  and e x p e r t is e . The e xe cu tive  can in te g ra te  n e g o tia t io n s  and 
o th e r  o p tio n s  in  a way which Congress cannot, and i t  can a c t w ith  g re a te r  
secrecy when i t  is  gen u in e ly  needed.
Whatever th e  th e o re t ic a l shortcom ings o f  th e  American system o f  
government, in  fa c t ,  th e  P residency works w e ll .  The process o f  s e le c t io n  is  
thorough and dem ocra tic . Only men o f  ra re  stam ina and p o l i t i c a l  m a tu r ity  can 
s u rv iv e  th e  g ru e lin g  t e s t  o f  P re s id e n t ia l campaigns.
o f  th e  P res idency.
H am ilton  and Van Dusen argue th a t  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  bureaucrac ies  a re  
r e la t iv e ly  in a c c e s s ib le  to  th e  peop le . The a t t i t u d e  th a t  th e  e xe cu tive  
branch is  bes t s u ite d  and equipped to  conduct fo re ig n  re la t io n s  has led  many 
in  th e  e xe cu tive  branch to  look  upon Congress as a nu isance, and upon 
C a p ita l H i l l  as enemy te r r ito ry .® ®
Franck and Weisband s ta te ,  " th e  f ia s c o  o f  th e  Vietnam War te s te d  th e  
p ro p o s it io n  th a t  e x tra o rd in a ry  tim e s  re q u ire  management by e x tra o rd in a ry  men 
endowed w ith  e x tra o rd in a ry  powers".®® The Vietnam War was conducted by an 
e x e cu tive  vested  w ith  v i r t u a l l y  u n lim ite d  power , and u n t i l  1973, la rg e ly  
f re e  from  "checking  and b a la n c in g " . However, c r i t i c s  o f  th e  Congressional
179
re v o lu t io n  argue th a t  i t  has gone to o  f a r .  They charge th a t  th e  le g is la to r s  
have gone to o  f a r .  They charge th a t  th e  le g is la to r s  have destroyed  th e  
n a t io n ’ s a b i l i t y  to  a c t d e c is iv e ly ,  and have "m ired p o l ic y  -  making in  a 
le g a l m orass".4o
In  a democracy, le g is la t io n  is  th e  most p u b lic  aspect o f  th e  fo re ig n  
p o l ic y  making processes. I t s  most p rom inen t c h a r a c te r is t ic  is  p u b l ic i t y ,  
fo llo w e d  by le g it im a c y , im m u ta b ility ,  comprehensiveness and u n iv e r s a l i ty  o f  
a p p lic a t io n .  These aspects  can be o f  va lu e  o r  d e tr im e n ta l to  th e  p o l ic y  
being persued, depending on th e  c ircum stances. For example, im m u ta b ility  -  
re s is ta n c e  o f  th e  law to  change, is  a q u a l i t y  o f  g re a t va lu e  in  a ssu ring  
a l l i e s  o f  American canm itm ent. However, le g is la t iv e  p r o h ib i t io n  on th e  use 
o f  fo rc e  in ,  o ve r, o r  o f f  Indoch ina  may have been ju s t i f i e d  in  th e  h is t o r ic  
c o n te x t, b u t i t  c rea ted  th e  d y s fu n c tio n a l c e r ta in ty  o f  American p o l ic y  when 
p o l ic y  in te r e s t  m igh t b e t te r  have been served by f l e x i b i l i t y . 4?
Why Am erica  Must S treng then t he P r^ id e n c y .
"N oth ing  g re a t is  done w ith o u t g re a t m en".42
"G rea t power makes g re a t le a d e rsh ip  p o s s ib le " .43
" P o l i t ic a l  le a d e rsh ip  is  th e  c re a tio n  o f  m y th s ".44
O nly f iv e  years a f t e r  W atergate came c a l ls  from  p o l i t i c a l  observe rs  f o r  
new measures to  b o ls te r  th e  P res idency. One term  o f  a more subm iss ive , 
u n a s s e rtiv e  and even unassuming P res idency, th a t  o f  C a rte r , and many 
Americans soon re a lis e d  th a t  i t  d e sp e ra te ly  needed th e  d e c is iv e  le a d e rsh ip  
and c o n f id e n t pos tu re  th a t  o n ly  a v ig o ro u s  P re s id e n t cou ld  su pp ly . Even as 
th e  P residency was being sound ly c r i t i c i s e d  f o r  th e  abuses o f  power o f  th e  
la te  1960s and e a r ly  ’ 70s, i t  was s im u lta n e o u s ly  p o rtra ye d  by many as
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a la rm in g ly  weakened by th e  Vietnam War and W atergate. M ichael Novak once 
remarked, " th e  R ig h t w o rr ie s  about th e  im p e ria l P residency a t  home, and th e  
L e f t  w o rr ie s  about th e  im p e ria l P residency a b ro a d ".4® However, C ron in  adds 
th a t  what Novak does n o t say is  th a t  th e  R ig h t d o u b tless  want a near 
im p e ria l P residency abroad and th e  L e f t ,  something approaching an im p e ria l 
P residency a t  h o n e . 4 b a weakened P residency weakens Am erica ’ s a b i l i t y  to
defend and p ro te c t  i t s  in te r e s ts  abroad.
M om enta rily , the  American people may have lo s t  con fidence  in  i t s  le a de rs , 
b u t i t  never lo s t  f a i t h  in  th e  va lu e  o f  s tro n g , pu rpos ive  le a d e rs h ip . A 
G a llo p  p o l l  in  1976, o n ly  two years a f t e r  W atergate, asked a n a tio n a l 
sample: "Do you th in k  t h a t  what th e  co u n try  needs is  r e a l ly  s tro n g  
le a d e rsh ip  th a t  would t r y  t o  so lv e  problems d i r e c t ly  w ith o u t w o rry in g  about 
how Congress o r  th e  Supreme C ourt m igh t fe e l ,  o r  do you th in k  such 
le a d e rsh ip  m igh t be dangerous?" By a 49% -  44% m arg in , respondents 
in d ic a te d  a p re fe rence  f o r  a s tro n g  government ove r a C o n s t i tu t io n a l one. 
Fear o f  ano the r W atergate had q u ic k ly  d i s a p p e a r e d . 4?
I f  p o l i t i c a l  th in k e rs  had w o rr ie d  about an im p e ria l P res idency, i t  a ls o  
w o rr ie d  about an im p e ria l Congress. The m a jo r ity  o f  commentators doubted 
th a t  in  th e  wake o f  th e  wounded P residency o f  W atergate, th a t  Congress cou ld  
fu rn is h  th e  le a d e rsh ip  necessary to  gove rn .4®
P re s id e n t ia l prim acy is  founded on th e  im p e ra tive s  o f  th e  American 
c o n d it io n : th e  con tinued  s ta te  o f  emergency, g lo b a l c o m p e tit io n  and th e
a n a rch ica l in te rn a t io n a l system emphasise th e  need f o r  speed, e f f ic ie n c y  an
u n ity  o f  government; s o c ia l,  urban and environm enta l problems re q u ire  a 
p e rs is te n t  d is p la y  o f  c re a t iv e  P re s id e n t ia l le a d e rsh ip . Gordon s ta te s , " th e  
American P residency is  th e  h igh  o f f ic e  which ho lds  th e  b e s t hope f o r  m eeting 
and overcom ing a tim e  when c r i s i s  appears d es tin e d  to  became a c h ro n ic  
c o n d it io n  o f  American l i f e " . 4® The P residency p ro v ide s  le a d e rsh ip  and 
guidance.
181
W einberger in  1987 argued th a t  th e  s e c u r ity  and advancement o f  American 
in te r e s ts  was paramount. However, Am erica ’ s a b i l i t y  to  s e t  i t s  own agenda is  
f a r  more l im ite d  than  in  th e  dom estic arena. The in te rn a t io n a l environm ent 
is  u n p re d ic ta b le . America must be a le r t  to  d e te r , respond to  and r e s is t ,  and 
th e re  is  o fte n  l i t t l e  o r  no tim e  f o r  debate. I f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  f a i l s  to  
ta ke  t im e ly  a c tio n ,  i t  does more than  send a l l i e s  and enemies a s ig n a l o f  
in d e c is io n . There is  a ls o  th e  r is k  o f  b lu nd e rin g  more deep ly in to  danger, by 
lo s in g  th e  bes t o p p o r tu n ity  f o r  e a r ly  and e f fe c t iv e  a c t io n .  Even the  
Founding Fa ther most wary o f  excess ive  e xe cu tive  power, Thomas J e ffe rs o n  
assumed th e  P re s id e n t,s  prim acy in  fo re ig n  a f f a i r s :  th e  t ra n s a c t io n  o f
business w ith  fo re ig n  n a tio n s  is  "e x e c u tiv e  a lto g e th e r " (1790)
Defenders o f  a pow erfu l P residency have debated how a government cou ld  
conduct a coheren t fo re ig n  p o l ic y  i f  le g is la t iv e  ascendancy r e a l ly  d id  mean 
th e  development o f  Congress in to  a second American government. The American 
n a tio n , however, cannot a ffo rd  t o  have two fo re ig n  p o l ic ie s .  A n a tio n  cannot 
long re ta in  a le a d e rsh ip  ro le  in  th e  w o rld  un less i t s  own le a d e rsh ip  is  
c le a r  and d e c is iv e . H un ting ton  urges th e  re c o g n it io n  o f  th e  le g it im a c y  and 
n e c e s s ity  o f  ’ h ie ra rc h y , c o e rc io n , d is c ip l in e ,  secrecy and decep tion  -  a l l  
o f  which a re  in  some measure, inescapab le  a t t r ib u te s  o f  th e  process o f  
government".®?
C on tra ry  to  th e  p o l i t i c a l  maxim th a t  power abhors a vacuum, i t  is  s im p ly  
n o t th e  case th a t  power removed o r  s tr ip p e d  away from  one branch w i l l  f in d  a 
home in  another.®® When a P re s id e n t is  unable to  e x e rc is e  a u th o r ity ,  no one 
e ls e  has been a b le  to  supp ly  comparable purpose and i n i t i a t i v e .  Even as 
S ch le s in g e r was condemning th e  im p e ria l P res idency, he conceded, "h is to r y  
has shown th e  P residency to  be th e  most e f fe c t iv e  in s t ru m e n ta lity  f o r  
ju s t ic e  and progress".®® Only th e  P re s id e n t has th e  n a tio n a l p e rs p e c tiv e  
which a llo w s  him to  p lan  com prehensive ly. C ron in  w r i te s ,  "w ith o u t s tro n g  
P re s id e n t ia l le a d e rs h ip , th e  p a ro c h ia lis m  in  Congress is  so pro found and 
in s id io u s  and u n re m itt in g  th a t  Congress is  n o t a good in s t i t u t io n  to  p lace
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o u r hopes f o r  th e  f u t u r e " . ® *  congress ra th e r  than b a lanc ing  P re s id e n t ia l 
powers has o fte n  s im p ly  b locked needed P re s id e n t ia l a c tio n s  because o f  
1o c a lis e d  s e l f - in t e r e s t .
Americans s t i l l  long f o r  dynamic and s tro n g  le a d e rsh ip . I t  is  s t i l l  th e  
J e ffe rs o n s , Jacksons and R ooseve lts  th a t  a re  considered  g re a t P re s id e n ts .
S undqu is t contends, ’ th e  day o f  th e  s tro n g  P re s id e n t is  here to  s ta y . I t  i s  
a n e c e s s ity  o f  th e  tim e s . People want i t  th a t  w ay ...T he  g re a t P re s id en ts  a re  
th e  men who b u i l t  th e  P residency and made a p ra c t ic e  o f  k ic k in g  Congress 
a round ’ .®®
C ron in  p o in ts  o u t th a t  however much th e  p u b lic  may want Congress to  be a 
m ajor p a r tn e r w ith  th e  P re s id e n t, and a m ajor check on th e  P re s id e n t, th e  
p u b l ic ’ s  su pp o rt f o r  Congress w i l l  a lways be s u b je c t to  d e te r io ra t io n .  Power 
is  much d ispersed  in  Congress, i t s  d e l ib e ra t io n s  and q u a rre ls  a re  ve ry  open.
W ith  tim e  th e  p u b lic  begins to  v iew  Congress as th e  ’ b ic k e r in g  b ranch ’ o r  
th e  ’ p o l ic y  th w a r t in g ’ branch. Then th e  people w i l l  aga in  look to  th e  
P re s id e n t f o r  in s p ira tio n .® ®  The P re s id e n t is  th e  one co n s ta n t; th e  key to  
an e f fe c t iv e  and success fu l fu tu re .
There is  th e  r is k  o f  s t r ip p in g  away th e  P re s id e n t’ s power w ith o u t seeming 
to  r e a l is e  th a t  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  has no o th e r in s t i t u t io n  to  whom those  
powers can be t ra n s fe r re d .
The P residency is  th e  fo c a l p o in t  o f  n a tio n a l l i f e .  He is  th e  o n ly  
o f f i c i a l  e le c te d  to  o f f ic e  by a n a tio n a l v o te . He is  th e  o n ly  o f f i c i a l  who 
has th e  " r ig h t "  to  speak as th e  re p re s e n ta t iv e  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta tes  to  o th e r 
s ta te s .  He is  the  o n ly  o f f i c i a l  who can come c lo se  to  m o b ilis in g  th e  t o t a l  
economic, s o c ia l and p o l i t i c a l  power o f  th e  n a tio n . W ith o u t a s tro n g  
P re s id e n t, "we w i l l  re v e r t  to  th e  k in d  o f  government th a t  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  
had under th e  A r t ic le s  o f  C o n fe d e ra tio n , a government so incapab le  o f  
e f fe c t iv e  a c tio n  th a t  th e  de lega tes  who gathered [h e re ] 200 years ago -I
determ ined a t  once to  a b o lis h  it " .® ?
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Appen d ix 1
"A J o in t  R e so lu tio n  to  Promote th e  Maintenance o f  In te rn a t io n a l Peace and 
S e c u r ity  in  Southeast A s ia "
(The G u lf o f  Tonkin R e so lu tio n )
Whereas naval u n i ts  o f  th e  Communist regime in  Vietnam, in  v io la t io n  o f  th e  
p r in c ip le s  o f  th e  C h a rte r o f  th e  U n ited  N a tions  and o f  in te rn a t io n a l law, 
have d e l ib e ra te ly  and re p e a te d ly  a tta cke d  U n ited  S ta te s  naval ve sse ls  
la w fu l ly  p resen t in  in te rn a t io n a l w a te rs , and have the re b y  c re a te d  a s e r io u s  
th r e a t  to  in te rn a t io n a l peace; and
Whereas these  a tta c k s  a re  p a r t  o f  a d e l ib e ra te  and s ys te m a tic  campaign o f  
aggress ion  th a t  th e  Communist regime in  N orth  Vietnam has been waging 
a g a in s t i t s  neighbours and th e  n a tio n s  jo in e d  w ith  them in  th e  c o l le c t iv e  
defence o f  t h e i r  freedom; and
Whereas th e  U n ited  S ta te s  is  a s s is t in g  th e  people o f  so u th ea s t A s ia  to  
p ro te c t  t h e i r  freedom and has no t e r r i t o r i a l ,  m i l i t a r y ,  o r  p o l i t i c a l  
a m b ition s  in  th e  a rea, b u t d e s ire s  o n ly  th a t  these  peoples be l e f t  in  peace 
to  work o u t t h e i r  own d e s t in ie s  in  t h e i r  own way: Now, th e re fo re ,  be i t
Resolved by th e  Senate and House o f  R ep resen ta tives  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  o f  
America assembled in  Congress, That th e  Congress approves and suppo rts  th e  
d e te rm in a tio n  o f  th e  P re s id e n t, as Com m ander-in-Chief, t o  ta ke  a l l  necessary 
measures to  repe l any armed a tta c k  a g a in s t th e  fo rc e s  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  
and to  p re ven t fu r th e r  agg ress ion .
S ec tio n  2. The U n ited  S ta te s  regards as v i t a l  to  i t s  n a tio n a l in te re s ts  and 
to  w o rld  peace th e  maintenance o f  in te rn a t io n a l peace and s e c u r ity  in  
so u th ea s t A s ia . Consonant w ith  th e  C o n s t itu t io n  and th e  C h a rte r o f  the  
U n ited  N a tions  and in  accordance w ith  th e  o b l ig a t io n s  under th e  Southeast 
A s ia  C o lle c t iv e  Defence T re a ty , th e  U n ited  S ta te s  is ,  th e re fo re ,  p repared, 
as th e  P re s id e n t de te rm ines, to  ta ke  a l l  necessary s te p s , in c lu d in g  th e  use 
o f  armed fo rc e , to  a s s is t  any member o r  p ro to c o l s ta te  o f  th e  Southeast A s ia  
C o lle c t iv e  Defence T re a ty  re q u e s tin g  a ss is ta n ce  in  th e  defence o f  i t s  
freedom.
S ec tio n  3. T h is  re s o lu t io n  s h a ll e x p ire  when th e  P re s id e n t s h a ll determ ine 
th a t  th e  peace and s e c u r ity  o f  th e  a rea  is  reasonably assured by 
in te rn a t io n a l c o n d it io n s  c rea ted  by th e  a c tio n  o f  th e  U n ited  N a tions o r  
o th e rw ise , excep t th a t  i t  may be te rm in a te d  e a r l ie r  by co n cu rre n t re s o lu t io n  
o f  th e  Congress.
Appendix 2
P u b lic  Law 93 -  148 
93rd Congress, H .J . Res. 542 
November 7, 1973
J o in t  R e so lu tio n
Concerning th e  war powers o f  Congress and th e  P re s id e n t.
Resolved by th e  Senate and th e  House o f  R ep resen ta tives  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta tes  
o f  America in  Congress assembled,
S h o rt T i t l e
S ec tion  1. T h is  re s o lu t io n  may be c i te d  as th e  "War Pavers R e s o lu t io n " .
S ec tion  2. (a ) I t  is  th e  purpose o f  t h i s  j o i n t  re s o lu t io n  to  f u l f i l l  th e  
in te n t  o f  th e  fram ers  o f  th e  C o n s t i tu to r  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  and in su re  
th a t  th e  c o l le c t iv e  judgement o f  both  th e  Congress and th e  P re s id e n t w i l l  
app ly  to  th e  in tro d u c t io n  o f  U n ited  S ta te s  Armed Forces in to  h o s t i l i t i e s ,  o r  
in to  s i tu a t io n s  where imminent invo lvem ent in  h o s t i l i t i e s  is  c le a r ly  
in d ic a te d  by th e  c ircum stances, and to  th e  con tinued  use o f  such fo rc e s  in  
h o s t i l i t i e s  o r  in  such s itu a t io n s .
(b ) Under a r t i c le  I ,  s e c tio n  8, o f  th e  C o n s t itu t io n  , i t  i s  s p e c i f ic a l ly  
p rov ided  th a t  th e  Congress s h a ll have th e  power to  make a l l  th e  laws 
necessary and p rope r f o r  c a r ry in g  in to  e x e c u tio n , n o t o n ly  i t s  own powers 
b u t a ls o  a l l  o th e r powers vested  by th e  C o n s titu t io n  in  th e  Government o f  
th e  U n ited  S ta te s , o r  in  any departm ent o r  o f f i c e r  th e re o f.
(c )  The C o n s t itu t io n a l Powers o f  th e  p re s id e n t as Commander-in- C h ie f to  
in tro d u c e  U n ited  S ta te s  Armed Forces in to  h o s t i l i t i e s ,  o r  in to  s itu a t io n s  
where imminent invo lvem ent in  h o s t i l i t i e s  is  c le a r ly  in d ic a te d  by the  
c ircum stances, a re  e xe rc ised  o n ly  pe rsuan t to  (1 ) a d e c la ra t io n  o f  war, (2 ) 
s p e c i f ic  s ta tu to r y  a u th o r is a t io n ,  o r  (3 ) a n a tio n a l emergency c rea ted  by an 
a tta c k  on th e  U n ited  S ta te s , i t s  t e r r i t o r i e s  o r  possessions, o r  i t s  armed 
fo r c e s .
C o n s u lta tio n
S ec tion  8. The P re s id e n t in  eve ry  p o s s ib le  in s tan ce  s h a ll c o n s u lt  w ith  
Congress b e fo re  in tro d u c in g  U n ited  S ta te s  Armed Forces in to  h o s t i l i t i e s  o r  
in to  s itu a t io n s  where imminent invo lvem ent in  h o s t i l i t i e s  is  c le a r ly  
in d ic a te d  by th e  c ircum stances, and a f t e r  every  such in tro d u c t io n  s h a ll 
c o n s u lt  re g u la r ly  w ith  th e  Congress u n t i l  U n ited  S ta tes  Armed Forces a re  no 
lo n ge r engaged in  h o s t i l i t i e s  o r  have been removed from  such s itu a t io n s .
R eporting
S ec tion  4 . (a ) In  th e  absence o f  a d e c la ra t io n  o f  war, in  any case in  which 
U n ited  S ta te s  Armed Forces a re  in tro d u c e d -
(1 ) in to  h o s t i l i t i e s  o r  in to  s i tu a t io n s  where imminent invo lvem ent in  
h o s t i l i t i e s  is  c le a r ly  in d ic a te d  by th e  c ircum stances;
(2 ) in to  th e  t e r r i t o r y , a i rspace o r  w a te rs  o f  a fo re ig n  n a tio n , w h ile  
equipped f o r  combat, excep t f o r  deployments which re la te  s o le ly  to  supp ly , 
deplacement, re p a ir  o r  t r a in in g  o f  such fo rc e s ; o r
(3 ) in  numbers which s u b s ta n c ia l ly  e n la rg e  U n ited  S ta tes  Armed Forces 
equipped f o r  combat a lre a d y  lo ca te d  in  a fo re ig n  n a tio n ;
th e  P re s id e n t s h a ll subm it w ith in  48 hours to  th e  Speaker o f  th e  House o f  
R ep resen ta tives  and to  th e  P re s id e n t p ro  tempore o f  th e  Senate a re p o r t ,  in  
w r i t in g ,  s e t t in g  f o r t h -
(A) th e  c ircum stances n e c e s s ita tin g  th e  in t ro d u c t io n  o f  U n ited  S ta te s  Armed 
Forces;
(B) th e  C o n s t itu t io n a l and le g is la t iv e  a u th o r ity  under which such 
in tro d u c t io n  to o k  p la ce ; and
(C) th e  es tim a ted  scope and d u ra t io n  o f  th e  h o s t i l i t i e s  o r  invo lvem ent .
(b ) The P re s id e n t s h a ll p ro v id e  such o th e r  in fo rm a tio n  as th e  Congress may 
reques t in  th e  f u l f i l lm e n t  o f  i t s  C o n s t itu t io n a l r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  w ith  
re sp e c t to  com m itting  th e  N a tion  to  war and to  th e  use o f  U n ited  S ta te s  
Armed Forces abroad.
(c )  Whenever U n ited  S ta te s  Armed Forces a re  in troduced  in to  h o s t i l i t i e s  o r  
in to  any s i tu a t io n  described  in  su bse c tio n  (a ) o f  t h is  s e c tio n , th e  
P re s id e n t s h a l l ,  so long as such anned fo rc e s  co n tin u e  to  be engaged in  such 
h o s t i l i t i e s  o r  s i tu a t io n ,  re p o r t  t o  th e  Congress p e r io d ic a l ly  on th e  s ta tu s  
o f  such h o s t i l i t i e s  o r  s i tu a t io n  as w e ll as on th e  scope and d u ra t io n  o f  
such h o s t i l i t i e s  o r  s i tu a t io n ,  b u t in  no even t s h a ll he re p o r t  to  th e  
Congress le ss  o fte n  than  once every  s ix  months.
C ongressional A c tio n
S ec tion  5 . (a ) Each re p o r t  subm itted  pe rsuan t to  s e c tio n  4 (a ) (1 )  s h a ll be 
tra n s m it te d  to  th e  Speaker o f  th e  House o f  R ep resen ta tives and to  th e  
P re s id e n t p ro  tempore o f  th e  Senate on th e  same calended day. Each re p o r t  so 
tra n s m itte d  s h a ll be re fe r re d  to  th e  Committee on Fore ign  A f fa i r s  o f  th e  
House o f  R ep resen ta tives  and to  th e  Committee on Fore ign  R e la tio n s  o f  th e  
Senate f o r  a p p ro p r ia te  a c tio n .  I f  when th e  re p o r t  is  tra n s m it te d , th e  
Congress has adjourned s in e  d ie  o r  has ad journed f o r  any p e r io d  in  excess o f  
th re e  ca lende r days, th e  Speaker o f  th e  House o f  R e p resen ta tives  and th e  
P re s id e n t p ro  terrpore o f  th e  Senate, i f  th e y  deem i t  a d v is a b le  (o r  i f  
p e t it io n e d  by a t  le a s t  80 p e rcen t o f  th e  membership o f  t h e i r  re s p e c tiv e  
Houses) s h a ll j o i n t l y  reques t th e  P re s id e n t t o  convene Congress in  o rd e r 
th a t  i t  may co n s id e r th e  re p o r t  and ta ke  a p p ro p ria te  a c tio n  persuan t t o  t h i s  
s e c tio n .
(b ) W ith in  s ix t y  ca le nd e r days a f t e r  a re p o r t  is  subm itted  o r  is  re q u ire d  
to  be subm itted  persuan t t o  s e c tio n  4 (a ) (1 ) ,  whichever is  e a r l ie r ,  th e  
P re s id e n t s h a ll te rm in a te  any use o f  U n ited  S ta te s  Armed Forces w ith  re sp ec t 
to  which such re p o r t  was subm itted  (o r  re q u ire d  to  be s u b m itte d ), un less  th e  
Congress (1 ) has dec la red  war o r  has enacted a s p e c i f ic  a u th o r is a t io n  f o r  
such use o f  U n ited  S ta te s  Armed Forces, (2 ) has extended by law such s ix t y -  
day p e r io d , o r  (3 ) is  p h y s ic a lly  unable t o  meet as th e  r e s u l t  o f  an armed 
a tta c k  upon th e  U n ited  S ta te s . Such s ix ty -d a y  p e r io d  s h a ll be extended f o r  
n o t more than  an a d d it io n a l t h i r t y  days i f  th e  P re s id e n t determ ines and 
c e r t i f i e s  to  Congress in  w r i t in g  t h a t  unavo idab le  m i l i t a r y  n e c e s s ity  
re s p e c tin g  th e  s a fe ty  o f  U n ited  S ta te s  Armed Forces re q u ire s  th e  con tinued  
use o f  such armed fo rc e s  in  th e  course o f  b r in g in g  about a prompt removal o f  
such fo rc e s .
(c )  N o tw ith s ta n d ing  subsec tion  (b ) ,  t h a t  any tim e  th a t  U n ited  S ta te s  Armed 
Forces a re  engaged in  h o s t i l i t i e s  o u ts id e  th e  t e r r i t o r y  o f  th e  U n ited  
S ta te s , i t s  possessions and t e r r i t o r i e s  w ith o u t a d e c la ra t io n  o f  war o r  
s p e c i f ic  s ta tu to r y  a u th o r is a t io n ,  such fo rc e s  s h a ll be removed by th e  
P re s id e n t i f  th e  Congress so d ir e c ts  by co n cu rre n t re s o lu t io n .
Congressional P r io r i t y  Procedures For J o in t  R e so lu tio n  o r  B i l l
S ec tion  6 . (a ) Any j o i n t  re s o lu t io n  o r  b i l l  in troduced  pe rsuan t to  s e c tio n  
5 (b ) a t  le a s t  t h i r t y  days b e fo re  th e  e x p ira t io n  o f  th e  s ix ty -d a y  p e rio d  
s p e c if ie d  in  such s e c tio n  s h a ll be re fe r re d  to  th e  Committee on Fore ign  
A f fa i r s  o f  th e  House o f  R ep resen ta tives  o r  th e  Committee on Fore ign
R e la tio n s  o f  th e  Senate, as th e  case may be, and such cormriittee s h a ll re p o r t  
one such j o i n t  re s o lu t io n  o r  b i l l ,  to g e th e r w ith  i t s  recommendations, n o t 
la t e r  than  tw e n ty - fo u r  ca lende r days b e fo re  th e  e x p ira t io n  o f  th e  s ix ty -d a y  
p e r io d  s p e c if ie d  in  such s e c tio n , un less  such House s h a ll o th e rw ise  
dete rm ine  by th e  yeas and nays.
(b ) Any j o i n t  re s o lu t io n  o r  b i l l  so re p o rte d  s h a ll become th e  pending 
business o f  th e  House in  q u e s tio n  ( in  th e  case o f  th e  Senate th e  tim e  f o r  
debate s h a ll be e q u a lity  d iv id e d  between th e  opponents and th e  p roponen ts ), 
and s h a ll be vo ted on w ith in  th re e  ca le nd e r days th e re a f te r ,  un less such 
House s h a ll determ ine by th e  yeas and nays.
(c )  Such a j o i n t  re s o lu t io n  o r  b i l l  passed by one House s h a ll be re fe r re d  
t o  th e  commitee o f  th e  o th e r  House named in  subsec tion  (a ) and s h a ll be 
re p o rte d  o u t n o t la t e r  than  fo u rte e n  ca lende r days b e fo re  th e  e x p ira t io n  o f  
th e  s ix ty -d a y  p e r io d  s p e c if ie d  in  s e c tio n  5 (b ) .  The j o i n t  re s o lu t io n  o r  b i l l  
so re p o rte d  s h a ll become th e  pending business o f  th e  House in  q ue s tio n  and 
s h a ll be vo ted  on w ith in  th re e  ca le nd e r days a f te r  i t  has been re p o rte d , 
un less  each House s h a ll dete rm ine  by th e  yeas and nays.
(d ) In  th e  case o f  any d isagreem ent between th e  two Houses o f  Congress w ith  
re sp ec t to  a j o i n t  re s o lu t io n  o r  b i l l  passed by th e  both  Houses, confe rees 
s h a ll be p rom p tly  appo in ted  and th e  committee o f  conference s h a ll make and 
f i l e  a re p o r t  w ith  re sp ec t t o  such re s o lu t io n  o r  b i l l  n o t la t e r  than fo u r  
ca le nd e r days b e fo re  th e  e x p ira t io n  o f  th e  s ix ty -d a y  p e r io d  s p e c if ie d  in  
s e c tio n  5 (b ) .  In  th e  even t th a t  th e  con fe rees a re  unable to  agree w ith in  48 
hours, the y  s h a ll re p o r t  back t o  t h e i r  re s p e c tiv e  Houses in  d isagreem ent. 
N o tw ith s ta n d ing  any ru le  in  e i th e r  House concern ing  th e  p r in t in g o f  
conference re p o r ts  in  th e  Record o r  concern ing  any de lay  in  th e  
c o n s id e ra tio n  o f  such re p o r ts ,  such re p o r t  s h a ll be enacted on by both 
Houses n o t la t e r  than  th e  e x p ira t io n  o f  such s ix ty -d a y  p e r io d .
Congresional P r io r i t y  Procedures f o r  C oncurrent R e so lu tio n
S ec tion  7 . (a ) Any co n cu rre n t re s o lu t io n  in tro du ce d  pe rsuen t t o  s e c tio n  5 (c )  
s h a ll be re fe r re d  to  th e  Committee on Fore ign  A ffa o rs  o f  th e  House o f  
R ep resen ta tives  o r  th e  Committee on Fore ign  R e la tio n s  o f  th e  Senate, as th e  
case may be, and one such co n c u rre n t re s o lu t io n  s h a ll be re p o rte d  o u t by 
such committee to g e th e r w ith  i t s  recommendations w ith in  f i f t e e n  ca lende r 
days, un less such House s h a ll o th e rw ise  determ ine by th e  yeas and nays.
(b ) Any such co n cu rre n t re s o lu t io n  so re p o rte d  s h a ll become th e  pending 
business o f  th e  House in  q u e s tio n  ( in  th e  Senate th e  tim e  f o r  debate s h a ll 
be e q u a lly  d iv id e d  between th e  proponents and th e  opponents) and s h a ll be 
vo ted  upon w ith in  th re e  ca le nd e r days th e re a f te r ,  un less  such House 
o th e rw ise  dete rm ine  by th e  yeas and nays.
(c )  Such a co n cu rre n t re s o lu t io n  passed by one House s h a ll be re fe r re d  to  
th e  com m ittee o f  th e  o th e r House named in  subsec tion  (a ) and s h a ll be 
re p o rte d  o u t by such com m ittee to g e th e r w ith  i t s  recommendations w ith in  
f i f t e e n  ca lende r days and s h a ll thereupon become th e  pending business o f  
such House and s h a ll be vo ted  upon w ith in  th re e  ca lende r days, un less  such 
House s h a ll o th e rw ise  dete rm ine  by yeas and nays.
(d ) In  th e  case o f  any d isagreem ent between th e  two Houses o f  Congress w ith  
re sp e c t to  a co n cu rre n t re s o lu t io n  passed by both Houses, con fe rees  s h a ll be 
p rom p tly  appo in ted  and th e  com m ittee o f  conference s h a ll make and f i l e  a 
re p o r t  w ith  re sp ec t to  such co n c u rre n t re s o lu t io n  w ith in  s ix  ca lende r days 
a f t e r  th e  le g is la t io n  is  re fe r re d  to  th e  com m ittee o f  confe rence . 
N o tw ith s ta n d ing  any ru le  in  e i th e r  House concern ing  th e  p r in t in g  o f  
conference re p o r ts  in  th e  Record o r  concern ing  any de lay  in  th e  
c o n s id e ra tio n  o f  such re p o r ts ,  such re p o r t  s h a ll be acted on by both Houses 
n o t la t e r  than  s ix  ca lende r days a f t e r  th e  conference re p o r t  is  f i l e d .  In  
th e  even t th e  con fe rees a re  unable  to  agree w ith in  48 hours , the y  s h a ll 
re p o r t  back to  t h e i r  re s p e c tiv e  Houses in  d isagreem ent.
In te rp re ta t io n  o f  J o in t  R e so lu tio n  |
S ec tion  8 . (a ) A u th o r ity  to  in tro d u c e  U n ited  S ta tes  Armed Forces in to  
h o s t i l i t i e s  o r  in to  s i tu a t io n s  w here in  invo lvem ent in  h o s t i l i t i e s  is  c le a r l t  
in d ic a te d  by th e  c ircum stances s h a ll n o t be in fe r re d -
(1 ) from  any p ro v is io n  o f  law (w hether o r  n o t in  e f f e c t  b e fo re  th e  da te  o f  
enactment o f  t h i s  j o i n t  re s o lu t io n ) ,  in c lu d in g  any p ro v is io n  con ta ined  in  
any a p p ro p r ia t io n  A c t, un less such p ro v is io n  s p e c i f ic a l ly  a u th o r is e s  th e  
in tro d u c t io n  o f  U n ited  S ta te s  Armed Forces in to  h o s t i l i t i e s  o r  in to  such 
s i tu a t io n s  and s ta te s  th a t  i t  i s  in tended to  c o n s t itu te  s p e c i f ic  s ta tu to r y  
a u th o r is a t io n  w ith in  th e  meaning o f  t h i s  j o i n t  re s o lu t io n ;  o r
(2 ) from  any t r e a ty  h e re to fo re  o r  h e re a fte r  r a t i f ie d  un less  such t r e a ty  is  
implemented by le g is la t io n  s p e c i f ic a l ly  a u th o r is in g  th e  in tro d u c t io n  o f  
U n ited  S ta te s  Armed Forces in to  h o s t i l i t i e s  o r  in to  s i tu a t io n s  and s ta t in g  
th a t  i t  i s  in tended to  c o n s t itu te  s p e c i f ic  s ta tu to r y  a u th o r is a t io n  w ith in  
th e  meaning o f  t h is  j o i n t  re s o lu t io n .
(b ) N oth ing  in  t h i s  j o i n t  re s o lu t io n  s h a ll be construed  to  re q u ire  any 
fu r th e r  s p e c i f ic  s ta tu to r y  a u th o r is a t io n  to  p e rm it members o f  th e  U n ited  
S ta te s  Armed Forces to  p a r t ic ip a te  j o i n t l y  w ith  members o f  th e  armed fo rc e s  
o f  one o r  more fo re ig n  c o u n tr ie s  in  th e  headquarters o p e ra tio n s  o f  h ig h -  
le v e l m i l i t a r y  commands which were e s ta b lis h e d  p r io r  to  th e  date  o f  
enactment o f  t h i s  j o i n t  re s o lu t io n  and persuan t to  th e  U n ited  N a tions 
C h a rte r o r  any t r e a ty  r a t i f ie d  by th e  U n ited  S ta tes  p r io r  t o  such d a te ,
(c )  For purposes o f  t h is  j o i n t  re s o lu t io n ,  th e  term  " in t ro d u c t io n  o f  U n ited  
S ta te s  Armed Forces" in c lu d e s  th e  assignm ent o f  members o f  such armed fo rc e s  
to  command, c o o rd in a te , p a r t ic ip a te  in  th e  movement o f ,  o r  accompany th e  
re g u la r  o r  i r r e g u la r  m i l i t a r y  fo rc e s  o f  any fo re ig n  c o u n try  o r  government 
when such m i l i t a r y  fo rc e s  a re  engaged, o r  th e re  e x is ts  an imminent th r e a t  
th a t  such fo rc e s  w i l l  become engaged, in  h o s t i l i t i e s .
(d ) N oth ing  in  t h i s  j o i n t  re s o lu t io n -
(1 ) is  in tended to  a l t e r  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n a l a u th o r ity  o f  th e  Congress o r  o f  
th e  P re s id e n t, o r  th e  p ro v is io n s  o f  e x is t in g  t r e a t ie s ;  o r
(2 ) s h a ll be construed  as g ra n tin g  any a u th o r ity  to  th e  P re s id e n t w ith  
re sp e c t to  th e  in tro d u c t io n  o f  U n ited  S ta te s  Armed Forces in to  h o s t i l i t i e s  
o r  in to  s itu a t io n s  w herein  invo lvem ent in  h o s t i l i t i e s  is  c le a r ly  in d ic a te d  
by th e  c ircum stances which a u th o r ity  he would n o t have had in  th e  absence o f  
t h i s  j o i n t  re s o lu t io n .
S e p a ra b il i ty  C lause
S ec tion  9. I f  any p ro v is io n  o f  t h i s  j o i n t  re s o lu t io n  o r  th e  a p p lic a t io n  
th e re o f to  any person o r  c ircum stance  is  he ld  in v a l id ,  th e  rem ainder o f  th e  
j o i n t  re s o lu t io n  and th e  a p p lic a t io n  o f  such p ro v is io n  to  any o th e r person 
o r  c ircum stance  s h a ll n o t be a ffe c te d  the re b y .
E f fe c t iv e  Date




S ho rt T i t l e
Append i x 3
P u b lic  Law 98 -  119, th e  M u lt in a t io n a l Force in  Lebanon R e so lu tio n ,
P u b lic  Law 98 -  119 -  O ctober 12,1983.
P u b lic  Law 98 -  119 
98th  Congress
J o in t  R e so lu tio n
P ro v id in g  s ta tu to r y  a u th o r is a t io n  under th e  War Powers R e so lu tio n  f o r  
con tinued  U n ited  S ta te s  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  th e  m u lt in a t io n a l peacekeeping 
fo rc e  in  Lebanon in  o rd e r t o  o b ta in  w ithd raw a l o f  a l l  fo re ig n  fo rc e s  from  
Lebanon.
Resolved by th e  Senate and House o f  R ep resen ta tives  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  o f  i
America in  Congress assembled,
S ec tio n  1. T h is  j o i n t  re s o lu t io n  may be c ite d  as th e  "M u lt in a t io n a l Force in  |
Lebanon R e s o lu tio n ". 4
F in d ing s  and Purpose
S ec tio n  2. The Congress f in d s  th a t -  j
(1 ) th e  removal o f  a l l  fo re ig n  fo rc e s  from  Lebanon is  an e s s e n tia l U n ited  
S ta te s  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  o b je c t iv e  in  th e  M idd le  East;
(2 ) in  o rd e r to  re s to re  f u l l  c o n tro l by th e  government o f  Lebanon ove r i t s  
own t e r r i t o r y ,  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  is  c u r re n t ly  p a r t ic ip a t in g  in  the  
m u lt in a t io n a l peacekeeping fo rc e  (h e re a fte r  in  th e  re s o lu t io n  re fe r re d  to  as 
th e  "M u lt in a t io n a l Force in  Lebanon") which was e s ta b lis h e d  in  accordance 
w ith  th e  exchange o f  le t t e r s  between th e  governments o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  
and Lebanon dated September 25, 1982;
(3 ) th e  M u lt in a t io n a l fo rc e  in  Lebanon b e t te r  enables th e  government in  %
Lebanon to  e s ta b lis h  u n i ty ,  independence, and t e r r i t o r i a l  in t e g r i t y ;
(4 ) p rogress tow ard n a tio n a l p o l i t i c a l  r e c o n c i l ia t io n  in  Lebanon is  
necessary; and
(5 ) U n ited  S ta te s  Armed Forces p a r t ic ip a t in g  in  th e  M u lt in a t io n a l Force in  
Lebanon a re  now in  h o s t i l i t i e s  re q u ir in g  a u th o r is a t io n  o f  t h e i r  con tinued  
presence under th e  War Powers R e s o lu tio n .
(b ) The Congress determ ines th a t  th e  requ irem ents o f  s e c tio n  4 (a ) (1 )  o f  th e  
War Powers re s o lu t io n  became o p e ra tiv e  on August 29, 1983. C o n s is te n t w ith  
s e c tio n  5 (b ) o f  th e  War Powers R e s o lu tio n , th e  purpose o f  t h i s  j o i n t  
re s o lu t io n  is  to  a u th o r is e  th e  con tinued  p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f  U n ited  S ta tes  
Armed Forces in  th e  M u lt in a t io n a l Force in  Lebanon.
(c )  The Congress in te n d s  th e  j o i n t  re s o lu t io n  to  c o n s t i tu te  th e  necessary 
s p e c i f ic  s ta tu to r y  a u th o r is a t io n  under th e  War Powers R e so lu tio n  f o r  
con tinued  p a r t ic ip a t io n  by U n ited  S ta te s  Armed Forces in  th e  M u lt in a t io n a l 
Force in  Lebanon.
A u th o r is a tio n  f o r  Continued P a r t ic ip a t io n  o f  U n ited  S ta te s  Armed Forces in  
th e  M u lt in a t io n a l fo rc e  in  Lebanon
S ec tion  3. The P re s id e n t is  a u th o r is e d , f o r  purposes o f  s e c tio n  5 (b ) o f  th e  
War Powers R e so lu tio n  to  co n tin u e  p a r t ic ip a t io n  by U n ited  S ta te s  Armed
Forces in  th e  M u lt in a t io n a l Force in  Lebanon, s u b je c t t o  th e  p ro v is io n s  o f  
s e c tio n  6 o f  th e  j o i n t  re s o lu t io n .  Such p a r t ic ip a t io n  s h a ll be l im ite d  to  
perform ance o f  th e  fu n c t io n ,  and s h a ll be s u b je c t to  th e  l im ita t io n s ,  
s p e c if ie d  in  th e  agreeinent e s ta b lis h in g  th e  M u lt in a t io n a l Force in  Lebanon 
as s e t  f o r t h  in  th e  exchange o f  le t t e r s  between th e  governments o f  the  
U n ited  S ta te s  and Lebanon dated September 25 th , 1982, excep t th a t  t h i s  s h a ll 
n o t p rec lude  such p ro te c t iv e  measures as may be necessary to  ensure th e  
s a fe ty  o f  th e  M u lt in a t io n a l Force in  Lebanon.
Reports t o  th e  Congress
S ection  4 . As re q u ire d  by s e c tio n  4 (c )  o f  th e  War Powers R e s o lu tio n , th e  
P re s id e n t s h a ll re p o r t  p e r io d ic a l ly  t o  Congress w ith  re sp e c t to  th e  
s i tu a t io n  in  Lebanon, b u t in  no e ven t s h a ll he re p o r t  le s s  o fte n  than  once 
every  th re e  months. In  a d d it io n  t o  p ro v id in g  th e  in fo rm a tio n  re q u ire d  by 
th a t  s e c tio n  on th e  s ta tu s ,  scope, and d u ra t io n  o f  h o s t i l i t i e s  in v o lv in g  
U n ited  S ta te s  armed Forces, such re p o r ts  s h a ll d e sc rib e  in  d e t a i l -
(1 ) th e  a c t i v i t ie s  be ing  perform ed by th e  M u lt in a t io n a l Force in  Lebanon;
(2 ) th e  p re sen t com pos ition  o f  th e  M u lt in a t io n a l Force in  Lebanon, 
in c lu d in g  a d e s c r ip t io n  o f  th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  and deployment o f  th e  armed 
fo rc e s  o f  each p a r t ic ip a t in g  c o u n try ;
(3 ) th e  re s u lts  o f  th e  e f f o r t s  t o  reduce and e v e n tu a lly  e lim in a te  th e  
M u lt in a t io n a l Force in  Lebanon;
(4 ) how con tinued  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  th e  M u lt in a t io n a l Force in  Lebanon is  
advancing U n ited  S ta te s  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  in te re s ts  in  th e  M idd le  E ast; and
(5 ) what p rogress has occurred  tow ard n a tio n a l p o l i t i c a l  r e c o n c i l ia t io n  
among a l l  Lebanese groups.
S tatem ents o f  P o lic y
S ec tio n  5 (a ) The Congress d e c la re s  th a t  th e  p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f  th e  armed |
fo rc e s  o f  o th e r c o u n tr ie s  in  th e  M u lt in a t io n a l Force in  Lebanon is  e s s e n tia l 
to  m a in ta in  th e  in te rn a t io n a l c h a ra c te r o f  th e  peacekeeping fu n c t io n  in  
Lebanon.
(b ) The Congress b e lie v e s  t h a t  i t  shou ld  co n tin u e  to  be th e  p o l ic y  o f  th e  
U n ited  S ta te s  t o  promote c o n tin u in g  d iscu ss io n s  w ith  Is r a e l ,  S y r ia , and 
Lebanon, w ith  th e  o b je c t iv e  o f  b r in g in g  about th e  w ith d ra w l o f  a l l  fo re ig n  
tro o p s  from  Lebanon and e s ta b lis h in g  an environm ent which w i l l  p e rm it th e  
Lebanese Armed Forces to  c a r ry  o u t t h e i r  r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  in  th e  B e iru t  
area.
(c )  I t  is  th e  sense o f  th e  Congress th a t ,  n o t la te r  than  one year a f t e r  th e  
da te  o f  enactment o f  t h i s  j o i n t  re s o lu t io n  and a t  le a s t  once a year 
th e re a f te r ,  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  shou ld  d iscu ss  w ith  o th e r members o f  te h  4 
S e c u r ity  C ouncil o f  th e  U n ited  N a tions  th e  e s ta b lish m e n t o f  an U n ited  
N a tions peacekeeping fo rc e  to  assume th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  o f  the  
M u lt in a t io n a l Force in  Lebanon. An a n a ly s is  o f  th e  in rp lic a t io n s  o f  th e  
response to  such d iscu ss io n s  f o r  th  e c o n tin u a tio n  o f  th e  M u lt in a t io n a l Force 
in  Lebanon s h a ll be in c lu de d  in  th e  re p o r ts  re q u ire d  under paragraph (8 ) o f  
s e c tio n  4 o f  t h is  re s o lu t io n .
D u ra tion  o f  A u th o r is a t io n  f o r  U n ited  S ta te s  P a r t ic ip a t io n  in  th e  
M u lt in a t io n a l Force in  Lebanon
I
S ec tio n  6. The p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  Armed Forces in  th e  |
M u lt in a t io n a l Force in  Lebanon s h a ll be a u th o rise d  f o r  purposes o f  th e  War 
Powers R e so lu tio n  u n t i l  th e  end o f  th e  e ig h teen  month p e r io d  beg inn ing  on 
th e  da te  o f  enactment o f  t h i s  re s o lu t io n  un less Congress extends such 
a u th o r is a t io n ,  excep t th a t  such a u th o r is a t io n  s h a ll te rm in a te  sooner upon 
th e  occurrence  o f  any one o f  th e  fo l lo w in g :
4
(1 ) th e  w ithd raw ! o f  a l l  fo re ig n  fo rc e s  from  Lebanon, un less  th e  P re s id e n t 
de term ines and c e r t i f i e s  to  Congress th a t  con tinued  U n ited  S ta te s  Armed 
Forces p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  th e  M u lt in a t io n a l Force in  Lebanon is  re q u ire d  a f t e r  
such w ith d raw l in  o rd e r to  accom plish th e  purposes s p e c if ie d  in  th e  
September 25, 1982, exchange o f  le t t e r s  p ro v id in g  f o r  th e  e s ta b lish m e n t o f  
th e  M u lt in a t io n a l Force in  Lebanon; o r
(2 ) th e  assum ption o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  o r  th e  Government o f  Lebanon o f  th e  
r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  o f  th e  M u lt in a t io n a l Force in  Lebanon; i r
(3 ) th e  im p lem enta tion  o f  o th e r  e f fe c t iv e  s e c u r ity  arrangements in  th e  
a rea ; o r
(4 ) th e  w ith d raw l o f  a l l  o th e r  c o u n tr ie s  from  p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f  th e  
M u lt in a t io n a l Force in  Lebanon.
In te rp re ta t io n  o f  th e  R e so lu tio n
S ec tio n  7. (a ) N oth ing  in  t h i s  j o i n t  re s o lu t io n  s h a ll p rec lude  th e  P re s id e n t 
from  w ithd raw ing  U n ited  S ra te s  Forces p a r t ic ip a t in g  in  th e  M u lt in a t io n a l 
Force in  Lebanon i f  c ircum stances w a rra n t, and n o th in g  in  t h is  j o i n t  
re s o lu t io n  s h a ll p rec lude  th e  Congress by j o i n t  re s o lu t io n  from  d ire c t in g  
such a w ith d ra w a l.
(b ) N oth ing  in  t h is  j o i n t  re s o lu t io n  m o d if ie s , l im i t s  o r  supercedes any 
p ro v is io n  o f  th e  War Powers R e so lu tio n  o r  th e  requ irem ent o f  s e c tio n  4 (a ) o f  
th e  Lebanon Emergency A ss is tan ce  A c t o f  1983, re la t in g  to  th e  C ongressional 
a u th o r is a tio n  f o r  any su b s ta n c ia l expansion in  th e  number o r  ro le  o f  U n ited  
S ta te s  Armed Forces in  Lebanon.
Congressional P r io r i t y  Procedures f o r  Amendments
S ec tion  8. (a ) Any j o i n t  re s o lu t io n  o r  amendment in tro du ce d  to  amend o r  
repeal t h i s  A c t s h a ll be re fe r re d  to  th e  Committee on Fore ign  A f fa i r s  o f  th e  
House o f  R ep resen ta tives  o f  te h  Committee on Fore ign R e la tio n s  o f  te h  
Senate, as th e  case may be. Such j o i n t  re s o lu t io n  o r  b i l l  s h a l l be 
cons ide red  by such com m ittee w ith in  f i f t e e n  ca lende r days and may be 
re p o rte d  o u t,  to g e th e r w ith  i t s  recanm endations, un less  such House s h a ll 
o th e rw ise  dete rm ine  pe rsuan t to  i t s  ru le s .
(b ) Any j o i n t  re s o lu t io n  o r  b i l l  so re p o rte d  s h a ll become th e  pending 
business o f  th e  House in  q u e s tio n  ( in  th e  case o f  th e  Senate th e  tim e  f o r  
debate s h a ll be e q u a lly  d iv id e d  between th e  proponents and th e  opponents) 
and s h a ll be vo ted on w ith in  th re e  ca lende r days th e re a f te r ,  un less  such 
House s h a ll o th e rw ise  dete rm ine  by th e  yeas and nays.
(c )  Such a j o i n t  re s o lu t io n  o r  b i l l  passed by one House s h a ll be re fe r re d  
to  th e  com m ittee o f  th e  o th e r House named in  subsec tion  (a ) and s h a ll be 
re p o rte d  o u t by such com m ittee to g e th e r w ith  i t s  recommendations w ith in  
f i f t e e n  ca lende r days and s h a ll thereupon become th e  pending business o f  
such House and s h a ll be vo ted  upon w ith in  th re e  ca lende r days, un less such 
House s h a ll o th e rw ise  dete rm ine  by th e  yeas and nays.
(d ) In  th e  case o f  any d isagreem ent between th e  two Houses o f  Congress w ith  
re sp e c t t o  a j o i n t  re s o lu t io n  o r  b i l l  passed by both Houses, con fe rees s h a ll 
be p rom p tly  appo in ted  and th e  com m ittee o f  conference s h a ll make and f i l e  a 
re p o r t  w ith  re sp ec t to  such j o i n t  re s o lu t io n  w ith in  s ix  ca lende r days a f t e r  
th e  le g is la t io n  is  re fe r re d  t o  th e  com m ittee o f  con fe rence . N o tw ith s ta n d ing  
any ru le  in  e i th e r  House concern ing  th e  p r in t in g  o f  conference re p o r ts  in  
th e  Record o r  concern ing  any d e la y  in  th e  c o n s id e ra tio n  o f  such re p o r ts , 
such re p o r t  s h a l l be acted  on by both  Houses n o t la t e r  than  s ix  calended 
days a f t e r  th e  confe rence  re p o r t  is  f i l e d .  In  th e  even t th e  confe rees a re  
unable to  agree w ith in  f i r t y - e i g h t  hours, the y  s h a ll re p o r t  back to  t h e i r  
re s p e c tiv e  Houses in  d isagreem ent.
Approved O ctober 12, 1983.
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